Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 21STLC08430, Date: 2022-09-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STLC08430     Hearing Date: September 27, 2022    Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS:      MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

MOVING PARTY:   Defendant Makrui Kiuregyan

RESP. PARTY:         None

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

(CPP §§ 1032, 1033.5, CCC § 789.3)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Makrui Kiuregyan’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED, in the amount of $4,563.75.

SERVICE: 

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300)                 OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a)                                                 OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b))                     OK

OPPOSITION:          None filed as of September 26, 2022                      [   ] Late                      [X] None

REPLY:                     None filed as of September 26, 2022                      [   ] Late                      [X] None

ANALYSIS:

I.                Background

On November 29, 2021, Plaintiff George J. Baghdassarian (“Plaintiff”), in propria persona, filed an action against Defendant Makrui Kiuregyan (“Defendant”) for (1) breach of verbal contract, (2) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment of the premises, (4) negligence, and (5) wrongful eviction (Civil Code § 789.3.)  The action arose out of an alleged rental agreement of a residential unit.

On January 27, 2022, after filing for an automatic extension, Defendant filed a Demurrer with Motion to Strike.  On March 11, 2022, the Court granted Defendant’s Demurrer without leave to Amend and further determined that the Motion to Strike was moot.  (3-11-22 Minute Order.)

On March 25, 2022, Defendant filed a Memorandum of Costs.

On April 7, 2022, the Court dismissed the entire case with prejudice and ordered that “Plaintiff takes nothing against Defendant” and “Defendant is the prevailing party and shall recover” attorney’s fees “to be determined by a noticed motion if legally appropriate” and costs based on a Memorandum of Costs.  (4-7-22 Judgment.)

On June 29, 2022, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Attorney’s Fees.  On August 19, 2022, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on the Motion from August 29 to September 14, 2022.  (8-19-22 Minute Order.)  On September 1, 2022, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the Court continued the hearing to September 27, 2022.

No opposition has been filed.

II.              Legal Standard

A prevailing party in a lawsuit includes “a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered…and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.”  (Code of Civ. Proc. 1032(a)(4).)

A prevailing party in entitled to recover costs, including attorney’s fees, as a matter of right.  (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032(a)(4), 1032(b), 1033.5.)  Furthermore, attorney’s fees are allowable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(10).) 

Pursuant to Civil Code § 789.3(d), “the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party” in any action under § 789.3, which governs a landlord’s termination of a tenant’s occupancy.

“A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under . . . rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).)  In a limited civil case, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of 30 days after service of a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or 90 days after the entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.822(a)(1).)

The calculation of attorney’s fees in California begins with the “lodestar” method – multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.  (Ibid. at p. 48, fn. 23.)  After the trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.)

As explained in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.:

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]  The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. . . . This approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” [Internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]

((2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)  “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  [Citations.]”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations are required.  The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.  The court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided.  The starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].)  However, California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets. (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103.)  An experienced trial judge is in a position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in his or her court.  (Ibid.; Serrano, 20 Cal.3d 25 at 49.)

III.            Discussion

The Motion was filed timely.

Defendant seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,001.25, as the prevailing party in the action.  (Mot. p. 2.)

Defendant argues that she is the prevailing party in this action because dismissal was entered in her favor and the Court determined Defendant to be the prevailing party.  (4-7-22 Judgment.). Furthermore, pursuant to Civil Code § 789.3(d), the prevailing party in a civil action involving a landlord’s termination of tenant’s occupancy is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.  (Mot. at p. 5.)

Defendant requests $5,001.25 in attorney’s fees.  (Ibid. at p. 8.)  Counsel has attached a billing statement and redacted any work done to represent Defendant in a related matter, LASC Case No. 22PDUD00289.  (Aroustamian Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. A.)  The billing statement presents a total of $3,888.75 billed for the instant case.  (Ibid.)  In addition, defense counsel is seeking $1,112.50 for work performed to prepare the Motion for Attorney’s Fees as follows: 3.5 hours of work performed by legal assistant/clerk to research and draft instant Motion, 0.5 hour spent by counsel in reviewing the Motion, and 1 hour to attend the hearing on the Motion.  (Ibid. at ¶¶ 6-9.)  The legal assistant’s time is billed at $125 per hour and counsel’s time is billed at a rate of $450.00 per hour.  (Ibid. at ¶¶ 7-8.)

Defense counsel argues that the amount of attorney’s fees requested is reasonable and “[t]he work done was necessary to evaluate the claims brought by Plaintiff against Defendant, to attempt to settle the matter, and to successfully defend against and demur to Plaintiff’s Complaint and the allegations therein.”  (Mot. at p. 6.)  Furthermore, “the new, unprecedented, and continuously changing rules, laws, and regulations related to the Covid-19 pandemic and landlord-tenant rights and responsibilities at the local and state level” presented a unique challenge to counsel.  (Ibid.)  Defense counsel states that his legal clerk/assistant undertook most of the work at a lower billing rate and counsel obtained a successful outcome for Defendant.  (Ibid.)

            No opposition has been filed by Plaintiff to contest Defendant’s arguments.

            On April 7, 2022, the Court deemed Defendant the prevailing party in the instant matter.     (4-7-22 Minute Order.)  Defendant has supported her arguments through legal authority showing that as the prevailing party, she is entitled to attorney’s fees.  (Civil Code § 789.3(d).)

In determining the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees, the Court considers the complexity of the tasks, number of hours expended on each task, and other necessary factors.  The billing statement submitted by defense counsel demonstrates that Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees for work done in furtherance of the instant case, in the amount of $3888.75, is reasonable.  However, the Court notes that the additional request for $1112.50 is excessive.  The billing statement already encompasses work performed by the legal clerk/assistant for the instant motion: 4.5 hours of research on attorney’s fees and a prevailing party’s rights on March 21 and 24, and 2 hours of research and drafting of the instant motion May 6 and 8.  (Aroustamian Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. A.)  The Court finds an additional $675.00 for the attorney’s work to review the Motion and appear at the hearing, reasonable.

            Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED for the amount of $4,563.75.

IV.           Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons,

Defendant Makrui Kiuregyan’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED, in the amount of $4,563.75.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.