Judge Katherine Chilton, Case 20STLC02495 2022-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 20STLC02495, Date: 2022-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STLC02495 Hearing Date: September 19, 2022 Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff State Farm Automobile Insurance Company

RESP. PARTY: None

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

(CCP § 438, et seq.)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff State Farm’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED, without leave to amend.

SERVICE:

[ ] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK

[ ] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK

[ ] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK

OPPOSITION: None filed as of September 15, 2022 [ ] Late [X] None

REPLY: None filed as of September 15, 2022 [ ] Late [X] None

ANALYSIS:

I. Background

On March 13, 2020, Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants Angel Saucedo (“Saucedo”) and Luis Espino (“Espino”), (collectively, “Defendants”) for subrogation, stemming from an alleged automobile accident between Defendant Saucedo, on the one hand, and an individual insured by Plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy (“Insured”), on the other hand. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Defendant Espino is the alleged “registered owner, bailee or other person who gained possession and/or control of the vehicle.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff compensated Insured for claimed damages in the amount of $10,770.72 and filed the instant action against Defendants for allegedly causing the damages. (Ibid. pp. 2-3.)

On August 24, 2020, Defendants filed a joint Answer to the Complaint, generally and specifically denying all allegations in the Complaint.

On April 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Deem Requests for Admission, Set One, Admitted as to Defendant Saucedo. On April 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Deem Requests for Admission, Set One, Admitted as to Defendant Espino. The Court granted the Motion against Defendant Saucedo on June 22, 2021, and the Motion against Defendant Espino on June 24, 2021. (6-22-21 Minute Order; 6-24-21 Minute Order.)

On September 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed a conditional Notice of Settlement of Entire Case. However, at the April 21, 2022, hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel informed the Court that settlement was not reached, so the matter was once again set for trial. (4-21-22 Minute Order.)

On June 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the “Motion”) and Request for Judicial Notice. The Notice of the Motion indicates that “Plaintiff hereby submits this motion on the moving papers pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1304(c) and will not appear at the hearing in open court.” (Mot. p. 2.)

No opposition has been filed.

On August 19, 2022, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the Motion to September 19, 2022, and continued the trial date to November 2, 2022. (8-19-22 Minute Order.)

II. Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents:

1. Defendants Saucedo’s and Espino’s Answer to the Complaint, Exhibit 1;

2. Plaintiff’s Motions to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted as to each Defendant, Exhibit 2;

3. This Court’s orders granting Plaintiff’s Motions to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted as to each Defendant, on June 22, 2021, and June 24, 2021, Exhibit 3.

According to Evidence Code § 452, the Court may take judicial notice of matters that include records or rules of another court and facts or propositions of common knowledge, among other matters. Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of the orders and documents filed in the instant case. Although it is not necessary to take judicial notice of these documents, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice.

III. Legal Standard

The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322, citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) Matters which are subject to mandatory judicial notice may be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered without notice to the parties. Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice must be specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points and authorities, or as the court otherwise permits. (Id.) “The motion is confined to the face of the pleading under attack and all facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true.” (Hightower v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 853, 858.)

A plaintiff may move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that “the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(c)(1)(A).

Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure § 439(a) states that “before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” The moving party “shall file and serve with the motion for judgment on the pleadings a declaration” that either states that a meeting took place or that the non-moving party did not respond to the request. Although a determination that the meet and confer process was insufficient is not grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings, that does not mean the requirement can be wholly ignored. (Code. Civ. Proc. § 439(a)(4).

IV. Discussion

A. Meet and Confer Requirement

Plaintiff’s counsel states that on April 25, 2022, prior to filing the instant Motion, he sent a meet and confer letter to Defendants’ counsel. (Espinosa Decl. p. 1; Ex. 1.) As of the date of the Motion, Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s request to meet and confer. The Court finds that Plaintiff has met the requirement to attempt a meet and confer with Defendants.

B. Merits

Plaintiff, an insurer, asserts a single cause of action seeking to recover damages of $10,770.72 arising from an alleged motor vehicle accident that occurred on or about April 2, 2019, between Plaintiff’s Insured and Defendant Saucedo. (See Compl.) Defendant Espino is the alleged “registered owner, bailee or other person who gained possession and/or control of the vehicle” and provided express or implied permission to Defendant Saucedo to operate the vehicle. (Ibid. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that it investigated Insured’s claim, determined the claim was covered, and paid Insured $10,770.72 for the loss. (Id. at ¶ 8.)

“There are eight elements of an insurer's cause of action for equitable subrogation: ‘[1] the insured suffered a loss for which the defendant is liable, either as the wrongdoer whose act or omission caused the loss or because the defendant is legally responsible to the insured for the loss caused by the wrongdoer; [2] the claimed loss was one for which the insurer was not primarily liable; [3] the insurer has compensated the insured in whole or in part for the same loss for which the defendant is primarily liable; [4] the insurer has paid the claim of its insured to protect its own interest and not as a volunteer; [5] the insured has an existing, assignable cause of action against the defendant which the insured could have asserted for its own benefit had it not been compensated for its loss by the insurer; [6] the insurer has suffered damages caused by the act or omission upon which the liability of the defendant depends; [7] justice requires that the loss be entirely shifted from the insurer to the defendant, whose equitable position is inferior to that of the insurer; and [8] the insurer's damages are in a liquidated sum, generally the amount paid to the insured.’ [Citation.]” (Pulte Home Corporation v. CBR Electric, Inc. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 216, 229.) (Italics in original.)

The Requests for Admission deemed admitted against Defendant Saucedo contradict any denial in his Answer. Specifically, the admissions admit that (1) Defendant Saucedo was driving a motor vehicle at the time of the incident; (2) he was driving the vehicle “with LUIS ESPINO’s express or implied permission;” (3) “LUIS ESPINO was the registered owner of the motor vehicle” he was driving at the time of the incident; (4) Defendant Saucedo “failed to drive with reasonable care;” (5) Defendant Saucedo was “the sole cause of the COLLISION with the INSURED;” (6) he “caused the VEHICLE to be involved in a COLLISION;” (7) as a result of the collision, the Insured incurred damages (8) “of at least $10,770.72;” (9) “plaintiff as the insurer for the INSURED has been damaged in the amount of at least $10,770.72, the amount which it paid its INSURED on the claim its INSURED made for his/her losses arising from INCIDENT plus any other uncovered losses the INSURED suffered and assigned to plaintiff;” and (10) “the affirmative defenses [Defendant Saucedo] asserted in this matter lack merit and evidentiary support.” (4-15-21 Pleasant Decl. – Ex. A; 6-22-21 Minute Order.)

The Requests for Admission deemed admitted against Defendant Espino contradict the general denial in his Answer. Specifically, the admissions admit that (1) on April 2, 2019, Defendant Espino was the registered owner of the vehicle involved in the collision; (2) “ANGEL SAUCEDO was driving the VEHICLE with [Espino’s] permission” at the time of the incident; (3) Defendant Espino “failed to exercise reasonable care by permitting ANGEL SAUCEDO to drive the VEHICLE;” (4) Defendant Espino’s “failure to exercise ordinary care in permitting ANGEL SAUCEDO to drive the VEHICLE was a substantial factor in causing the COLLISION;” (5) “the COLLISION caused the INSURED to incur damages;” (6) “of at least $10,770.72;” and thus, (7) “plaintiff as the insurer for the INSURED has been damaged in the amount of at least $10,770.72, the amount which it paid its INSURED on the claim its INSURED made for his/her losses arising from INCIDENT plus any other uncovered losses the INSURED suffered and assigned to plaintiff;” and (8) “affirmative defenses [Defendant Espino has] asserted in this matter lack merit and evidentiary support.” (4-16-21 Pleasant Decl. – Ex. A; 6-24-21 Minute Order.)

By this Motion, Plaintiff has demonstrated that the Complaint properly pleads a subrogation cause of action, and that Defendants made several judicial admissions by way of the admitted Requests for Admission. The admissions establish the facts upon which Plaintiff bases its Complaint and Defendants have not opposed this Motion to demonstrate otherwise.

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED.

C. Leave to Amend

After a judgment on the pleadings is granted, the same standards apply in granting leave to amend as for demurrers and leave is routinely granted. (See CCP §438(h); Virginia G. v. ABC Unified Sch. Dist. (1993) 15 Cal. App. 4th 1848, 1852 [holding that when a motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion if the pleading does not show on its face that it is incapable of amendment].) In case of a demurrer, the Court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318). When a plaintiff “has pleaded the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based,” the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not “be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars.” (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.) Accordingly, California law imposes the burden on the plaintiffs to demonstrate the manner in which they can amend their pleadings to state their claims against a defendant. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

If leave to amend is granted, the party against whom the motion is granted must be given 30 days to file an amended pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(h)(2).)

Here, Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission and have not filed any response to the instant Motion to show that there is a reasonable possibility that an amendment to the pleading will cure the defect. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted without leave to amend.

V. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff State Farm’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED, without leave to amend.

Moving party is ordered to give notice and file a proposed judgment along with a memorandum of costs within ten (10) days of this order.