Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 22STLC04567, Date: 2023-04-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STLC04567 Hearing Date: April 28, 2023 Dept: 25
PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ALTERNATIVELY SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Monica Ford
RESP. PARTY: Defendant Timothy Harris
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
ALTERNATIVELY, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
(CCP § 437c)
TENTATIVE RULING:
The hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, or alternatively, Summary Adjudication is CONTINUED to MAY
31, 2023 at 10:30 a.m. in Department 25 at the SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. Plaintiff is ordered to file supplemental
papers addressing the issues discussed herein at least 16 court days before the
next scheduled hearing.
SERVICE:
[X] Proof of Service Timely
Filed (CRC 3.1300) OK
[X] Correct Address (CCP 1013,
1013a) OK
[X] 75/80 Day Lapse (CCP 12c
and 1005 (b)) OK
OPPOSITION: Filed on April 11, 2023. [ ] Late [ ] None
REPLY: Filed on April
12, 2023. [ ] Late [ ] None
ANALYSIS:
I.
Background
On July 11, 2022, Plaintiff Monica Ford (“Plaintiff”)
filed an action against Defendant Timothy Harris (“Defendant”) for unlawful
retention of security deposit pursuant to Civil Code § 1950.5, breach of
residential lease agreement, negligence, and conversion.
On November 2, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer to the
Complaint.
On February 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion
for Summary Judgment or alternatively, Summary Adjudication (“Motion”). On April 11, 2023, Defendant filed an
Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”) and Plaintiff filed a Reply to the
Opposition (“Reply”) on April 12, 2023.
II.
Legal
Standard
A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of
producing evidentiary facts sufficient to entitle him/her to judgment as a
matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. §
437c(c).) The moving party must make an
affirmative showing that he/she is entitled to judgment irrespective of whether
or not the opposing party files an opposition. (Villa
v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 742-743.) Thus, “the initial burden is always on
the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues
of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519 (citing
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 850.). When a plaintiff seeks summary
judgment, he/she must produce admissible evidence on each element of each cause
of action on which judgment is sought. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1).) The moving
party’s “affidavits must cite evidentiary facts, not legal conclusions or
‘ultimate’ facts” and the courts must construe the evidence in support of the
opposing party, resolving any doubts in favor of the opposing party. (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639; Scalf, 128 Cal.App.4th at 1519;
Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
The opposing party on a motion for summary judgment is
under no evidentiary burden to produce rebuttal evidence until the moving party
meets his or her initial movant’s burden. (Binder
v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Once the initial movant’s burden is met, then
the burden shifts to the opposing party to show, with admissible evidence, that
there is a triable issue requiring the weighing procedures of trial. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p).) The opposing party may not simply rely on
his/her allegations to show a triable issue but must present evidentiary facts
that are substantial in nature and rise beyond mere speculation. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162.) Summary judgment must be granted “if
all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there
is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
As to any alternative request for summary adjudication of
issues, such alternative relief must be clearly set forth in the Notice of
Motion and the general burden-shifting rules apply but the issues upon which
summary adjudication may be sought are limited by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be
granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative
defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Ibid.)
III.
Discussion
Plaintiff seeks a court order
granting summary judgment in her favor and against Defendant on grounds that there
are no triable issues of material fact as to any of the causes of action. (Mot. p. 2.) Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks summary
adjudication as to each of the four causes of action set forth in the
Complaint. (Ibid.)
A. Unlawful Retention of Security
Deposit, Civil Code § 1950.5
Civil Code § 1950.5 applies to
security deposits for residential property used as a tenant’s dwelling. (Civ. Code, § 1950.5(a).)
“The elements of an action for
wrongful retention of a security deposit under Civil Code § 1950.5 are:
(1) the plaintiff paid a security deposit; (2) the security deposit was for a
residential property; (3) the plaintiff used the property as a dwelling; and
(4) the amounts deducted by the defendant were not reasonably necessary. If the
plaintiff is seeking punitive damages, then it must also be shown that the
defendant made the deductions in bad faith.”
(Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks
Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
874, 899.) The bad faith retention of a
security deposit may subject the landlord to statutory damages of up to twice
the amount of the security deposit in addition to actual damages. (Civ. Code, § 1950.5(l).)
As used in § 1950.5, “security”
is defined as “any payment, deposit, or charge, including, but not limited to,
any payment, fee, deposit, or charge, except as provided in Section 1950.6,
that is imposed at the beginning of the tenancy to be used to reimburse the
landlord for costs associated with processing a new tenant or that is imposed
as an advance payment of rent, used or to be used for any purpose” including to
compensate the landlord for the tenants default in the payment of rent, to
repair damages to the premises leased, to clear the premises upon termination
of the tenancy and to return the unit to the same level of cleanliness it was
in at the inception of the tenancy, or to remedy future defaults by the tenant
in any obligation under the rental agreement.
(Civil Code §1950.5(b).)
No later than 21 days after the
tenant has vacated the premises, the landlord must serve via personal delivery
or first-class mail a copy of an itemized statement indicating the basis for
and the amount of any security received and the disposition of the security
funds and must return any remaining portion of the security to the tenant. (Civ. Code, § 1950.5(g)(1).) If a landlord does not provide the tenant with
an itemized statement of the portion of the security deposit retained within
the required 21-days, then the entire security deposit must be returned to the
tenant. (Granberry v. Islay
Investments (1995) 9 Cal.App.4th 738, 744-45.)
“Within a reasonable time after
notification of either party’s intention to terminate the tenancy, or before
the end of the lease term, the landlord shall notify the tenant in writing of
the tenant’s option to request an initial inspection and of the tenant’s right
to be present at the inspection.” (Civ.
Code §
1950.5(f).) The inspection shall be
conducted “at a reasonable time, but no earlier than two weeks before the
termination or end of the lease date” and “shall be to allow the tenant an
opportunity to remedy identified deficiencies.”
(Ibid.)
“Proof of the existence of and
the amount of a security deposit may be established by any credible evidence,
including, but not limited to, a canceled check, a receipt, a lease indicating
the requirement of a deposit as well as the amount, prior consistent statements
or actions of the landlord or tenant, or a statement under penalty of perjury
that satisfies the credibility requirements set forth in § 780 of the Evidence
Code.” (Civ. Code, § 1950.5(o).)
In support of her Motion, Plaintiff
has presented the following evidence:
1. Exhibit 1 – Residential Lease
Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant.
(Verdun Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.)
2. Exhibit
2 – Itemized Statement Email. (Ibid.
at ¶ 3, Ex. 2.)
3. Exhibit
3 – Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission. (Ibid. at ¶ 4, Ex. 3.)
4. Exhibit
4 – Certified Copy of Deposition Transcript of Defendant Harris. (Ex. 4.)
Based on this evidence, Plaintiff states that Defendant
rented the property located at 999 North Holliston Ave, Pasadena, CA 91104
(“Property”) as a residential rental property for fifteen (15) years. (Ex. 4 – Depos. 12:25-13:12) Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a residential
Lease Agreement for the Property on July 8, 2018. (Ex. 1 – Lease Agreement; Ex. 3 – RFA #1; Ex.
4 – Depos. 5:12-5:22, 5:23-6:1, 7:12-7:25.)
On or around the same date, Plaintiff paid Defendant a security deposit
of $3,350 as part of the Lease Agreement for the Property. (Ex. 1 – Lease Agreement; Ex. 3 – RFA #2; Ex.
4 – Depos. 9:15-9:21.) Plaintiff gave
Defendant notice of her intent to terminate the tenancy on or about April 1,
2022, about six weeks before the move out date.
(Ex. 4 – Depos. 21:12-22:5.)
Defendant has admitted that he did not “obtain advance express consent
in the form of a mutual agreement” before serving the itemized statement of the
security deposit on Plaintiff by email.
(Ex. 4 – Depos. 31:10-32:6.)
Defendant also admits that he did not notify Plaintiff of her right to
an initial inspection two (2) weeks before the move out date and did not
provide Plaintiff with “an initial inspection itemized statement” that would
give her the opportunity to remedy any issues prior to deduction from the
security deposit. (Ex. 4 – Depos.
21:12-22:5, 77:4-78:3.) Plaintiff moved
out of the Property on May 14, 2022.
(Ex. 4 – Depos. 97:12-97:19, 98:8-99:6.)
Defendant was required to return the security deposit and provide an
itemized statement of any deductions with supporting evidence by June 4,
2022. (Ex. 4. – Depos, 97:12-97:19.)
However, Defendant has admitted that he did not send the itemized list
of deductions within 21 days of the date that Plaintiff vacated the Property. (Ex. 4 – Depos., 98:8-99:6.) On June 20, 2022, Defendant sent an itemized
statement by email, but Plaintiff did not receive this document by personal
service or U.S. mail. (Ex. 4 –
Depos. 19:2-20:10, 31:1-31:9.) Defendant
has admitted that he did not return any portion of the security deposit. (Ex. 4 – Depos. 18:24-19:1.) Thus, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff
notice of her right to an initial inspection, did not conduct an initial
inspection, and withheld her entire security deposit. (Ex. 4 – Depos. 21:12-22:5.) When Defendant did send Plaintiff an itemized
deduction, it was not properly served personally or by mail and did not contain
any supporting documents. (Ex. 4 –
Depos. 20:11-20:17.) Defendant has
acknowledged that he does not have sufficient knowledge about his
responsibilities regarding security deposits, has never taken any courses or educated
himself on how to properly handle security deposits. (Ex. 4 – Depos. 12:13-12:24, 58:3-59:21.) Moreover, he did not know that he was legally
obligated to provide Plaintiff notice of her right to an initial inspection
after her notice to vacate and thus, did not provide such notice. (Ex. 4 – Depos. 23:15-25:4.) Defendant also did not know that he had to
obtain express consent to serve the itemized statement of deductions by email
and thus, did not obtain express consent.
(Ex. 4 – Depos. 32:7-32:17.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden of
demonstrating that Defendant has violated Civil Code § 1950.5 due to failure to notify
Plaintiff of her rights to an initial inspection, failure to properly and
timely serve Plaintiff with itemized deductions, and as a result, failure to
return the full amount of the security deposit to Plaintiff.
In response, Defendant has submitted his own
declaration. Defendant does not dispute the
following statements presented by Plaintiff.
Defendant rented the Property as a residential property for 15 years,
and entered into a residential Lease Agreement with Plaintiff and her husband
Tom Ford for this Property on or about July 8, 2018. (Def. SS ¶¶ 1-3; Harris Decl. ¶¶ 2-3,
Ex. A.) A security deposit in the amount
of $3,350 was paid to Defendant. (Harris
Decl. ¶ 4.) On or around April 1, 2022, Plaintiff gave notice of
intent to terminate the tenancy. (Ibid.
at ¶ 5.) On May 14, 2022,
Plaintiff vacated the Property. (Ibid.
at ¶ 9.) Defendant was obligated to
return the deposit and provide an itemized statement of deductions with
supporting documentation by June 4, 2022.
(Ibid. at ¶ 10; Harris Decl. ¶ 17.) Defendant “has a lack of knowledge about his
responsibilities when it comes to handling security deposits, admitting he has
never taken any training courses, read any books, or taken any steps to educate
himself about the proper handling of a security deposit.” (Def. SS ¶ 16.). He did not know that he had
to provide notice of Plaintiff’s right to an initial inspection and thus, did
not do so. (Ibid. at ¶ 17.)
However, Defendant disputes the following
statements. The security deposit was
paid by both lessees, Monica and Tom Ford.
(Def. SS ¶ 4; Ex.
1 – Lease Agreement; Harris Decl. ¶ 2.)
The Fords vacated the property two days after they stopped paying rent,
on May 14, 2022, instead of May 12, 2022.
(Ibid. at ¶ 12.) Defendant was unaware
that the itemized statement had to be served by mail or of Plaintiff’s rights
concerning an initial inspection before moving out. (Def. SS ¶¶ 6-8; Harris Decl. ¶¶ 7, 18-19;
Ex. 4 – Depos. 24:1-25:4.) Defendant did
send the itemized deductions, which he did by email on June 6, 2022, together
with receipts. (Def. SS ¶¶ 11-12, 15,
18; Harris Decl. ¶ 7, 17, 21, Ex. E.)
Defendant did not deny Plaintiff an initial inspection and offered to
return the security deposit after the lawsuit was initiated. (Ibid. at ¶¶ 13-14; Harris Decl. ¶ 17,
Ex. E.)
Defendant adds that “[t]he property was in very good
condition when leased to the Fords.”
(Harris Decl. ¶ 5.) The
Fords did not inform Defendant that “they planned to sublease any portion of
the property.” (Ibid. at ¶
6.) On July 10, 2018, Defendant’s agent
informed Defendant that the Fords would take over the gardener’s obligations
and deduct $100 from the month’s rent. (Ibid.
at ¶ 7.) Without Defendant’s approval,
the Fords discharged the gardener and did not take care of the
landscaping. (Ibid. at ¶ 8.) Defendant had to incur $2,400 in expenses in
restoring and cleaning the landscaping.
(Ibid.) Defendant had to
also pay $400 to remove a concrete and stone fire pit that was installed
without his permission and $360 for cleaning of the Property. (Ibid.) The Fords did not pay rent for two days, in
the amount of $216, and accordingly the total costs to Defendant, $3,376,
exceeded the amount of the security deposit.
(Ibid.) Furthermore,
Defendant had to pay a $113 citation to the City of Pasadena because the Fords
subleased a portion of the Property without informing Defendant. (Ibid. at ¶¶ 9-10, Ex. C.) Finally, Defendant has submitted estimates of
the costs to refinish his piano that was exposed to direct sunlight and damaged
due to the Fords’ conduct, in violation of the Lease Agreement. (Ibid. at ¶ 11, Ex. D.)
Defendant adds personal reasons
related to his wife’s immigration application, his business, and health, that
impacted his ability to handle the instant matter. (Harris Decl. ¶¶ 13-16.) As a result of these reasons, Defendant was
overwhelmed and could not deal with the Plaintiff’s decision to vacate
unexpectedly. (Ibid. at ¶ 16.) He has not acted in bad faith or with malice
toward the Fords and has been accommodating to them throughout the lease. (Ibid.at ¶¶ 18-19.) Defendant also attached the full deposition,
arguing that Plaintiff’s exhibit containing portions of the deposition is not
complete. (Ibid. at ¶ 21, Ex. F.)
In her Reply, Plaintiff argues that
“Defendant did not raise a single issue of material fact – and in fact admits
the violations.” (Reply p. 1.) Defendant asserts that he was ignorant of the
law, however, § 1950.5 does
not required awareness of the statutory requirements. (Ibid.) Moreover, acting in bad faith is also not
required to establish a violation of § 1950.5, as a finding of bad faith
pertains to the issue of damages, not liability. (Ibid. at p. 4.)
Plaintiff also objects to portions of Defendant’s
declaration that discuss Plaintiff’s alleged conduct throughout the lease that
caused Defendant to incur expenses on the ground of relevance. (4-12-23 Response ¶¶ 23-26.) Plaintiff states that “this evidence may be
useful for mitigation at trial, or in a cross-complaint, it is not relevant for
the matters raised in this hearing.” (Ibid.) Moreover, Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s
discussion of the circumstances around his wife’s immigration status, business,
and health, which are not relevant to matters raised at this hearing or a valid
defense to liability under §1950.5. (Ibid. at ¶¶ 27-29.)
Finally, Plaintiff objects to the
relevance of Defendant’s statement regarding his offer to return the security
deposit after the lawsuit was filed, arguing that “efforts to resolve the
dispute after the lawsuit is filed cannot negate liability” and are not
relevant. (Ibid. at p. 5.)
The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s
Objections #1-14 as they may be relevant to the determination of whether
Defendant acted in bad faith.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has
sustained her burden of showing that there is no material dispute of fact
regarding Defendant’s violation of Civil Code § 1950.5 and unlawful retention of the security deposit. However, the Court finds that there is a
triable issue of material fact as to the determination of damages stemming from
the violation of § 1950.5.
Civil Code § 1950.5(l), “[T]he bad
faith claim or retention by a landlord … of the security or any portion thereof
in violation of this section, or the bad faith demand of replacement security
in violation of subdivision (j), may subject the landlord or the landlord’s
successors in interest to statutory damages of up to twice the amount of the
security, in addition to actual damages. The court may award damages for
bad faith whenever the facts warrant that award, regardless of whether the
injured party has specifically requested relief. In an action under this
section, the landlord or the landlord’s successors in interest shall have the
burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the amounts claimed or the
authority pursuant to this section to demand additional security deposits.” [Emphasis added.]
Here, Plaintiff seeks statutory
damages “[t]wo times the amount of the entire deposit.” (Compl. p. 16.) However, Plaintiff’s evidence is not
sufficient to show Defendant’s failure to return the security deposit was
conducted in bad faith.
For this reason, Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Adjudication as to the first cause of action is DENIED.
B. Breach of Residential Lease Agreement,
Negligence, and Conversion Causes of Action
For the following causes of action – breach of
residential lease agreement, negligence, and conversion, Plaintiff incorporates
facts set forth in the first cause of action for violation of Civil Code §
1950.5.
A motion for summary judgment “shall include a separate
statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the
moving party contends are undisputed.”
(Code of Civ. Proc. § 437c(b)(1).)
Moreover, California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350, sets forth the
following requirements for the Separate Statement:
(1) The Separate Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts in support of a motion must separately identify:
(A) Each cause of action, claim
for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the
motion; and
(B) Each supporting material fact
claimed to be without dispute with respect to the cause of action, claim for
damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the
motion.
(2) The separate statement should
include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the
disposition of the motion.
Here, Court finds that Plaintiff’s Separate Statement is
defective and does not “plainly and concisely” present the facts that are
relevant to the disposition of the second through fourth causes of action. The Court cannot discern which of the facts
presented for the first cause of action are dispositive to the elements for
breach of lease agreement, negligence, and conversion. The Court also notes that Plaintiff has
included a fifth cause of action for violation of the Business and Professions
Code §17200. (Sep. St. p.
6.) The fifth cause of action is not
included in Plaintiff’s Complaint or anywhere in the instant Motion.
Accordingly, the hearing on the
instant Motion is continued. Plaintiff
is ordered to file a supplemental Separate Statement that presents facts that
are material to the elements for causes of action for breach of lease
agreement, negligence, and conversion.
IV.
Conclusion
& Order
For the foregoing reasons,
The hearing on
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or alternatively, Summary Adjudication
is CONTINUED to MY 31, 2023 at 10:30 a.m. in Department 25 at the SPRING STREET
COURTHOUSE. Plaintiff is ordered to file
supplemental papers addressing the issues discussed herein at least 16 court
days before the next scheduled hearing.
Moving party is ordered to give
notice.