Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 21STCP03152, Date: 2022-08-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCP03152 Hearing Date: August 4, 2022 Dept: 25
PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
MOVING PARTY: Petitioners
Michael Tamola and Anita Schillhorn
RESP. PARTY: None
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
(Civ. Code § 8488)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Petitioners Michael Tamola and Anita Schillhorn’s Motion
for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $3,000.00.
SERVICE:
[X] Proof of
Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) YES
[X]
Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) YES
[X]
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) YES
OPPOSITION: None filed as of August 2,
2022 [ ] Late [X]
None
REPLY: None filed as
of August 2, 2022 [ ] Late [X] None
ANALYSIS:
I.
Background
On September 23, 2021, Petitioners Michael Tamola
(“Tamola”) and Anita Schillhorn (“Schillhorn”) (“Petitioners”) filed the
instant verified Petition for Decree to Release Property from Mechanic’s Lien
(the “Petition”) against Respondent Vu Pham aka Vu Hoang Pham (“Respondent”).
The Petition seeks an order releasing property commonly known as 3676 Via
Dolce, Marina Del Rey, CA 90292, erroneously designated as 3676 S. Via Dolce,
Marina Del Rey, California 90292 (the “Subject Property”) from a mechanic’s
lien filed on December 28, 2020, by Respondent. (Pet. ¶ 1.)
On March 29, 2022, the Court granted
the Petition and ruled that “[a]ttorney’s fees under Civil Code section 8488
may be sought pursuant to a noticed motion.”
(3-29-22 Minute Order.)
On May 5, 2022, Petitioners filed
the instant Motion for Determination of Prevailing Party Status and Attorney’s
Fees in the sum of $3,000.
No opposition was filed.
II.
Legal
Standard
A prevailing party is entitled to
recover costs as a matter of right.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1032(a)(4).)
Attorney’s fees may be recovered as costs when authorized by contract,
statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., §
1033.5(a)(10).)
Civil Code section 8488(c) allows
for the prevailing party in a petition to release property from a mechanic’s
lien to recover its reasonable attorney’s fees.
“A notice of motion to claim
attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in
the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a
notice of appeal under . . . rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1702(b)(1).) In a limited civil case,
a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of 30 days after
service of a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or 90 days after
the entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.822(a)(1).)
The fee setting inquiry in
California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of
hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. A computation of time spent on a case and the
reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an
appropriate attorneys’ fee award. The
lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, in
order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d
25, 49.) Such an approach anchors the
trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the
attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id., at p. 48, fn. 23.) After the trial court has performed the
lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated
under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount
and, if so, shall reduce the award so that it is a reasonable figure. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22
Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.)
As explained in Graciano v.
Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154:
“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal
services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors
including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to
which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys,
(4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of such
adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.
In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation
involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying
augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market
rate for such services. . . . This approach anchors the trial court's analysis
to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring
that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” [Internal citations and internal
quotation marks omitted.]
(Graciano v. Robinson Ford
Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140.) “It is well established that the determination
of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of
the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse
of discretion. [Citations.] The value of
legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its
own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after
consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation,
its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the
skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other
circumstances in the case. [Citations.]”
(Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64
Cal.App.3d 618, 623624.)
No specific findings reflecting
the court’s calculations are required.
The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according
to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.
The court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee
award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services
provided. The starting point for this
determination is the attorney’s time records.
(Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ.
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to
credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].) However, California case law permits fee
awards in the absence of detailed time sheets. (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th
1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th
99, 103.) An experienced trial judge is
in a position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in his
or her court. (Id.; Serrano v.
Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.)
III.
Discussion
Petitioners’ Motion is timely as no “notice of entry of
judgment” was served and the Motion was filed on May 5, 2022, within 90 days of
the Court’s April 7, 2022, signed Order.
(4-7-22 Order.)
Code of Civil Procedure § 1032(a)(4) states that in
situations where there was no net monetary recovery, “the ‘prevailing’ party
shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court,
in its discretion may allow costs or not…”
The Court determines that Petitioners are the prevailing party in the
instant action because their Petition to Release Property from Mechanic’s Lien
was granted. (3-29-22 Minute
Order.) Thus, Petitioners are entitled
to reasonable attorney’s fees.
Petitioners seek $3,000.00 in attorney’s fees. (Mot. p. 1.)
Petitioner’s Counsel contends that his hourly rate is $500.00 per hour
based on his extensive experience; however, he was hired to represent
Petitioners in the instant case for a flat fee of $3,000.00. (Lovett Decl. ¶ 4.) As part of representation, Counsel lists the
following tasks in his Declaration:
1. Drafted letter to respondent
prior to filing the Petition.
2. Drafted original petition, filed
on September 23, 2021.
3. Arranged for service on
respondent.
4. Obtained copy of grant deed.
5. Reviewed February 16, 2022,
tentative ruling.
6. Prepared first amended petition.
7. Attended two hearings via L.A.
Court Connect.
8. Spoke with respondent’s attorney.
9. Prepared April 7, 2022, Order to
be signed by the Court.
10. Ordered certified copy of Order.
11. Prepared instant Motion.
Ibid. at ¶ 5.) Counsel
also anticipates “spending some additional time reading the Court’s tentative
ruling on this motion and appearing at the hearing.” (Ibid.)
The Court finds Counsel’s request for
attorney’s fees to be reasonable.
IV.
Conclusion
& Order
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners Michael Tamola and
Anita Schillhorn’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $3,000.00.
Moving parties are ordered to give
notice.