Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 21STCP04047, Date: 2023-05-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCP04047     Hearing Date: May 17, 2023    Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS:      MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

MOVING PARTY:   Plaintiff/Creditor Copper Ranch Community Association

RESP. PARTY:         None

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

(CCP § 685.040)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff/Creditor Copper Ranch Community Association’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED for attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,000.00 and costs in the amount of $760.32 for a total of $3,760.32.

SERVICE: 

[   ] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300)                 OK

[   ] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a)                                                 OK

[   ] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b))                     OK

OPPOSITION:          None filed as of May 15, 2023.               [   ] Late                      [X] None

REPLY:                     None filed as of May 15, 2023.               [   ] Late                      [X] None

ANALYSIS:

I.                Background

On December 10, 2021, this Court entered as Judgment sister-state Judgments from the Highland Justice Court in Gilbert, Arizona and the Maricopa County Superior Court, Arizona, in favor of Copper Ranch Community (“Plaintiff” or “Creditor”) and against Joseph A. Valadez and Stephanie Valadez, a marital community (“Defendants” or “Debtors”).

On October 14, 2022, based on Creditor’s request, the Court dismissed Defendant/Debtor Stephanie Valadez without prejudice.  (6-28-22 Request for Dismissal.)

Creditor filed a Writ of Execution and Memorandum of Costs After Judgment, Acknowledgment of Credit, and Declaration of Accrued Interest on November 10, 2022.

On January 18, 2023, Creditor filed the instant Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, requesting “an award of at least $4,755.32 in Attorneys’ Fees and Costs incurred post-judgment.”  (Mot. p. 1.)

No opposition has been filed.

II.              Request for Judicial Notice

Judgment Creditor requests that the Court take judicial notice of:

(1)   Exhibit 1 - Relevant portions of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements for Copper Ranch, recorded in the Maricopa County, Arizona Recorder’s Office on June 12, 2007, as Instrument No. 20070681667.

(2)   Exhibit 2 –Judgment entered in the Highland Justice Court, County of Maricopa, State of Arizona, entitled Copper Ranch Community Association v. Joseph A. Valadez and Stephanie Valadez, Case No. TJ2016-004368;

(3)    Exhibit 3 - Notice of Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment entered in the instant action.

(Mot., RJN Exs. 1-3.)

Judgment Creditor’s request is GRANTED.  (Evid. Code., § 452(c), (d).)

III.            Legal Standard

A prevailing party in entitled to recover costs, including attorney’s fees, as a matter of right.  (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032(a)(4), 1032(b), 1033.5.)  Attorney’s fees are allowable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(10).)

“The judgment creditor is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment.  Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law.  Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as costs collectible under this title if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney’s fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.040.)

“The judgment creditor may claim costs authorized by Section 685.040 by noticed motion.  The motion shall be made before the judgment is satisfied in full, but not later than two years after the costs have been incurred.  The costs claimed under this section may include, but are not limited to, costs that may be claimed under Section 685.070 and costs incurred but not approved by the court or referee in a proceeding under Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 708.010) of Division 2.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.080(a).)

“The notice of motion shall describe the costs claimed, shall state their amount, and shall be supported by an affidavit of a person who has knowledge of the facts stating that to the person’s best knowledge and belief the costs are correct, are reasonable and necessary, and have not been satisfied.  The notice of motion shall be served on the judgment debtor.  Service shall be made personally or by mail.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.080(b).)

The calculation of attorney’s fees in California begins with the “lodestar” method – multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.  (Ibid. at p. 48, fn. 23.)  After the trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.)

As explained in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.:

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]  The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. . . . This approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” [Internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]

((2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)  “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  [Citations.]”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations are required.  The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.  The court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided.  The starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].)  However, California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets. (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103.)  An experienced trial judge is in a position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in his or her court.  (Ibid.; Serrano, 20 Cal.3d 25 at 49.)

IV.           Discussion

A.    Proof of Service

Plaintiff/Creditor has filed Proof of Service indicating that Defendant/Debtor was served with the moving papers by mail on January 18, 2023.  (1-18-23 Proof of Service.)  The Court finds that Defendant/Debtor was properly served.

B.    Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff/Creditor seeks “an award of at least $4,755.32 in Attorneys’ Fees and Costs incurred post-judgment.”  (Mot. p. 1.)

The Court finds that Creditor is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements, Articles 6, Section 6.1.1, and the sister-state Judgments which awarded attorney’s fees and costs.  (RJN, Exs. 1-2.)

Creditor supports its request with a declaration of its counsel.  (See Baillio Decl.)  Creditor states that its Motion is timely because the Judgment has not been satisfied.  (Baillio Decl. ¶ 4.)  Furthermore, Creditor is requesting fees and costs incurred between August 2, 2021, and January 9, 2023.  (Ibid. at ¶ 12; Mot. p. 6.)

Creditor argues that the attorney’s fees and costs requested are “reasonable and necessary” since the attorneys in this case provided extensive legal services to pursue collection of the Judgment.  (Mot. p. 6.)  Creditor’s attorneys had to “(i) domesticate the Arizona Judgment to California; (ii) serve notice of entry of judgment, (iii) draft a notice of change of firm and change of address for plaintiff’s attorney; (iv) draft memorandum of costs after judgment; (v) obtain a writ of execution, a wage garnishment, and a bank levy; and (vi) draft this Motion.”  (Baillio Decl. ¶ 5.)

To preserve costs, the following attorneys, with extensive experience in collections cases, worked on the case –Kristopher L. Amundsen, Garren R. Laymon, and Austin Baillio.  (Baillio Decl. ¶ 6.)  Counsel Amundsen’s hourly rate was $275 per hour before January 1, 2022, and $300 per hour thereafter, Mr. Laymon’s billing rate is $325 per hour, and Mr. Baillio’s hourly rate “was $325.00 per hour and then, after January 1, 2023, $375.00 per hour.”  (Ibid.)  These rates are commensurate with those of other attorneys with similar levels of experience and specialization.  (Ibid. at ¶¶ 6, 10.)

            Between August 2, 2021, and January 9, 2023, Counsel Amundsen spent 1.7 hours and billed a total of $470.00.  (Ibid. at ¶ 7.)  Counsel Laymon spent 0.3 hours and billed a total of $97.50.  (Ibid. at ¶ 8.)  Counsel Baillio spent 2.5 hours in collection efforts and charged three flat fees of $450 for two writs of execution and two earnings withholding orders, and one flat fee of $250 for anticipated cost of drafting notice of satisfaction, for a total amount of $2,405.  (Ibid. at ¶ 9.)  The firm’s paralegal, Kristine McDonald, spent 0.4 hours assisting with the collection efforts, billed at a rate of $150, for a total of $60.  (Ibid. at ¶ 12.)

Moreover, Counsel Baillio spent 1.5 hours, at a rate of $375.00 per hour, drafting the instant Motion and accompanying papers and anticipates spending another 0.4 hours to attend the hearing on the Motion.  (Ibid. at ¶ 13.)  In total, Creditor requests $3,995.00 in attorney’s fees, expended between August 2, 2021, and January 9, 2023.  (Ibid. at ¶ 14.)  Counsel Baillio has attached an itemized billing statement demonstrating the legal work performed for Creditor in pursuit of collecting the Judgment.  (Ibid. at ¶ 15, Ex. A.)

The Court reviews counsel’s billing statement for tasks billed between August 2, 2021, and January 9, 2023, in pursuit of enforcing the Judgment.  (Ibid.; Ex. A.)  The Court considers factors such as counsel’s expertise, number of hours expended on each task, and whether each task was expended in pursuit of the Judgment.  The Court finds that Creditor’s request for $3,995 is slightly excessive.  For example, the instant Motion, regularly drafted by Counsel, does not warrant 1.5 hours of attorney time at a billing rate of $375.00.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds a reduced amount of $3,000.00 in attorney’s fees to be reasonable.

C.    Costs

Code of Civil Procedure § 685.070(b) states: “Before the judgment is fully satisfied but not later than two years after the costs have been incurred, the judgment creditor claiming costs under this section shall file a memorandum of costs with the court clerk and serve a copy on the judgment debtor. Service shall be made personally or by mail. The memorandum of costs shall be executed under oath by a person who has knowledge of the facts and shall state that to the person's best knowledge and belief the costs are correct, are reasonable and necessary, and have not been satisfied.”

Code of Civil Procedure 685.080(b) requires that: “The notice of motion shall describe the costs claimed, shall state their amount, and shall be supported by an affidavit of a person who has knowledge of the facts stating that to the person's best knowledge and belief the costs are correct, are reasonable and necessary, and have not been satisfied. The notice of motion shall be served on the judgment debtor. Service shall be made personally or by mail.”

Creditor requests costs in the amount of $760.32 through a noticed motion.  The request includes “electronic monitoring fees, filing fees, service fees, sheriff's fees, fees for writs of execution and wage garnishment orders, and background research fees.”  (Mot. p. 8; Baillio Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. A.) 

The Court finds Creditor’s request for costs to be reasonable and grants the request in the amount of $760.32.

V.             Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons,

Plaintiff/Creditor Copper Ranch Community Association’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED for attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,000.00 and costs in the amount of $760.32 for a total of $3,760.32.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.