Judge Katherine Chilton, Case 21STLC05944 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 21STLC05944, Date: 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STLC05944 Hearing Date: March 8, 2023 Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Fox Rent-A-Car

RESP. PARTY: Plaintiffs Tomesha Fowler, et al.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(CCP § 437c)

TENTATIVE RULING:

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Fox Rent-A-Car is GRANTED.

SERVICE:

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC 3.1300) OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP 1013, 1013a) OK

[X] 75/80 Day Lapse (CCP 12c and 1005 (b)) OK

OPPOSITION: Filed on February 14, 2023. [ ] Late [ ] None

REPLY: Filed on February 22, 2023. [ ] Late [ ] None

ANALYSIS:

I. Background

On August 12, 2021, Plaintiffs Tomesha Fowler (“Fowler”) and Aman Robertson (“Robertson”), (collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed an action against Defendants Clayton Watson (“Watson”), Marlana Dutton (“Dutton”), and Fox Rent-A-Car (“Fox”), (collectively “Defendants”) for motor vehicle and general negligence arising out of an alleged automobile accident that took place on August 13, 2019.

On April 5, 2022, Defendant Fox filed an Answer to the Complaint.

On October 24, 2022, Defendant Fox filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). On December 29, 2022, Defendant Fox filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to the Motion.

On January 9, 2023, the Court continued the hearing on the Motion and requested that Defendant Fox verify that Plaintiffs had been properly served with the moving papers. (1-9-23 Minute Order.) On January 31, 2023, Defendant Fox filed a Supplemental Declaration of Crystal N. Le in support of its Motion.

On February 2 and 10, 2023, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Applications to Continue Hearing on the Motion. (2-2-23 Minute Order; 2-10-23 Minute Order.)

On February 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”). Defendant Fox filed a Reply on February 22, 2023.

On February 27, 2023, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the Motion to March 8, 2023. (2-27-23 Minute Order.)

II. Judicial Notice

According to Evidence Code § 452, the Court may take judicial notice of matters that include records or rules of another court and “facts or propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.”

Here, Defendant submitted a Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) on October 24, 2022, of the following documents:

1) Plaintiff’s Complaint filed in the instant case;

2) California Secretary of State, Statement of Information for Fox Rent-A-Car, Inc.

On January 9, 2023, the Court found that it is not necessary to take judicial notice of the Plaintiff’s Complaint in the instant case. (1-9-23 Minute Order.) Furthermore, the Court noted that privately prepared documents filed with the Secretary of State and not previously part of the Court record are not subject to judicial notice, and neither is the truth of its contents. (Ibid.; People v. Thacker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 594, 598-99; Herrera v. Deutsche National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) Accordingly, the Court DENIED Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice. (1-9-23 Minute Order.)

III. Legal Standard

A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of producing evidentiary facts sufficient to entitle him/her to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The moving party must make an affirmative showing that he/she is entitled to judgment irrespective of whether or not the opposing party files an opposition. (Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 742-743.) Thus, “the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519 (citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)

When a plaintiff seeks summary judgment, he/she must produce admissible evidence on each element of each cause of action on which judgment is sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).) When a defendant seeks summary judgment, he/she has the “burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).)

The opposing party on a motion for summary judgment is under no evidentiary burden to produce rebuttal evidence until the moving party meets his or her initial movant’s burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Once the initial movant’s burden is met, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to show, with admissible evidence, that there is a triable issue requiring the weighing procedures of trial. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p).) The opposing party may not simply rely on his/her allegations to show a triable issue but must present evidentiary facts that are substantial in nature and rise beyond mere speculation. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162.) Summary judgment must be granted “if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to any alternative request for summary adjudication of issues, such alternative relief must be clearly set forth in the Notice of Motion and the general burden-shifting rules apply but the issues upon which summary adjudication may be sought are limited by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Ibid.)

IV. Discussion

A. Defendant Fox’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant seeks a court order granting summary judgment in its favor and against Plaintiffs “on the grounds that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and Fox is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Mot p. 2.) Defendant Fox did not operate the vehicle involved in the accident, did not employ Defendants Watson and Dutton, and did not cause or contribute to the automobile accident at issue. (Ibid.) Defendant Fox is “engaged in the business of renting and leasing vehicles to members of the public” and “is statutorily immune from vicarious liability pursuant to Federal and State law.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs assert two causes of action, one for “general negligence” and another for “motor vehicle negligence” and state the same set of facts for both causes of action as follows:

DEFENDANTS AND EACH OF THEM NEGLIGENTLY, CARELESSLY, AND RECKLESSLY OWNED, OPERATED, ENTRUSTED, MAINTAINED, AND DROVE THEIR VEHICLE IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CAUSE AUTOMOBILE COLLISION WITH VEHICLE OPERATED AND OCCUPIED BY PLAINTIFFS. THE COLLISION RESULTED IN PERSONAL INJURIES TO PLAINTIFFS AND DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF'S VEHICLE. PLAINTIFFS WERE COMPELLED TO SEEK THE SERVICES OF PHYSICIANS FOR THEIR INJURIES, AND INCURRED COSTS THEREFORE IN AMOUNT TO BE PROVEN AT TRIAL.

(Compl. p. 5.) Specifically, Defendants Clayton Watson and Marlana Dutton were operating a motor vehicle, owned by Fox Rent-a-Car, that was involved in a collision with Plaintiffs’ vehicle on August 13, 2019. (Ibid. at pp. 4-5.) As a result of the accident, Plaintiffs sustained injuries, property damage, and other damages. (Ibid. at pp. 3-5.)

On January 9, 2023, the Court continued the hearing on the Motion and ordered Defendant Fox to provide the Court with proof that it had served Plaintiffs at their counsel’s correct email address. (1-9-23 Minute Order.) On January 31, 2023, Defendant filed Supplemental Declaration of Crystal N. Le providing evidence that Plaintiffs have previously been served at the same email address as the one they used to serve the moving papers. Plaintiffs’ counsel disputes that any communication took place via the email address where Plaintiffs served the moving papers. (Chukwudobe Decl. ¶¶ 8-11.) However, at this time, Plaintiffs have filed an Opposition to the Motion, thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have received a copy of the moving papers.

Defendant submits the declaration of Carrie Damico, “Senior Director of Training and Organizational Development, which manages Defendant FOX’s employee and agent training and hiring, including training and hiring policies for the rental office located at 2501 N. Hollywood Way, Bob Hope Airport Car Rental, Burbank, CA 91505.” (Damico Decl. ¶ 1.) Damico has been employed by Defendant Fox for nine years. (Ibid.) Damico states that Defendant Fox is a rental car company that rents and leases motor vehicles to the general public. (Ibid.) One of Damico’s responsibilities includes training employees who assist Fox’s customers in renting vehicles. (Ibid. at ¶ 2.) Employees who assist with renting vehicles are trained “not to rent a vehicle to an individual who does not present a facially valid driver’s license or who is or appears to be impaired or otherwise unfit to safely operate a vehicle.” (Ibid. at ¶ 3.) Employees are trained to ensure that a renter’s driver license is “facially valid” and “to observe potential signs of impairment, including diminished motor skills, difficulty holding a conversation, and stumbling or difficulty walking, regardless of whether this is as a result of drugs or alcohol.” (Ibid. at ¶ 3.) If a potential renter appears unfit to drive, employees are trained not to rent a car to this person. (Ibid. at ¶ 3.) The same procedure is followed for additional authorized drivers of a rented vehicle. (Ibid. at ¶ 4.) According to Fox’s records, on August 13, 2019, Defendant Clayton Watson rented a 2019 Mitsubishi Outlander from Fox’s rental office located at 2501 N. Hollywood Way, Bob Hope Airport Car Rental, Burbank, CA. (Ibid. at ¶ 6, Ex. A.) Watson was assisted by rental agent Maria Rios Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), who received the training specified above. (Ibid. at ¶¶ 2-3, 6.) Rodriguez is no longer employed by Fox and cannot be located. (Ibid. at ¶ 2.) Rodriguez’s employee file indicates that she was never observed to have failed to follow any of the proper procedures, including inspecting a potential renter’s driver’s license or observing signs of impairment. (Ibid. at ¶ 5.) Rodriguez followed all procedures because the rental agreement lists information about Watson’s driver’s license and does not contain any notes indicating that he was unfit to drive a car. (Ibid. at ¶ 6.) Rodriguez also assisted Defendant Marlana Dutton in adding her as an additional driver. (Ibid. at ¶ 7.) Dutton’s driver license information is also listed and there are no notes indicating that she was incapable of driving a car. (Ibid. at ¶ 7.) Defendants Watson and Dutton are not employees of Defendant Fox. (Ibid. at ¶ 8.)

Defendant Fox also submits Plaintiffs Fowler and Robertson’s responses to its discovery requests. Defendant Fox indicates that Plaintiffs’ responses to the discovery show that they do not have any “facts to support a claim that Defendants Clayton Watson and/or Marlana Dutton were employees, agents, joint ventures, or principals of defendant FOX.” (Sep. St. ¶ 12, referring to Ex: D – Fowler’s Responses to Form Interrogatories No. 20.2, Ex: H – Robertson’s Responses to Form Interrogatories No. 20.2.) Plaintiffs do not have any evidence, facts, or documents to show that Defendant Fox caused or contributed to the accident. (Sep. St. ¶ 14, referring to Ex: D – Fowler’s Responses to Form Interrogatories No. 20.2-20.11, Ex: H – Robertson’s Responses to Form Interrogatories No. 20.2-20.11.) Moreover, Plaintiffs do not have any evidence, facts, or documents to show that Defendant Fox negligently entrusted the 2019 Mitsubishi Outlander to Defendants Watson and Dutton on or before the accident. (Ibid.) Finally, Plaintiffs do not have any evidence, facts, or documents to show that the Mitsubishi had any mechanical defect that was a substantial factor in causing the accident. (Sep. St. ¶ 16, referring to Ex. D - Fowler’s Responses to Form Interrogatories, No. 20.9; Ex. H – Robertson’s Responses to Form Interrogatories, No. 20.9.)

Defendant Fox argues that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Defendant Fox owed a duty to Plaintiffs because Fox “did not operate a motor vehicle involved in the subject accident, did not employ Defendants Watson and Dutton at the time of the accident, and did not cause or contribute to the subject accident.” (Mot. pp. 2, 11.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not have any evidence or facts to show that Defendant Dutton was “an employee or agent of Fox, or involved in a joint venture with Fox,” that “Fox negligently entrusted the vehicle to Defendants Watson and Dutton,” “that Fox negligently serviced, repaired, maintained, and/or inspected the vehicle driven by Defendant Dutton at the time of the accident” or that “Fox caused or contributed to the subject accident.” (Ibid. at pp. 6-7, 12.) Moreover, the vehicle did not have a mechanical defect. (Ibid. at pp. 7, 12.)

Furthermore, Defendant Fox states that Vehicle Code §§ 14604 and 14608 require a car rental agency to check a potential rental customer’s driver’s license to ensure that it is facially valid before entrusting a vehicle to the renter. (Ibid. at p. 12.) The rental records indicates that Defendants Watson and Dutton presented facially valid driver’s licenses at the time they rented vehicle and did not show any sign of being impaired or incapable of driving a car. (Ibid.) Defendant Fox cites to Dodge Ctr. v. Superior Court and other case law for the holding that in order to have a claim of negligent entrustment against a car rental agency, the claimant must show that the agency had “‘actual knowledge of facts showing or suggesting’ incompetence on the part of the driver.” (Ibid.; Dodge, 199 Cal.App.3d 332, 341.) Here, rental agent Rodriguez’s notes do not indicate that either Defendants Watson or Dutton were incapable or unfit to operate a vehicle and Plaintiffs do not have evidence to show otherwise. (Ibid. at pp. 12-13.)

Finally, Defendant Fox argues that pursuant to the federal Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C.A § 30106, Fox, as a rental car owner, “cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligent actions of rental customers.” (Ibid. at pp. 14-15.)

B. Plaintiffs’ Opposition

Plaintiffs oppose Defendant Fox’s Motion on the grounds that there are triable issues of material fact and thus, the Motion should be denied. (Oppos. pp. 1-2.)

First, Plaintiffs argue that there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the Rental Agreement covered third parties that were injured as a result of the renters’ use of the vehicle. (Oppos. p. 8.) Plaintiffs refer to Clause 5 of the Agreement which states:

LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE OR INJURY TO OTHERS: FOX is in full compliance with the financial requirements of the state in which the vehicle is rented by either self -insuring or posting a cash deposit. FOX's exposure for personal injury and property damage claims by third parties is the minimum policy limits required by state law. No other insurance or coverage are provided to Renter or any authorized driver by this Agreement unless separately purchased at the time of rental. If valid automobile liability insurance or self insurance is available on any basis to Renter and such insurance or self insurance satisfies the applicable state motor vehicle financial responsibility law, then FOX extends none of its motor vehicle financial responsibility. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Renter (and any authorized additional driver designated in this contract) agrees to hold FOX, its agents, employees and affiliates, harmless from any and all claims, losses, expenses and damages, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, for injury or damage to persons or property of any kind or nature whatsoever (including death resulting from such injury), caused by, resulting from, arising out of, or occurring in connection with the rental of the vehicle pursuant to this contract. Renter agrees to cooperate fully in the investigation and defense of any accident claim or lawsuit. Renter will defend and indemnify the renting location, holding them harmless from all loss, liability, and expense of the coverages available under the terms of this Agreement.

(Chukwudobe Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, Exs. A-B, Oppos. pp. 5-6.)

Plaintiffs state that Defendant Fox knew that renters Watson and Dutton did not have any form of third party liability insurance and admitted this information in their responses to Plaintiffs’ Request for Admission, Set One. (Chukwudobe Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D.) The Court notes that Defendant Fox has provided responses with objections, nevertheless, admitting that Defendant Watson did not provide a copy of third party liability insurance at the time of renting the vehicle, while Defendant Fox was “in full compliance with the state’s financial requirements for the 2019 Mitsubishi Outlander.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs also submit letters from Defendant Fox that state that Defendant Fox has “valid coverage,” is “self insured,” and “only provide[s] min. coverage if the driver is at fault and only if the driver has no policy of coverage.” (Chukwudobe Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7, Exs. C, E.) The letters indicate that “Fox is also not bound to coverage for liability to uninsured and underinsured clients or PIP coverage or for med pay coverages.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs argue that Fox is bound by the Rental Agreement and is thus, liable to Plaintiffs for their injuries. (Oppos. p. 5.)

Plaintiffs also argue that Fox is not immune from liability based on the exclusion provision of the Graves Amendment, set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1)(2), Insurance Code § 11580.1b, and Vehicle Code § 16056. (Ibid. at pp. 5, 9.) Federal law does not preempt state laws that impose financial responsibility or insurance standards on car rental companies and thus, Defendant Fox is not exempt from the requirements imposed by California law. (Ibid.) Furthermore, the “Graves Amendment does not preempt or invalidate contractual agreement between parties,” in this case the Agreement between Fox and the renters Watson and Dutton. (Ibid. at p. 6.)

C. Defendant Fox’s Reply

In its Reply, Defendant Fox requests that the Court disregard Plaintiffs’ Opposition for failing to file and serve it within 14 days of the hearing date on the Motion. (Reply p. 3.) Plaintiffs have failed to file proof that the Opposition was served on Defendant Fox and have delayed the filing of the Opposition despite having been notified of the Motion “as early as December 29, 2022.” (Ibid. at pp. 4-5.) This delay has left Defendant Fox at a disadvantage in preparing the instant Reply. (Ibid.) Given that Defendant Fox has filed a Reply and the hearing has been continued, the Court, in its discretion considers the arguments presented in the Opposition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d).)

Defendant Fox argues that the Motion should be granted as to Plaintiffs’ claims of negligent ownership, operation, entrustment, and maintenance because Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of negligence as to Defendant Fox. (Ibid. at p. 6.) Plaintiffs have wrongfully cited to Vehicle Code § 16056 which is irrelevant and “has no bearing on the issues on liability of FOX” because it applies to “the effectiveness of a policy issued by an insurance company in the event of an accident and proof of financial responsibility for a nonresident driver whose driving privilege has been suspended or revoked.” (Ibid. at p. 6.) Pursuant to the Graves Amendment, liability is imposed on a rental car agency as the owner of a vehicle if the agency “committed an act of negligence or criminal wrongdoing.” (Ibid. at p. 7, citing to 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2).)

Furthermore, Plaintiffs wrongfully cite to the Insurance Code § 11580.1(b) and “focus on the insurance and financial responsibility of FOX.” (Ibid.) Section 11580.1(b) does not provide a basis for liability and “merely states the limits and provision of the issuance of an insurance policy for a motor vehicle.” (Ibid.) Fox argues that it has complied with its financial responsibilities. (Ibid.) Referring to Plaintiffs’ Complaint that alleges that Defendants “negligently, carelessly, and recklessly owned, operated, entrusted, maintained, and drove” the vehicle and caused the collision, Fox reiterates that it has not committed any “negligent acts or criminal wrongdoing that amounts to the conduct that FOX would be liable for under a Negligence cause of action.” (Ibid. at p. 7.)

Defendant Fox argues that “[e]xposure is not the same as ‘availability for coverage” and the Rental Agreement clearly indicates that “the renter/driver is responsible for any damages arising out of the operation of the rented vehicle.” (Ibid. at p. 8.) Fox states that Plaintiffs misrepresent its communications which clearly state that the drivers’/renters’ own insurance is primarily used to cover damage and Fox is only financially responsible if the renter is at fault and does not have a policy of coverage. (Ibid. at p. 8.) Fox adds that Defendants Watson and Dutton have yet to be served with the summons and complaint in the instant case. (Ibid.)

Finally, Defendant Fox reiterates that under the Graves Amendment, Fox can be liable only if it is established that it acted negligently or committed a criminal wrongdoing. (Ibid. at p. 9.) There is no triable issue of fact regarding Fox’s negligence or criminal wrongdoing. (Ibid.)

D. Analysis

Plaintiffs’ Complaint sets forth causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence.

“The essential elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) the defendant's legal duty of care toward the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's breach of duty—the negligent act or omission; (3) injury to the plaintiff as a result of the breach—proximate or legal cause; and (4) damage to the plaintiff.” (Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.) Owing a duty of care to the plaintiff is an indispensable prerequisite to the imposition of liability for negligence. (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63.) A duty is an “obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.” (Hilyar v. Union Ice Co. (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 30, 36-37.) Generally, an omission to perform a contract obligation is not a tort, unless that omission is also an omission of a legal duty. (Jones v. Kelly (1929) 208 Cal. 251, 255.)

It is undisputed that Defendant Fox did not drive or operate the vehicle. Furthermore, it is undisputed that it did not “negligently, carelessly, and recklessly” own or maintain the vehicle, as no defects are alleged. At issue is whether Defendant Fox negligently entrusted the vehicle to Defendants Watson and Dutton.

“‘California is one of the several states [that] recognizes the liability of an automobile owner who has entrusted a car to an incompetent, reckless, or inexperienced driver’…through the tort of negligent entrustment.’ [Citation.]” (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565-66.) “Negligent entrustment is a common law liability doctrine, which arises in numerous factual contexts. [Citation.] In cases involving negligent entrustment of a vehicle, liability ‘is imposed on [a] vehicle owner or permitter because of his own independent negligence and not the negligence of the driver.’ [Citations.]” (Ghezavat v. Harris (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 555, 559.) “’Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) The elements of negligent entrustment of a vehicle are as follows: (1) the driver was negligent in operating the vehicle; (2) the defendant owner owned the vehicle operated by the driver or had possession of that vehicle with the defendant owner’s permission; (3) the defendant owner knew, or should have known, the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; (4) defendant owner permitted the driver to operate the vehicle regardless; and (5) the driver’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. (McKenna, 67 Cal.App.5th at 566.)

Furthermore, pursuant to Vehicle Code §§ 14604 and 14608, the duty imposed on the owner/renter of a vehicle is “only to make a reasonable effort or inquiry to determine whether the prospective driver possesses a valid driver's license before allowing him or her to operate the owner's vehicle.” (Veh. Code § 14604.)

Here, Defendant Fox presents evidence that its rental agent followed all proper procedures and policies in checking whether Defendants had facially valid driver’s licenses and observing whether there were any signs that they were incapable of driving. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to the contrary to show that there is a triable issue of material fact regarding its claim that Defendant Fox negligently entrusted the vehicle to the renters.

Plaintiffs base their arguments on the Rental Agreement’s provision regarding Defendant Fox’s financial responsibility to third parties. They also rely on the Graves Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1)(2)), Insurance Code § 11580.1(b), and Vehicle Code § 16056 in claiming that Defendant Fox is liable for their injuries and damages.

First, Plaintiffs’ cause of action for negligence cannot be based on Defendant Fox’s contractual obligations.

Second, Plaintiff does not demonstrate how 49 U.S.C. § 30106 imposes liability on Defendant Fox. Section 30106 states as follows:

(a) In general - An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—

(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; ¿and

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).

(b) Financial responsibility laws - Nothing in this section supersedes the law of any State or political subdivision thereof—

(1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle; ¿or

(2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law.

Here, there is no dispute that Defendant Fox is not liable under 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) because it is in the business of renting motor vehicles to the public and there is no proof of its negligent conduct or criminal wrongdoing. Moreover, there is no dispute that Defendant Fox met its financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under state law as it contends that it maintains the required minimum policy limits. The Court also finds Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding Insurance Code 11580.1(b) and Vehicle Code § 16056 do not demonstrate that there is a triable issue of material fact regarding its causes of action for general and motor vehicle negligence. The sections cited by Plaintiffs pertain to California’s requirements for maintaining insurance coverage. Neither Plaintiffs, nor Defendant Fox dispute that Defendant Fox has maintained insurance coverage in compliance with these state laws. The issue is whether Defendant Fox is liable for the damages to Plaintiffs. However, once again, Plaintiff does not show how these laws create a triable issue of material fact as to any elements of negligence or negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Defendants Watson and Dutton.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Fox has met its burden of producing sufficient evidence to show that there is no triable issue of material fact as to Plaintiffs’ causes of action for general and motor vehicle negligence alleged against Defendant Fox. Defendant Fox had a duty to ensure that renters had facially valid driver’s licenses and did not show any obvious signs of impairment; Defendant Fox contends that it complied with this duty. In opposing the Motion, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show that there is a triable issue of material fact as to Defendant’s breach of this duty. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendant Fox’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

V. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons,

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Fox Rent-A-Car is GRANTED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.