Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 22STCP00837, Date: 2022-08-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCP00837    Hearing Date: August 2, 2022    Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS:      MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

MOVING PARTY:   Petitioner Pomona Islander, L.P.

RESP. PARTY:         None

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

(CCC § 798.85)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Pomona Islander, L.P.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED for attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,270.00 and costs in the amount of $416.43, for a total of $8,686.43.

SERVICE: 

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300)                 OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a)                                                 OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b))                     OK

OPPOSITION:          None filed as of July 31, 2022                [   ] Late                      [X] None

REPLY:                     None filed as of July 31, 2022                [   ] Late                      [X] None

ANALYSIS:

I.                Background

On March 9, 2022, Petitioner Pomona Islander, L.P. dba HilLea Village Mobile Home Park (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Permanent Injunction Pursuant to Civil Code § 798.88 against Respondent Edgar Carrasco (“Respondent”).

            On April 11, the Court granted Petitioner’s Motion in Part and found that Petitioner is the prevailing party.

On April 25, 2022, Petitioner filed a Memorandum of Costs and subsequently, on May 11, 2022, the instant Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs was filed, requesting $10,020.00 in attorney’s fees and $416.43 in costs.  (Beam Dec. ¶¶ 6-9.)

No opposition was filed.

II.              Legal Standard

A prevailing party in entitled to recover costs, including attorney’s fees, as a matter of right.  (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032(a)(4), 1032(b), 1033.5.)  Attorney’s fees are allowable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(10).)

Civil Code § 798.85 provides:

“In any action arising out of the provisions of this chapter the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs.  A party shall be deemed a prevailing party for the purposes of this section if the judgment is rendered in his or her favor or where the litigation is dismissed in his or her favor prior to or during the trial, unless the parties otherwise agree in the settlement or compromise.”

“A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under . . . rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).)  In a limited civil case, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of 30 days after service of a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or 90 days after the entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.822(a)(1).)

The calculation of attorney’s fees in California begins with the “lodestar” method – multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.  (Ibid. at p. 48, fn. 23.)  After the trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.)

As explained in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.:

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]  The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. . . . This approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” [Internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]

((2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)  “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  [Citations.]”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations are required.  The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.  The court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided.  The starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].)  However, California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets. (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103.)  An experienced trial judge is in a position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in his or her court.  (Ibid.; Serrano, 20 Cal.3d 25 at 49.)

III.            Discussion

The Motion was filed timely.

“Petitioner is the prevailing party in this action and is thus entitled to an award of its attorney’s fees and costs, pursuant to Civil Code section 798.85.  The amount of attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded shall be determined by the Court upon the filing of a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Memorandum of Costs by Petitioner.”  (4-20-22 Order Granting Petition.)  Here Petitioner filed the instant Motion on May 11, 2022, and the Memorandum of Costs on April 25, 2022.

Counsel for Petitioner lists some of the legal services provided by its law firm as “two (2) of the Seven Day Notices, preparing and filing the Petition, communicating with witnesses, preparing and filing the declarations in support of the Petition, and attending the hearing and obtaining the issuance of the Injunction Order,” among others listed in its invoices (Beam Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. 1.)  The hourly billing rates for the attorneys in the case are $350.00 (Attorney Beam) and $300.00 (Attorney Breen), and $140.00 for the paralegals.  (Ibid.)  Moreover, Attorney Breen spent one and a half (1.5) hours preparing the instant Motion and Attorney Beam spent an hour reviewing and revising the Motion, each at their respective hourly rates.  (Ibid. at ¶ 6.)  Attorney Beam further anticipates spending two (2) hours reviewing and preparing a reply if an opposition is filed, and at least two (2) hours preparing for and appearing at the hearing.  (Ibid.)  Petitioner requests $10,020.00 total in attorney’s fees.  (Ibid.)  Attorney Beam states that he has been practicing in this specialized area of law since 1984.  (Ibid. at ¶ 8.)

Petitioner also seeks $416.43 in costs – $225 for filing and motion fees, $95 for service of process, $25.86 for models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits, $70.57 in fees for electronic filing or service.  (Ibid. at ¶ 9.)

The Court considers counsels’ expertise, number of hours expended on each task, and other necessary factors, and finds Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees to be unreasonable.  Given Counsel’s extensive experience in the specific area of law, the number of hours spent on certain tasks appear to be excessive.  For example, the Court finds that three (3) hours spent on reviewing photos and prior notices and drafting the Seven Day Notice, a relatively three-page standard document, is excessive.  (Beam Decl. – Ex. 1.)  Similarly, the entry on November 9, 2021 for another 7-day notice seems excessive. Additionally, the instant Motion does not warrant two and a half (2.5) hours of time for drafting and two (2) hours of time for drafting a reply, as no opposition has been filed.  The Court finds $8,270.00 in attorney’s fees to be reasonable.

The Court finds the costs requested to be reasonable and necessary and awards costs in the amount of $416.43.

IV.           Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Pomona Islander, L.P.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED for attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,270.00 and costs in the amount of $416.43, for a total of $8,686.43.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.