Judge Katherine Chilton, Case 21STLC00540 2023-04-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 21STLC00540, Date: 2023-04-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STLC00540 Hearing Date: April 6, 2023 Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Luiz Marquez

RESP. PARTY: Defendant Su Yeon Oh

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

(CCC § 52, 42 U.S.C. § 12205)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Luis Marquez’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $4,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $2,073.21 in costs, for a total of $6,073.21.

SERVICE:

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK

OPPOSITION: Filed on March 20, 2023. [ ] Late [ ] None

REPLY: Filed on March 27, 2023. [ ] Late [ ] None

ANALYSIS:

I. Background

On January 20, 2021, Plaintiff Luiz Marquez (“Plaintiff” or “Marquez”) filed an action against Defendant Su Yeon Oh (“Defendant”) for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

On June 11, 2021, Defendant filed an Application for Stay and Early Evaluation Conference. On June 13, 2022, Court entered a stay in the action and scheduled an Early Evaluation Conference for July 14, 2022. On July 14, 2022, Counsel represented to the Court that the matter had settled, so the Court lifted the stay and scheduled an Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal (Settlement) for September 22, 2022. (7-14-22 Minute Order.)

On July 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement of Entire Case.

On December 16, 2022, the Court granted the parties’ request to continue the hearing date on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs to April 3, 2023. (12-16-22 Stipulation and Order; 12-28-22 Stipulation and Order.)

On March 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorney Fees (“Motion”). On March 20, 2023, Defendant filed an Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”). Plaintiff filed a Reply to the Opposition (“Reply”) on March 27, 2023.

On April 3, 2023, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the Motion for Attorney Fees and OSC Re: Dismissal (Settlement) to April 6, 2023. (4-3-23 Minute Order.)

II. Legal Standard

According to Civil Code § 52(a):

Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6, is liable for each and every offense for the actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney’s fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6.

“A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under . . . rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).) In a limited civil case, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of 30 days after service of a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or 90 days after the entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.822(a)(1).)

The calculation of attorney’s fees in California begins with the “lodestar” method – multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate. A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Ibid. at p. 48, fn. 23.) After the trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.)

As explained in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.:

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. . . . This approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” [Internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]

((2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. [Citations.]” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations are required. The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach. The court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided. The starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].) However, California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets. (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103.) An experienced trial judge is in a position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in his or her court. (Ibid.; Serrano, 20 Cal.3d 25 at 49.)

III. Discussion

A. Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff moves for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $13,003.21 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and California Civil Code § 52. (Mot. p. 1.)

Plaintiff is an individual with physical disabilities who visited a laundromat, owned and operated by Defendant, and discovered that it was not “readily accessible to and useable by persons with disabilities. (Ibid. at p. 7.) Plaintiff initially filed a lawsuit in federal court, along with claims for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). After Defendant made changes to the laundromat, the federal court found the ADA claims to be moot and declined to retain jurisdiction on the supplemental state law claims, thus, the case was dismissed. (Ibid.) On January 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action in state court. (Ibid.; 1-20-21 Compl.) On July 13, 2022, the parties reached a settlement in the instant action and executed a settlement agreement on August 25, 2022, according to which Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff $4,000 in statutory damages and reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation costs to be determined by a noticed motion. (Mot. p. 7.; Potter Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to attorney’s fees based on the stipulation and as a prevailing party under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Mot. p. 7.)

Plaintiff argues that “the detailed background of each attorney” demonstrates that they are “skilled in their practice and qualified to command rates between $400-$650 per hour.” (Ibid. at pp. 9-14; Potter Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9-19.) Plaintiff has submitted evidence and data to show that these rates are also “full consistent within their market” and “have been approved by this district and are in line with market rates.” (Mot. pp. 9-14; Potter Decl. ¶¶ 18-21, Exs. 3-6, 9.)

Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that its attorneys deserve to be awarded market rates because “CDA does significant work and has shaped ADA law with numerous, precedent setting opinions” which are listed in the Motion. (Mot. pp. 14-15, Potter Decl. ¶¶ 18-21.) Plaintiff also argues that the hours have been reasonably expended and explains that Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm “has created an innovative staffing approach in which each attorney is assigned discrete tasks and able to become experienced in narrow aspects of litigation in a short period of time,” which provides for “both efficiency and effectiveness.” (Ibid. at pp. 16-17, Potter Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, 7-9.)

A copy of the firm’s billing records and expert invoices are attached as Exhibits 2 and 8. (Potter Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5, Exs. 2, 8.)

B. Opposition to Motion

a. Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections

Defendant objects to Exhibits 3, 4, and 6, cases cited by Plaintiff, for irrelevance. (Defendant’s Objections, pp. 2-3.) The Court overrules Defendant’s Objections as to Exhibits 3, 4, and 6.

Defendant also objects to the Declaration of Mark Potter, ¶¶ 20-21, for citation to federal case law in support of counsel’s request for attorney’s fees. (Defendant’s Objections, pp. 3-4.) The Court overrules Defendant’s Objections as to Declaration of Mark Potter, ¶¶ 20-21.

b. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant has filed a Request for Judicial Notice of the following documents:

1) Notice of Non-Opposition to Defense Motion to Dismiss on Basis of Mootness in Federal Court case - Luis Marquez v. Su Yeon Oh, Case No. 2:19-cv-10835-FLA-MRW, file-stamped January 10, 2021, attached to Declaration of Richard Miyamoto, Esq., as Exhibit A, and incorporated herein by this reference.

2) Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in Federal Court case of Luis Marquez v. Su Yeon Oh, Case No. 2:19-cv-10835-FLA-MRW, file stamped March 2, 2021, attached to Declaration of Richard Miyamoto, Esq. as Exhibit B, and incorporated by reference.

3) Complaint For Damages and Injunctive Relief for Violations Of Americans With Disabilities Act; Unruh Civil Rights Act in Federal Court case of Luis Marquez v. Su Yeon Oh, Case No. 2:19-cv-10835-FLA-MRW, file stamped December 23, 2019, attached to Declaration of Richard Miyamoto, Esq. as Exhibit C, and incorporated by reference.

Pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 452 and 453, Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice of Exhibits A-C is GRANTED.

c. Opposition

Defendant opposes the Motion on the basis that Plaintiff is not a prevailing party and is not entitled to attorney’s fees, the federal action’s dismissal with prejudice “constitutes a retraxit that bars the present action,” and Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is unreasonable and should be denied, or at least dramatically reduced.

Defendant has attached a copy of the Complaint filed in federal court as Exhibit A. (Miyamoto Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) Defendant has attached a copy of the report prepared by Certified Access Specialist, John Battista, “stating that Defendant’s property is in compliance with all federal and state disability access standards,” and filed with the federal court on December 22, 2020. (Ibid. at ¶ 5, Ex. B.) Defendant states that on December 22, 2020, she filed a Motion to Dismiss in federal court on the basis that she had “remediated all of the conditions that Plaintiff alleged were in violation of the ADA and the Unruh Act” and prevailed on the Motion. (Ibid.at ¶ 7.) On January 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to the Defense Motion Based on Mootness in the federal action and stated in the Notice that “Plaintiff has now received independent confirmation of the fixes and, therefore, finds no basis upon which to contest these claims, and therefore, does not oppose this Court finding that the ADA claim had been rendered moot and dismissing the ADA claim for that reason.” (Ibid. at ¶ 8, Ex. C.) On January 20, 2021, ten (10) days after filing the Notice, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint in state court. (Ibid. at ¶ 9.) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was granted in federal court on March 2, 2021. (Ibid. at ¶ 11, Ex. D.)

Defendant states that after Plaintiff’s Notice was filed, Defendant “attempted to negotiate a settlement in exchange for an agreement for Plaintiff to not file a state action,” however, Plaintiff went forward with the state action. (Ibid. at ¶¶ 12-13.)

First, Defendant argues that attorney’s fees are only available to the prevailing party. (Oppos. p. 8.) Here, Plaintiff “provides no analysis, makes no argument, and does not even address the threshold issue of establishing whether he is a prevailing party” and thus, he “has failed to meet his burden to justify attorney’s fees.” (Ibid. p. 9.) Plaintiff does not cite to any admission of liability and the settlement agreement “provides no admission of liability.” (Ibid.) Defendant made a “business decision” to settle and “[t]here has been no judicial determination that Defendant violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act.” (Ibid.; Oh Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant argues that “Plaintiff has made a judicial admission that there was no basis to contest the claims,” which is why he is not a prevailing party. (Mot. p. 9.) Given that the federal action was dismissed with prejudice, without Plaintiff’s opposition, “the doctrine of retraxit provides that Ms. Oh prevailed on Plaintiff’s allegations of alleged of ADA and UCRA violations, and Defendant is barred by res judicata from relitigating them.” (Ibid. at pp. 10-11.)

Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is not reasonable and should either be denied “or at least dramatically reduced.” (Ibid. at p. 11.) Defendant argues that there is an inconsistency between the $13,002.21 requested in attorney’s fees and costs and the invoice totaling $9,192.21. (Ibid. at p. 12.) However, “the hours Plaintiff requests far exceed anything rationally related to accomplish the reasonable litigation objectives in this case, especially since there was no merit to this lawsuit from the outset.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on January 20, 2021, after the dismissal of the federal action and finding of the business’s “full compliance with the ADA and UCRA,” thus, “this entire litigation was unnecessary.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff could have communicated with Defendant to resolve the issues instead of filing the instant Complaint. (Ibid.) Furthermore, the case was stayed “for the vast majority of its history,” thus, “[t]here has been no discovery conducted in this case and no motion practice.” (Ibid. at p. 13.) Defendant also points out that several entries between January 2021 and February 2021 that relate to settlement were related to the federal action as it was still pending and “should be disregarded.” (Ibid.) Finally, the Court should take into account that the amount of attorney’s fees requested is “disproportionate to the settlement amount” and is “unreasonably and grossly inflated.” (Ibid.at pp. 14-15.)

C. Plaintiff’s Reply

In his reply, Plaintiff argues that the federal court dismissed the case without prejudice because the only remedy available under the ADA, injunctive relief, was no longer necessary as the discriminatory conditions had been removed. (Reply p. 5.) As a result, Plaintiff moved the remaining state claim to a state court; however, “[i]n no case could it be considered that defendant prevailed on any issue in federal court.” (Ibid. at pp. 5-6.) There was no prevailing party in federal court. (Ibid. at p. 6.)

Plaintiff argues that he is “entitled to the work incurred to successfully prosecute his Unruh claim” as permitted by §§ 51, 51.5, and 51.6 of the Act. (Ibid. at pp. 6-7.) This “includes fees reasonably incurred prior to every filing in state court” including prelitigation activities. (Ibid. at p. 7.) Furthermore, the work done in prosecuting the ADA claim cannot be distinguished from the Unruh claim as “they are coterminous as the Unruh claim is entirely based on an ADA violation.” (Ibid. at p. 8.)

Plaintiff also argues that the federal court’s dismissal does not bar Plaintiff’s claim in the present action because the federal court “declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim” and dismissed the state law claim without prejudice. (Ibid. at p. 9.) Plaintiff refers to the settlement agreement and argues that Defendant expressly agreed to pay attorney’s fees. (Ibid. at p. 10.)

Plaintiff also replies to Defendant’s arguments that the fee request is inflated and the work completed unnecessary given that the Plaintiff has admitted that there was no violation. (Ibid. at pp. 10-11.) Plaintiff states that he has not admitted that there was no violation, just that the ADA claim was moot because of the remediation of the facility. (Ibid.)

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s statements regarding disproportionate request for attorney’s fees are unsubstantiated and Defendant has not submitted any evidence of market rates to contest Plaintiff’s request. (Ibid. at p. 11.)

Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted an unredacted copy of the settlement agreement as Exhibit 1. (Reply – Potter Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.)

D. Analysis

a. Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees and Costs

The Court finds that the instant case is similar to Gutierrez v. Chopard USA Ltd. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 383.) In Gutierrez, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees based on the Unruh Civil Rights Act after the parties executed a confidential settlement agreement. (Ibid. at 386.) The agreement stated as follows:

Defendant has agreed not to dispute liability as it pertains to its website, www.chopard.com/us under the applicable website accessibility guidelines, and as to Plaintiff's claims.

Defendant has also agreed that it will not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs under the fee shifting provisions of Cal. Civil Code §§ 51 and 52, which apply in this case.

The parties have agreed that attorneys' fees and costs arising from this matter will be determined by noticed motion brought by Plaintiff, and request that this Court retain jurisdiction over this matter to decide this dispute.

The Parties agree that Defendant shall retain all rights to oppose any motion relating to attorneys' fees and costs, based on relevant legal authority.

(Ibid.) In Gutierrez, the Court found that, unlike cases cited by the Defendant, in this case, “the parties executed and filed with the court a Joint Stipulation in which Chopard expressly ‘agreed that it will not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs under the fee shifting provisions of Cal. Civil Code §§ 51 and 52, which apply in this case.’” (Ibid. at 392.) The Court ruled that the Defendant was bound by the agreement and the only matter that remained unresolved was the reasonableness of the award. (Ibid.)

Similarly, the Settlement Agreement in the instant case expressly states that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees, as it provides:

Defendants agree to pay Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees and costs as determined by the Court.

The amount of attorney fees and litigation costs/expenses Plaintiff's counsel is entitled to shall be determined by the Court via a Noticed Motion. Defendants agree that Plaintiff is entitled to file a motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses/costs but Defendants retain all arguments related to the reasonableness of the Plaintiff's requested fee award.

(Potter Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 7 – ¶¶ 2.5, 4.)

Thus, the Court finds that the parties are bound by the Settlement Agreement and pursuant to this Agreement, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.

b. Reasonableness

In determining the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees, the Court considers the complexity of the tasks, number of hours expended on each task, and other necessary factors. Having reviewed the billing statement submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel, the Court finds that the hours expended on certain tasks are excessive. For example, between January 20 and 25, 2022, an hour was billed to site inspection scheduling, after Plaintiff filed an Notice of Non-Opposition in the federal case stating that the discriminatory barriers were removed from the facility. Moreover, on July 5, 2022, Plaintiff’s representatives spent 6.4 hours on preparation of what the Court presumes is an Early Evaluation Conference statement.

Having reviewed the billing statements and considering the fact that proceedings were stayed and the case was resolved through settlement, the Court finds $4,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $2,073.21 in costs to be reasonable.

Plaintiff has also submitted invoices from expert witnesses; however, Plaintiff has not presented the Court with a basis for a request of expert witness fees as the remediation of the facility occurred prior to the state court action. (Potter Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 8.) For this reason, the Court does not grant these fees.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is granted in the amount of $6,073.21.

IV. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons,

Plaintiff Luis Marquez’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $4,000 in attorney’s fees and $2,073.21 in costs, for a total of $6,073.21.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.