Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 20STLC10232, Date: 2023-04-12 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STLC10232 Hearing Date: April 12, 2023 Dept: 25
PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff State Farm
Automobile Insurance Co.
RESP. PARTY: Defendants Efrain Garcia, Julio Efrain Garcia
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
(CCP § 438, et seq.)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff
State Farm’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED, without leave to
amend.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice and file a proposed judgment along with a
memorandum of costs within ten (10) days of this order.
SERVICE:
[ ] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule
3.1300) OK
[ ] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK
[ ] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c,
1005(b)) OK
OPPOSITION: Filed
on March 24, 2023. [ ]
Late [ ] None
REPLY: Filed
on April 3, 2023. [ ]
Late [ ] None
ANALYSIS:
I.
Background
On December 8, 2020, Plaintiff
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint
against Defendants Efrain Garcia, aka Efrain Gabriel Menchugarcia (“Efrain”)
and Julio Efrain Garcia (“Julio”), (collectively “Defendants”), for subrogation,
stemming from an automobile accident between Defendant Efrain and an individual
insured by Plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy. (Compl. ¶ 6.)
Defendant
Julio is the alleged “registered owner, bailee or other person who gained
possession and/or control of the vehicle.”
(Ibid.) Plaintiff
compensated Insured for claimed damages in the amount of $19,219.62 and filed
the instant claim against Defendants for allegedly causing the damages. (Ibid. pp. 2-3.)
On October 12, 2021, Defendants filed a
joint Answer to the Complaint.
On April 18, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to
Deem Requests for Admission Admitted as to Defendants Efrain and Julio and
granted Plaintiff’s request for sanctions in the amount of $460.00. (4-18-22 Minute Order.)
On June 7, 2022, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the
Court continued Non-Jury Trial to March 14, 2023. (6-7-22 Minute Order.)
On January 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (“Motion”) and Request for Judicial Notice. Plaintiff notes that the Motion is submitted on the moving
papers, and it will not appear at the hearing.
(Mot. p. 2.)
On March 24, 2023, Defendants filed an Opposition to the
Motion and on April 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Reply to the Opposition.
On
February 27, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application to
Continue Trial and continued the trial date to May 2, 2023. (2-27-23 Minute Order.)
II.
Request for
Judicial Notice
Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the
following documents:
1.
Defendants’ Answer the
Complaint, Exhibit 1;
2.
Plaintiff’s Motion to
Deem Requests for Admission Admitted, Exhibit 2;
3.
This Court’s order
granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted, on April
18, 2022, Exhibit 3.
According to Evidence Code § 452,
the Court may take judicial notice of matters that include records or rules of
another court and facts or propositions of common knowledge, among other
matters. Although it is not necessary to
take judicial notice of documents in the instant case, the Court GRANTS
Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice of Exhibits 1-3.
III.
Legal Standard
The standard for ruling on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a
general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with
matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322, citing Schabarum
v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) Matters which are subject to mandatory
judicial notice may be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered
without notice to the parties. Matters which are subject to permissive judicial
notice must be specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points and
authorities, or as the court otherwise permits. (Id.)
“The motion is confined to the face of
the pleading under attack and all facts alleged in the complaint must be
accepted as true.” (Hightower v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 853, 858.)
A plaintiff may move for judgment
on the pleadings on the ground that “the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendant and the answer does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(c)(1)(A).
Additionally, Code of Civil
Procedure § 439(a) states that “before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by
telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion
for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement
can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment
on the pleadings.” The moving party
“shall file and serve with the motion for judgment on the pleadings a
declaration” that either states that a meeting took place or that the
non-moving party did not respond to the request. Although
a determination that the meet and confer process was insufficient is not
grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings, that does not
mean the requirement can be wholly ignored.
(Code. Civ. Proc. § 439(a)(4).
IV.
Discussion
A.
Meet and Confer Requirement
Plaintiff’s counsel states that on November
9, 2022, prior to filing the instant Motion, he sent a meet and confer letter
to defense counsel. (Anderson Decl. ¶ 1;
Ex. 1.) Defense counsel did not respond
to the letter. (Ibid. at ¶ 2.)
The Court finds that the parties
have satisfied the requirement to meet and confer.
B.
Merits
Plaintiff, an insurer, asserts a single cause of action
seeking to recover damages of $19,219.62 arising from an alleged motor vehicle
accident that occurred on or about September 7, 2019, between Plaintiff’s
insured and Defendant Efrain, as the driver of the vehicle involved. (Compl. pp. 1-3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Julio was
the registered owner of the vehicle that was involved in the accident with
Plaintiff’s insured and that Defendant Efrain was driving the vehicle with the
express or implied permission of Defendant Julio. (Ibid. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges it investigated its
insured’s claim, determined the claim was covered, and paid its insured $19,219.62 for the loss. (Id. at ¶ 8.)
“There are eight elements of an insurer's
cause of action for equitable subrogation: ‘[1] the insured suffered a loss for which the defendant is liable, either as the wrongdoer whose act or omission caused the loss or because the defendant is legally responsible to the insured for the loss caused by the wrongdoer; [2]
the claimed loss was one for which the insurer was not
primarily liable; [3] the
insurer has compensated the insured in whole or in part for the same loss for
which the defendant is primarily liable; [4] the insurer has paid the claim of
its insured to protect its own interest and not as a volunteer; [5] the insured
has an existing, assignable cause of action against the defendant which the
insured could have asserted for its own benefit had it not been compensated for
its loss by the insurer; [6] the insurer has suffered damages caused by the act
or omission upon which the liability of the defendant depends; [7] justice
requires that the loss be entirely shifted from the insurer to the defendant,
whose equitable position is inferior to that of the insurer; and [8] the insurer's
damages are in a liquidated sum, generally the amount paid to the insured.’ [Citation.]” (Pulte Home Corporation v. CBR
Electric, Inc. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 216, 229.) (Italics in original.)
The Requests for Admission deemed
admitted against Defendant Efrain contradict any denial in his Answer. Specifically, the admissions admit (1) that
Defendant Efrain was driving a motor vehicle at the time of the incident; (2)
he was driving the vehicle “with JULIO EFRAIN GARCIA’s express or implied
permission;” (3) “JULIO EFRAIN GARCIA was the registered owner of the motor
vehicle” he was driving at the time of the incident; (4) Defendant Efrain
“failed to drive with reasonable care;” (5) that he was “the sole cause of the COLLISION
with the INSURED;” (6) that he “caused the VEHICLE to be involved in a COLLISION;”
(7) as a result of the collision, the Insured incurred damages (8) “of at least
$19,219.62;” (9) that the insurer “has been damaged in the amount of at least $19,219.62,
the amount which it paid its INSURED on the claim its INSURED made for his/her
losses arising from INCIDENT plus any other uncovered losses the INSURED
suffered and assigned to plaintiff;” and (10) “that the affirmative defenses
[Defendant Efrain] asserted in this matter lack merit and evidentiary support.”
(3-15-22 Anderson Decl. – Ex. A; 4-18-22
Minute Order.)
The Requests for Admission deemed
admitted against Defendant Julio contradict any denial in his Answer. Specifically, the admissions admit that (1) on
September 7, 2019, Defendant Julio was the registered owner of the vehicle
involved in the collision; (2) “EFRAIN GARCIA was driving the vehicle with [Defendant
Julio’s] permission;” (3) Defendant Julio “failed to exercise reasonable care
by permitting EFRAIN GARCIA to drive the VEHICLE;” (4) Defendant Julio’s
“failure to exercise ordinary care in permitting EFRAIN GARCIA to drive the VEHICLE
was a substantial factor in causing the COLLISION;” (5) “the COLLISION caused
the INSURED to incur damages;” (6) “of at least $19,219.62” and (7) “plaintiff
as the insurer for the INSURED has been damaged in the amount of at least $19,219.62,
the amount which it paid its INSURED on the claim its INSURED made for his/her
losses arising from INCIDENT plus any other uncovered losses the INSURED suffered
and assigned to plaintiff.” (3-15-22
Anderson Decl. – Ex. A; 4-18-22 Minute Order.) Finally, (8) “affirmative
defenses [Defendant Julio has] asserted in this matter lack merit and
evidentiary support.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff
argues it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because these admissions “remove
any issue raised by Defendants…under a general denial or any affirmative
defenses raised in the attached answer.”
(Memorandum p. 3.)
Defense counsel has submitted an
Opposition to the Motion. He states that
he was assigned to defend the lawsuit by Defendants’ insurance company, Viking
Insurance Company, on or around February 2, 2021. (Hummel Decl. ¶ 3.) In order to avoid default, defense counsel
filed an Answer on behalf of Defendants, while simultaneously attempting to
locate them with the help of an investigator.
(Ibid. at ¶¶ 4-8, 13.) As
he was unable to locate Defendants, he could not obtain verification for the
responses to the requests for admission.
(Ibid. at ¶ 9.) Defense
counsel states that he believes neither Defendant is aware of the instant proceedings. (Ibid. at ¶ 10.) He also responded to Plaintiff’s counsel’s
meet and confer letter on December 21, 2022, and offered to settle the matter for
$4,826.92, the amount available under Defendants’ insurance policy. (Ibid. at ¶ 14.)
Defense counsel argues that granting
the Motion would “not be equitable and not fair” because Defendants cannot be
located by Plaintiff or defense counsel and do not have knowledge of the
litigation. (Oppos. p. 3.) Defense counsel cites to Brigante v. Huang
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1569, in which the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court’s order of summary judgment against Defendant, whose
whereabouts were unknown during the litigation.
(Brigante, 20 Cal.App.4th 1569.) The case was remanded for the trial court to exercise
its discretion in issuing a protective order or another alternative to ordering
requests for admission admitted. (Brigante,
20 Cal.App.4th at 1588-89.) The Court noted that it did “not intend to
instruct the court on how to exercise its discretion; we require only that it
be exercised.” (Ibid.)
In its
Reply, Plaintiff argues that “Defendants’ failure to participate in
resolution of the case necessitates the need for this dispositive motion” and
“Defendants’ non-compliance with discovery statutes and non-participation in
the litigation process does not justify denying Plaintiff’s instant
Motion.” (Reply – Anderson Decl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff states that the instant case is
distinguishable from Brigante because of Brigante’s excessive
demands for damages in the amount of $500,000 that were difficult to
ascertain. (Reply p. 2.) Here, the damages requested in the amount of
$19,219.62 entirely consist of special damages for total loss of value of
vehicle, rental car expenses, insured’s deductive, out of pocket expenses, and
auction expenses, minus salvage amount collected. (Ibid.; Anderson Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. A.) Moreover, unlike the court in Brigante,
the Court, in the instant case, exercised its discretion in deeming the RFAs admitted. (Reply p. 2; Anderson Decl. ¶ 6.)
First, the Court finds that on
April 18, 2022, the Court did exercise its discretion in finding it proper to
grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Request for Admissions Admitted. (4-18-22 Minute Order.) Defense counsel had not filed an opposition
to the Motion indicating that the whereabouts of Defendants were unknown and,
the Court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.280, had the authority to
grant the Motion. Had Defendants’ counsel informed the Court in an opposition
that it could not locate Defendants, the Court could have considered alternatives
to ordering the requests deemed admitted.
Second, with respect to the instant
Motion, Plaintiff has demonstrated
that the Complaint properly pleads a subrogation cause of action, and that
Defendants made several judicial admissions by way of the admitted Requests for
Admission. The admissions establish the
facts upon which Plaintiff bases its Complaint.
Accordingly, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
GRANTED.
C.
Leave to Amend
After a judgment on the pleadings is granted, the same
standards apply in granting leave to amend as for demurrers and leave is
routinely granted. (See CCP §438(h); Virginia G. v. ABC
Unified Sch. Dist. (1993) 15 Cal. App. 4th 1848, 1852 [holding that
when a motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, denial of leave to
amend constitutes an abuse of discretion if the pleading does not show on its
face that it is incapable of amendment].)
In case of a demurrer, the Court determines whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318). When a plaintiff “has pleaded
the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based,” the court
should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since
plaintiff should not “be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the
ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars.” (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152
Cal.App.2d 892, 900.) Accordingly, California law imposes the burden on the
plaintiffs to demonstrate the manner in which they can amend their pleadings to
state their claims against a defendant.
(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)
If leave to amend is granted, the party against whom the
motion is granted must be given 30 days to file an amended pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(h)(2).)
Here, Defendants did not respond to
Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission and currently, cannot be located. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings is granted without leave to amend.
V.
Conclusion & Order
For
the foregoing reasons,
Plaintiff
State Farm’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED, without leave to
amend.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice and file a proposed judgment along with a
memorandum of costs within ten (10) days of this order.