Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 21STLC09127, Date: 2023-05-04 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STLC09127    Hearing Date: May 4, 2023    Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS:      MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

 

MOVING PARTY:   Plaintiff Comforting Home Hospice Inc.

RESP. PARTY:         Defendant David C. Perkins

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(CCP § 437c)

 

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Plaintiffs Comforting Home Hospice, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Complaint’s First Cause of Action for violation of the California Business & Professions Code § 7031 is GRANTED. 

 

SERVICE

 

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC 3.1300)             OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP 1013, 1013a)                                     OK

[X] 75/80 Day Lapse (CCP 12c and 1005 (b))                     OK

 

OPPOSITION:          Filed on April 18, 2023.                                    [   ] Late                      [   ] None

REPLY:                     Filed on April 25, 2023.                                    [   ] Late                      [   ] None

 

ANALYSIS:

 

I.                Background

 

On December 30, 2021, Plaintiff Comforting Home Hospice Inc. (“Hospice”) and Alexander Everest (“Everest”) filed a Complaint against David C. Perkins (“Perkins”) for 1) violation of Business and Professions Code § 7031, 2) breach of contract, 3) fraudulent concealment, and 4)  negligent misrepresentation.

 

On April 7, 2022, Defendant, in propria persona, filed an Answer to the Complaint.  Defendant also filed a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiffs for common count – work labor and services and breach of oral contract.  Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants filed an Answer to the Cross-Complaint on May 13, 2022.

 

On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Complaint’s First Cause of Action (“Motion”).  Defendant, in propria persona, filed an Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”) on April 18, 2023.  Plaintiff filed a Reply to the Opposition (“Reply”) on April 25, 2023.

 

            On May 3, 2023, the Court on its own motion, continued the hearing on the Motion to May 4, 2023.  (5-3-23 Minute Order.)

 

II.              Legal Standard

 

A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of producing evidentiary facts sufficient to entitle him/her to judgment as a matter of law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).)  The moving party must make an affirmative showing that he/she is entitled to judgment irrespective of whether or not the opposing party files an opposition.  (Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 742-743.)  Thus, “the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519 (citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.).  When a plaintiff seeks summary judgment, he/she must produce admissible evidence on each element of each cause of action on which judgment is sought.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).)  The moving party’s “affidavits must cite evidentiary facts, not legal conclusions or ‘ultimate’ facts” and the courts must construe the evidence in support of the opposing party, resolving any doubts in favor of the opposing party.  (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639; Scalf, 128 Cal.App.4th at 1519; Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

 

The opposing party on a motion for summary judgment is under no evidentiary burden to produce rebuttal evidence until the moving party meets his or her initial movant’s burden.  (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.)  Once the initial movant’s burden is met, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to show, with admissible evidence, that there is a triable issue requiring the weighing procedures of trial.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p).)  The opposing party may not simply rely on his/her allegations to show a triable issue but must present evidentiary facts that are substantial in nature and rise beyond mere speculation.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162.)  Summary judgment must be granted “if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

 

As to any alternative request for summary adjudication of issues, such alternative relief must be clearly set forth in the Notice of Motion and the general burden-shifting rules apply but the issues upon which summary adjudication may be sought are limited by statute.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).)  “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.”  (Ibid.)  California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b) requires that “the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.”

 

III.            Discussion

 

Plaintiffs seek a court order granting summary adjudication in its favor and against Defendant for its first cause of action for violation of Business & Professions Code § 7031.  (Mot pp. 1-2.)

 

Business and Professions Code § 7031(b) “allows any person who utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor to bring an action for disgorgement of all compensation paid for the performance of any act or contract, regardless whether there was any fault in the contractor’s work…”  (Eisenberg Village of Los Angeles Jewish Home for the Aging v. Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1201, 1203.)  In a matter of first impression, the Court in Eisenberg held that the one-year statute of limitations applied to claims for disgorgement under § 7301(b), and that a 7301(b) claim accrued upon the completion or cessation of performance of the contract at issue. (Ibid.)

 

Plaintiff Everest asserts that he met Defendant Perkins in the beginning of 2020 and was told that Defendant is a licensed electrician.  (Everest Decl. ¶ 1.)  Plaintiff “requested that [Perkins] install outdoor lighting and wiring to add cameras and a security system” to his property and the parties orally discussed the terms of the agreement.  (Ibid. at ¶ 2.)  After some months, Perkins submitted handwritten invoices to Defendant for a total of $19,131.03, including materials purchased from Home Depot.  (Ibid.at ¶ 3, Exs. A-B.)  Plaintiff sets forth several issues with the work done by Defendant, including damage to his property.  (Ibid. at ¶¶ 4-5.)  According to Plaintiff, he paid $19,131.03 to Perkins for work already performed and was presented with an additional bill for $10,647.18, which he refused to pay due to outstanding work and damage to his property.  (Ibid. at ¶ 5, Ex. C.)  Everest hired an attorney and learned that Perkins was not a licensed electrician and had been charging excessive amounts “in violation of law.”  (Ibid. at ¶ 6.)  Plaintiff’s counsel, Anne Singer, states that she was retained around November 2021 as Plaintiffs Hospice and Everest were being sued in Small Claims Court by Perkins.  (Singer Decl. ¶ 1, Ex. 1.)  Singer checked the California Contractors State License Board and did not find any information showing that Defendant “Perkins is or has ever been licensed as a contractor.”  (Ibid. at ¶ 2, Ex. D.)  Counsel has attached an image from the Contractors State License Board website showing that Defendant Perkins does not appear in any searches.  (Ibid.)  Moreover, Perkins has admitted in his discovery responses that he is not a licensed contractor.  (Ibid. at ¶¶ 3-4, Exs. E-F.)

 

Plaintiffs argue that according to Business & Professions Code § 7026, a contractor is “‘any person, who undertakes to ... construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve, move, wreck or demolish any building ... structure, project, development or improvement, or to do any part thereof, ... whether or not the performance of [such] work ... involves the addition to or fabrication into any [such] structure, project, development or improvement ... of any material or article of merchandise.’”  (Mot. p. 8.)  Moreover, pursuant to California Code of Regulations Title 16, Division 8, Article 3, Section 832.10, an electrical contractor is someone who: “places, installs, erects or connects any electrical wires, fixtures, appliances, apparatus, raceways, conduits, solar photovoltaic cells or any part thereof, which generate, transmit, transform or utilize electrical energy in any form or for any purpose.”  (Mot. p. 6.)  Although Perkins argues that he was hired as a handyman, Business & Professions Code § 7048 states that the statute does not apply when “the aggregate contract price which for labor, material, and all other items, is less than five hundred dollars ($500)” and is considered “casual, minor, or inconsequential nature.”  (Ibid. at p. 8.)  Here, Defendant was providing services for thousands of dollars, which required a contractor’s license.  (Ibid.)

 

Defendant, in propria persona, opposes Plaintiff’s Motion.  He states that when he met with Plaintiff Everest, he “made it perfectly clear that [he] did not have a Contractors nor an Electricians’ license.”  (Perkins Decl. ¶ 1.)  Defendant explains that “the majority [of the work he was asked to perform] were manual labor jobs” that “were basic, simple tasks.”  (Ibid. at ¶ 2.)  None of these tasks “required an electrician’s license to perform.”  (Ibid. at ¶ 2.)  Defendant has attached a list of the projects he was assigned by Plaintiff Everest, who “was the boss on all jobs.”  (Ibid. at ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. A.)  Perkins asserts that he never informed Everest that he had a professional license.  (Ibid. at ¶ 4.)  Defendant also contests that Motion was properly served as he found it in his mailbox on March 8, 2023, less than 75 days before the hearing, and was not notified in any other manner by Plaintiffs’ attorney regarding the Motion. (Ibid. at ¶ 6.)  However, the Court finds that service was proper as the moving papers were served on Defendant’s physical address via first class mail on February 9, 2023.  (Mot. p. 49.)

 

In their Reply, Plaintiffs argue that “it is clear from the invoices and receipts included in Plaintiff’s Motion that Defendant was providing contracting services” as defined by Business & Professions Code § 7026.  (Reply p. 1.)  The invoices and receipts submitted along with Plaintiff’s Motion demonstrate that he spent “hundreds of hours of work on Plaintiff’s residence” charging well over $500 for the total work performed.  (Ibid. at pp. 3-4.) 

 

            Having reviewed the evidence presented by Plaintiffs, including the invoices and receipts filed demonstrating the type of work performed and the amounts charged, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of producing sufficient evidence to show that that the work performed by Defendant Perkins constituted that of a “contractor” under Business & Professions Code § 7026 and required a license pursuant to § 7048.  Although, Defendant argues that he informed Plaintiffs that he was not a licensed contractor, the Court does not find that Defendant has presented evidence demonstrating that a triable issue of material fact exists regarding the requirement for Defendant to carry a license for the type of work he performed.  Thus, the Court finds that there is no triable issue of material fact as to the cause of action for violation of the California Business & Professions Code § 7031.

            Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED.

 

IV.           Conclusion & Order

 

For the foregoing reasons,

 

Plaintiffs Comforting Home Hospice, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Complaint’s First Cause of Action for violation of the California Business & Professions Code § 7031 is GRANTED. 

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.