Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 22STLC03567, Date: 2022-10-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STLC03567 Hearing Date: October 3, 2022 Dept: 25
PROCEEDINGS: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Montana Marketing and Sales, Inc.
RESP. PARTY: Plaintiff Old Republic Surety Company
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY
PROCEEDINGS
(CCP §§ 1281 et seq.)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant Montana Marketing’s Motion
to Compel Plaintiff Old Republic to Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is DENIED.
Defendant Montana Marketing’s Motion
to Compel all Defendants/claimants to Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is DENIED.
SERVICE:[1]
[X]
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) NOT OK
[X]
Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) NOT
OK
[X]
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) NOT
OK
OPPOSITION: Filed on August 19, 2022. [ ] Late [ ] None
REPLY: None filed as
of September 28, 2022. [ ] Late [X] None
ANALYSIS:
I.
Background
On May 26, 2022, Plaintiff Old Republic Surety Company (“Plaintiff”
or “Old Republic”) filed an action in interpleader against Defendants Montana
Marketing and Sales, Inc., dba AAA Green Builders (“Montana Marketing”), Alicia
Whitman (“Alicia”), Jorge Ocedgueda (“Jorge”), Marlene Ocedgueda (“Marlene”),
Damien Oregel (“Damien”), Sharinga Oregel (“Sharinga”), Christopher Taublee
(“Christopher”), and Gricelda Escobar (“Gricelda”), (collectively “Defendants”).
Since filing the initial Complaint, Plaintiff has amended
the Complaint to add the following Defendants Steve Walleman (“Steve”) and
Tereza Walleman (“Tereza”) (on June 10, 2022); April Davison (“April”), Barbara
Hurr (“Barbara”), and Jack Hurr (“Jack”) (on June 21, 2022); and Rosa Saenz
Kollar (“Rosa”) and Bertha Saenz (“Bertha”) (on July 27, 2022).
Plaintiff has also requested dismissal of several
Defendants. Pursuant to Plaintiff’s
requests, the Court has dismissed the following Defendants: Alicia Whitman and
Christopher Taulbee (on June 23, 2022); April Davison (on July 25, 2022); and
Barbara Hurr and Jack Hurr (on August 10, 2022). (6-17-22 Request for Dismissal; 7-21-22
Request for Dismissal; 8-2-22 Request for Dismissal.)
On July 29, 2022, Defendants Damien and Sharina Oregel,
in propria persona, filed a General Denial. Other defendants have been named,
but not served. Others have been served
but have not filed answers and Plaintiff has not requested a default be entered.
On July 5, 2022, Defendant Montana Marketing filed the
instant Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings (the “Motion”). On August 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Limited
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion (“Opposition”). No reply has been filed.
On September 20, 2022, the Court noted that due to a
clerical error, the hearing on the instant Motion and Non-Jury Trial were
inadvertently taken off calendar. (9-20-22
Minute Order.) The hearing on the Motion
was rescheduled to October 3, 2022, and Non-Jury Trial was rescheduled to
November 27, 2023.
II.
Legal
Standard
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
§1281.2, generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the
petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists;
(2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for
revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the
arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting¿rulings on common issues.
When seeking to compel arbitration, the
initial burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the existence of a
valid arbitration agreement by prepondernace of evidence. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021), 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-65.) It is sufficient for the moving
party to produce a copy of the arbitration agreement or set forth the
agreement’s provisions. (Gamboa,
72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) The
burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove by a preponderance of
evidence any defense to enforcement of the contract or the arbitration clause. (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at 842; Gamboa,
72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) Subsequently,
the moving party must establish with the preponderance of admissible evidence a
valid arbitration agreement between the parties. (Ibid.) The trial court then weighs all the evidence
submitted and uses its discretion to make a final determination. (Ibid.) “California law, ‘like [federal law], reflects
a strong policy favoring arbitration agreements and requires close judicial
scrutiny of waiver claims.’” (Wagner Const. Co. v. Pacific Mechanical
Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 31.)
If the court orders arbitration, then the court shall
stay the action until arbitration is completed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)
III.
Discussion
Defendant Montana Marketing brings the instant Motion
seeking to compel arbitration of “any and all complaints or claims which arise
from the performance of of [sic] a contract subject to an arbitration clause”
and to stay proceedings pending the arbitration. (Mot. p. 1.)
Defendant Montana Marketing explains that each bond claimant signs a
written contract with Montana Marketing for services to be performed. (Ibid. at p. 3.) Here, Plaintiff Old Republic’s claims arise
from “the written contract mutually entered into and executed by the
bond claimants (named defendants to this interpleader action) and defendant
Montana Marketing and Sales, Inc.” (Ibid.) The written contract between one of the
claimants and Montana Marketing is redacted and attached as Exhibit A. Defendant also cites to the arbitration
clause of the contract in the body of the Motion:
In the event of any dispute or a
claim arising out of or relating to this agreement, or the enforcement or
interpretation hereof, the parties agree that any such dispute or claim shall
be determined exclusively by binding arbitration before the Better Business
Bureau if Contractor is a member of the same, or if Contractor is not a member
of the BBB, then in accordance with the Construction Industry Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, and the judgment upon the award rendered by
the Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
NOTICE: BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE
BELOW, YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED
IN THE ARBITARTION OF DISPUTES PROVISION DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AS
PROVIDED BY CALIFORNIA LAW, AND YOU ARE GIVING UP ANY RIGHTS YOU MIGHT POSSESS
TO HAVE THE DISPUTE LITIGATED IN COURT OR JURY TRIAL. BY INTIALING IN THE SPACE
BELOW, YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR JUDICIAL RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY AND APPEAL, UNLESS
THOSE RIGHTS ARE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THE ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES
PROVISION. IF YOU REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION AFTER AGREEING TO THIS
PROVISION, YOU MAY BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE, OR OTHER APPLICABLE LAWS. YOUR AGREEMENT TO THIS
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS VOLUNTARY. “WE HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE FOREGOING,
AND AGREE TO SUBMIT DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED “ARBITRATION
OF DISPUTES PROVISION TO NEUTRAL ARBITRATION”
(Ibid. at pp. 3-4.)
Defendant Montana Marketing argues
that “[a]ll of the claimants/defendants claims stem from the entry and
performance of the contract between the defendants/claimants and defendant
Montana Marketing and Sales, Inc.” (Ibid.
at p. 6.) Defendant states that it has
met its burden of showing the existence of an arbitration agreement and
claimants/Defendants cannot show grounds “to defeat the validity of the
underlying arbitration agreement” because Montana Marketing has not waived its
rights to arbitration, there are no grounds for recission of the agreement, and
there are no non-arbitrable third-party claims that could result in conflicting
rulings. (Ibid. at pp. 6-7.) Defendant also requests a stay of the
proceedings pending arbitration. (Ibid.
at p. 8.)
Plaintiff
submits a Limited Opposition to the Motion and argues that its “sole
involvement in this matter was to issue a statutory contractor’s license
bond.” (Oppos. p. 1.) It was not party to any contract signed by
the parties and has not agreed to any arbitration agreement, so it cannot be
compelled to arbitration. (Ibid.
at p. 2.) Furthermore, it is not a
third-party beneficiary of the contract.
(Ibid.) Nevertheless, it
does not object to the proceedings being stayed while the claimants arbitrate
the controversy. (Ibid.)
No reply
has been filed.
First, the Court finds that
Defendant Montana Marketing has not met its burden to show that it can compel
Plaintiff Old Republic to arbitration.
The Court cannot consider Exhibit A, attached to the Motion, because it
has not been authenticated. (See
Evidence Code § 1400 et seq.) In
reviewing the language of the arbitration provision cited by Defendant Montana
Marketing, the Court finds that there is no indication that Old Republic, as a
surety, is party to the agreement and may be compelled to arbitration. Furthermore, the Complaint filed in the
instant case is an action in interpleader and does not establish any dispute
between Plaintiff and Defendant Montana Marketing that would be subject to
arbitration. For this reason, Montana
Marketing’s Motion to Compel Old Republic to arbitration is DENIED.
Second, Defendant Montana Marketing
cannot establish its right to compel arbitration of any claimants/Defendants in
this case based on the Complaint in Interpleader filed by Plaintiff. Montana Marketing has attached a copy of a
redacted agreement that is not authenticated and not admissible, and thus
cannot demonstrate that any particular Defendant entered into a contract with
Montana Marketing. In order to compel
arbitration of any claimant, Montana Marketing must first establish the
existence of a dispute through its own cause of action against the Defendant/claimant. For this reason, Montana Marketing’s Motion
to Compel all Defendants/claimants to arbitration is DENIED.
IV.
Conclusion
& Order
For the reasons discussed above,
Defendant Montana Marketing’s Motion
to Compel Plaintiff Old Republic to Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is DENIED.
Defendant Montana Marketing’s Motion
to Compel all Defendants/claimants to Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is DENIED.
Moving party is ordered to give
notice.