Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 19STLC10602, Date: 2022-10-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STLC10602     Hearing Date: October 13, 2022    Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS:      MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

MOVING PARTY:   Plaintiff Maria Teresa Juarez-Rivera

RESP. PARTY:         Defendant Jesus Plascencia

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

(CCP § 1281.97, 1281.99)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Maria Teresa Juarez-Rivera’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $25,000 in attorney’s fees and $495.80 in costs.

SERVICE: 

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300)                 OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a)                                                 OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b))                     OK

OPPOSITION:          Filed on August 1, 2022.                                    [X] Late                       [   ] None

REPLY:                     None filed as of August 5, 2022.               [   ] Late                      [X] None

ANALYSIS:

I.                Background

On November 15, 2019, Plaintiff Maria Teresa Juarez-Rivera (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Jesus Plascencia dba PM Auto Sales (“Plascencia” or “Dealer”), Westlake Services, LLC dba Westlake Financial Services (“Westlake”), and Hudson Insurance Company (“Hudson”) (collectively “Defendants”) for (1) violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code § 1750 et seq.; (2) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq., Unlawful Acts or Practices; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) violation of Civil Code § 1632; and (5) claim against surety.  Defendants Hudson and Defendant Plascencia filed their Answers on January 3 and January 8, 2020, respectively.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration on January 2, 2020, which was granted by this Court on October 20, 2020.  (10-20-20 Minute Order.)  On February 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Lift Stay of the proceedings; Defendant filed an Opposition April 13, 2021.  At the April 27, 2021, status conference, the parties represented that arbitration could not be conducted, so the Court scheduled the matter for trial for March 14, 2022.  (4-27-21 Minute Order.)

On September 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint.  Hudson filed an Answer to the First Amended Complaint on October 19, 2021 and Plascencia filed an Answer on December 6, 2021, followed by Amended Answer on January 6, 2022.  Westlake filed an Answer on January 14, 2022.

On March 14, 2022, the Court was informed that the case had settled with two of the defendants and Plaintiff would be dismissing causes of action one through five (1-5) and only proceeding with the sixth cause of action for Violation of Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.97 and 1281.99.  (See 9-21-21 Amended Complaint, 3-14-22 Minute Order.)  Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal of Defendants Hudson and Westlake on May 4, 2022, and May 24, 2022, respectively.

On May 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Fees and Costs, in the amount of $37,901.65, against Defendant Plascencia.  Defendant Plascencia filed an Opposition on August 1, 2022, and served it on Plaintiff by overnight delivery.  (Opposition p. 33.)  No reply was filed.

On August 11, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees in the amount of $25,000 and continued the hearing to September 12, 2022, with regard to the issue of costs.        (8-11-22 Minute Order.)

On August 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed Declaration of Kasra Sadr in Support of the Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

II.              Legal Standard

Attorney’s fees may be recovered as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(10).)

“In an employment or consumer arbitration that requires, either expressly or through application of state or federal law or the rules of the arbitration provider, the drafting party to pay certain fees and costs before the arbitration can proceed, if the fees or costs to initiate an arbitration proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date the drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel arbitration under Section 1281.2..”  (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1281.97(a).)  “If the drafting party materially breaches the arbitration agreement and is in default under subdivision (a), the employer or consumer may do either of the following: (1) [w]ithdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction [or] (2) [c]ompel arbitration in which the drafting party shall pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs related to the arbitration.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1281.98(b)(1).)  “If the employee or consumer proceeds with an action in a court of appropriate jurisdiction, the court shall impose sanctions on the drafting party in accordance with Section 1281.99.”  (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1281.97(d).)

Under § 1281.99, “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction against a drafting party that materially breaches an arbitration agreement pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1281.97 … by ordering the drafting party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.”  (CCP § 1281.99(a).)  Other types of sanctions are also available, in addition to monetary sanctions.  (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1281.99(b).)

III.            Discussion

A.    Entitlement to Fees and Costs

On August 11, 2022, having considered Plaintiff’s Motion and Defendant’s Opposition to Motion, the Court determined that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.          (8-11-22 Minute Order, p. 5.)  The Court limited the award to attorney’s fees and costs incurred after January 1, 2020, the date on which the controlling statutes, Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1281.97-.98 (the “Statutes”) went into effect.  (Ibid.)

B.    Reasonableness

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.  A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.  (Id., at p. 48, fn. 23.)  After the trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the award so that it is a reasonable figure.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.)

As explained in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154:

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. . . . This approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” [Internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]

(Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140.)  “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  [Citations.]”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623624.)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations are required.  The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.  The court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided.  The starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].)  However, California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets.  (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103.)  An experienced trial judge is in a position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in his or her court.  (Id.; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.)

On August 11, 2022, the Court found $25,000 in attorney’s fees to be reasonable.                 (8-11-22 Minute Order, p. 8.)  The Court continued the hearing on the Motion in regard to costs to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to submit clarification on which costs were incurred after January 1, 2020, the date the Statues went into effect.  (Ibid.)

            On August 30, 2022, Plaintiff submitted Declaration of Kasra Sard in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.  The Declaration includes a copy of the firm’s billing of costs.  (8-30-22 Sadr Decl., Ex. 1.)  Plaintiff’s counsel states that Plaintiff has incurred $495.80 in costs as of January 6, 2021.  (Sadr Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. 1.)  The Court is unable to follow Plaintiff’s calculation.  However, having reviewed the attached billing statement, the Court finds these costs to be reasonable and grants Plaintiff’s request for costs in the amount of $495.80.

IV.           Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Maria Teresa Juarez-Rivera’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $25,000 in attorney’s fees and $495.80 in costs.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.