Judge Katherine Chilton, Case 22STLC05300 2023-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 22STLC05300, Date: 2023-03-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STLC05300 Hearing Date: March 28, 2023 Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS: MOTION TO STRIKE AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT; MOTION TO RECLASSIFY TO UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Crestwood Hills Association

RESP. PARTY: Plaintiff Timothy D. Rand-Lewis

MOTION TO STRIKE;

MOTION TO RECLASSIFY

(CCP §§ 403.040, 435-436)

TENTATIVE RULING:

The Motion Requesting that the Court Exercise Its Discretion to Strike Plaintiff’s Amendment to Complaint filed by Crestwood Hills Association is DENIED.

The Motion to Reclassify filed by Crestwood Hills Association is DENIED. Moreover, Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

SERVICE:

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) [OK]

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) [OK]

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) [OK]

Motion to Strike

OPPOSITION: Filed on 2/10/23 and 3/8/23. [ ] Late [ ] None

REPLY: Filed on 2/15/23 and 3/14/23. [ ] Late [ ] None

Motion to Reclassify

OPPOSITION: Filed on February 2, 2023. [ ] Late [ ] None

REPLY: Filed on February 8, 2023. [ ] Late [ ] None

ANALYSIS:

I. Background

On August 10, 2022, Plaintiff Timothy D. Rand-Lewis (“Plaintiff”) filed his complaint in limited jurisdiction court against Defendant Crestwood Hills Association (“Defendant”), alleging defamation, negligence, violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200, violation of the Unruh Act, and a general claim for “injunctive relief.” Plaintiff sought damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. Limited civil jurisdiction courts do not have authority to grant permanent injunctive relief or declaratory relief.

On September 8, 2022, Defendant filed a Special Motion to Strike (anti-SLAPP). Because anti-SLAPP cannot be heard in limited jurisdiction courts, on September 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application to Strike Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike.

On September 12, 2022, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Reclassify (“Motion to Reclassify”) the case to unlimited jurisdiction on the basis that Plaintiff requests relief that is not available in a limited jurisdiction court.

On September 13, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application and ordered the entire action to be reclassified as a civil unlimited case. (9-13-22 Minute Order.) The case was reclassified on September 19, 2022. (9-19-22 Notice of Reclassification.)

On September 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Errata” requesting that the Court strike the causes of action and remedies that he pleaded that caused the case to be reclassified, stating that his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were included “due to inadvertence of counsel in using a prior complaint format.” (Notice of Errata p. 1.)

On September 21, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Notice of Errata.

On September 26, 2022, the Court erroneously entered default against Defendant. (9-26-22 Request for Entry of Default.)

On September 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a “Stipulation to the Reclassification of the Case from Civil Unlimited to Civil Limited.” However, this was not a stipulation between the parties – it was merely Plaintiff’s statement that the case should be reclassified based on his “Notice of Errata.” On October 18, 2022, Plaintiff also filed an Ex Parte Application for Order Reclassifying the Case as a Limited Civil Case. On October 19, 2022, the Court ordered the case to be reclassified to limited jurisdiction court. (10-19-22 Minute Order.) The case was reclassified as a limited civil case and reassigned to Department 25 of the Spring Street Courthouse. (10-28-22 Minute Order.)

On November 10, 2022, the Court denied Defendant’s Ex Parte Application for Order Striking Order Reclassifying and Reassigning Matter to Limited Civil Jurisdiction. (11-10-22 Minute Order.)

On November 29, 2022, the Court granted Defendant’s Ex Parte Application for an Order Setting Aside Default and vacated default against Defendant, entered on September 26, 2022. (11-29-22 Minute Order.)

On December 29, 2022, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Reclassify, filed on September 12, 2022, to February 16, 2023. (12-29-22 Minute Order.)

On January 5, 2023, the Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Strike Notice of Errata. (1-5-23 Minute Order.) However, the Court, on its own motion, struck the Notice of Errata filed by Plaintiff. (Ibid.) On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Verified Amendment to and Correction of Complaint.

On January 17, 2023, Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Verified Compliant, “under protest.” (Answer p. 1.)

On January 25, 2023, Defendant filed the instant Motion Requesting the Court Exercise Its Discretion to Strike Plaintiff’s Amendment to His Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure § 436 (“MTS”). On February 10, 2023, Judge Windham granted Defendant’s Ex Parte Application for An Order Advancing the Hearing on Defendant's Motion and advanced the hearing to February 16, 2023. (2-10-23 Minute Order.) Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the instant Motion to Strike on February 10, 2023. On February 15, 2023, Defendant filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Strike.

On February 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Reclassify. Defendant filed a Reply to the Opposition on February 8, 2023.

On February 16, 2023, the Court noted Plaintiff’s objection to the advanced hearing on the Motion and reduced time to oppose it, and continued the hearing. (2-16-23 Minute Order.) The Court permitted Plaintiff to file a supplemental opposition and Defendant to reply to the opposition. (Ibid.) On March 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a supplemental Opposition to the MTS and on March 14, 2023, Defendant filed a supplemental Reply to the Opposition to MTS.

On March 21, 2023, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing to March 28, 2023. (3-21-23 Minute Order.)

II. Legal Standard & Discussion

A. Motion to Strike

California law authorizes a party’s motion to strike matter from an opposing party’s pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper. (Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 435; 436(a).) Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings that are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable laws, rules, or orders. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 436(b).)

However, motions to strike in limited jurisdiction courts may only challenge pleadings on the basis that “the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 92(d).) The Code of Civil Procedure also authorizes the Court to act on its own initiative to strike matter “at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 436.)

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure § 435.5 requires that “[b]efore filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a).)

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s Verified Amendment to and Correction of Complaint on the grounds that it was filed after Defendant’s special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP) and “plaintiff may not amend their complaint to avoid a special motion to strike.” (MTS p. 2.) Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion has not been heard by the Court and, thus, the Court should strike “Plaintiff’s newest attempt to avoid the Anti-SLAPP Motion.” (Ibid. at p. 8.) On February 9, 2023, Defendant filed an Ex Parte Application for an Order Advancing the Hearing on the Motion to Strike; Plaintiff opposed the Ex Parte Application. On February 10, 2023, Judge Windham granted Defendant’s Ex Parte Application and advanced the hearing on the Motion to Strike to February 16, 2023. (2-10-23 Minute Order.)

On February 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to Strike. Plaintiff argues that a Motion to Strike in limited civil jurisdiction can only be filed on the ground that “the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint,” citing Code of Civil Procedure § 92. (Oppos. to MTS pp. 1-2.) Thus, the Motion should be denied due to Defendant’s “improper and bad faith attempt to circumvent Code of Civil Procedure § 92.” (Ibid. at p. 2.) Furthermore, Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was never properly filed as such motions are not permitted in limited jurisdiction courts. (Ibid.) Plaintiff also states that “he objects to the Court’s February 10, 2023, Order advancing the hearing on Defendant’s Motion as said Order violates Plaintiff’s right to due process” as it was issued by a judge who is not assigned to the case and without notice to Plaintiff. (Ibid. at pp. 2-3.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that it properly filed the Amendment to the Complaint and did not require permission from the Court to amend the Complaint. (Ibid.)

In its Reply, filed on February 15, 2023, Defendant argues that Code of Civil Procedure § 92 does not limit the Court from striking improper matters on its own discretion, as it has done in prior instances. (Reply p. 3.) Furthermore, Defendant states that November 29, 2022, the Court already found that Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was not void or invalid because it set aside default against Defendant on the basis that it had filed an anti-SLAPP motion. (Ibid. at p. 4.) Thus, given that the anti-SLAPP motion is valid, “Plaintiff should have brought a motion for reconsideration” regarding the Court’s ruling that “Defendant’s Anti-SLAPP Motion is valid and pending.” (Ibid.) In the footnote, Defendant adds that if the Anti-SLAPP Motion was void, “then the Court should not have found the default to be improper.” (Ibid., Fn. 1.) Therefore, Defendant reiterates its argument that amending the Complaint after the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion is impermissible and Plaintiff’s argument that he did not need permission to amend the Complaint “is inapt and should be rejected as inapplicable here.” (Ibid. at p. 5.) Finally, Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s argument that his due process rights were violated by the Court’s order to advance the hearing as Plaintiff does not cite any authority for its arguments. (Ibid. at p. 6.) Instead, Code of Civil Procedure § 1005 permits the Court or judge to advance a hearing. (Ibid.)

Given the Plaintiff’s objection to the Court’s ruling to advance the hearing to February 16, 2023, and the reduced time to oppose the Motion, on February 16, 2023, the Court continued the hearing and provided Plaintiff with additional time to file a supplemental Opposition. (2-16-23 Minute Order.) The Court also allowed Defendant to file a reply to the Plaintiff’s Opposition. (Ibid.)

On March 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Opposition to the Motion on the following grounds:

1) Code of Civil Procedure §92 bars Defendant’s motion to strike as it is not on a proper basis. Even if it is proper, Defendant has not met and conferred with Plaintiff prior to filing the Motion.

2) Defendant seeks to strike the amended Complaint due to its anti-SLAPP motion; however, an anti-SLAPP motion cannot be filed in limited jurisdiction courts, pursuant to §92.

3) No legal or factual basis exists for the Motion.

4) Plaintiff filed the amendment “to correct scrivener’s errors” and only seeks relief in limited jurisdiction court. The Amendment was filed timely, and Plaintiff did not require leave of Court.

5) The “improper and void anti-SLAPP motion” did not bar Plaintiff’s amendment.

(3-8-23 Supp. Oppos. pp. 2-3.)

Defendant filed a Supplemental Reply on March 14, 2023. Defendant states that “[t]he only substantive difference between the February 10 Opposition and Rand-Lewis’s Supplemental Opposition is the inclusion of an argument that Crestwood was required to meet and confer with opposing counsel prior to filing the 436 Motion.” (3-14-23 Supp. Reply p. 2.) For this reason, Defendant only addresses Plaintiff’s reference to the meet and confer requirement. (Ibid.) Defendant argues that “[a] Motion to Strike is therefore different from the 436 Motion” because the 436 motion requests that the Court exercise its own discretion to strike the Amendment. (Ibid. at p. 3.) For this reason, the instant Motion does not require parties to meet and confer, unlike a motion to strike as set forth in § 435. (Ibid.) Alternatively, if the Court finds that a § 436 motion requires parties to meet and confer, failure to meet and confer is not grounds to grant or deny a motion to strike, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 435.5(a)(4).

First, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Strike, as it is not on any permissible basis in a limited jurisdiction court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 92(d).

Next, the Court considers the parties’ arguments to determine whether it should exercise its discretion to strike the amendment to the Complaint, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 436. The Court notes that it does not agree with Defendant’s interpretation of its November 29, 2022, Order. On November 29, 2022, the Court set aside default entered against Defendant, not because the anti-SLAPP motion was proper, but because “Plaintiff’s counsel breached his ethical and statutory obligations by failing to notify opposing counsel of the intent to seek entry of a default” and “the fact that Defendant had filed two responsive motions that had not been heard.” (11-29-22 Minute Order, p. 2.) The Court did not make any ruling regarding the validity of the anti-SLAPP motion. (Ibid.)

The Court notes that anti-SLAPP motions are not permitted in limited jurisdiction courts. (Code of Civil Procedure § 92(d); 1550 Laurel Owner's Assn., Inc. v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1154.) Thus, the Court does not find that Plaintiff was precluded from amending the Complaint and the Court does not find it necessary to strike Plaintiff’s amendment. The Court requests that Plaintiff file an amended complaint that incorporates the changes listed in the Verified Amendment to and Correction of Complaint.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

B. Motion to Reclassify

Code of Civil Procedure § 403.040 allows a plaintiff to file a motion for reclassification of an action within the time allowed for that party to amend the initial pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 403.040(a).) “A party may amend its pleading once without leave of court at any time before an answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer to motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 472(a).) If the motion is made after the time for the plaintiff to amend the pleading, the motion may only be granted if (1) the case is incorrectly classified; and (2) the plaintiff shows good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier. (Code Civ. Proc. § 403.040(b).)

In Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262, the California Supreme Court held that a matter may be reclassified from unlimited to limited only if it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff’s damages will necessarily be less than $25,000. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257.) If there is a possibility that the damages will exceed $25,000.00, the case cannot be transferred to limited. (Ibid.) This high standard is appropriate in light of “the circumscribed procedures and recovery available in the limited civil courts.” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 278.)

In Ytuarte, the Court of Appeal examined the principles it set forth in Walker and held that “the court should reject the plaintiff’s effort to reclassify the action as unlimited only when the lack of jurisdiction as an ‘unlimited’ case is certain and clear.” (Ytuarte, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at 279 (emphasis added).) Nevertheless, the plaintiff must present evidence to demonstrate a possibility that the damages will exceed $25,000.00 and the trial court must review the record to determine “whether a judgment in excess of $25,000.00 is obtainable.” (Ibid.)

On September 12, 2022, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Reclassify the case as a civil unlimited case. Defendant moved to reclassify the action on the ground that Plaintiff’s Complaint included causes of action and prayers for relief not permitted in limited civil jurisdiction. (Mot. for Reclass. P. 2.) Defendant argued that good cause existed for not moving for reclassification earlier. (Ibid.)

In response, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Errata” requesting that the Court strike the causes of action and remedies that he pleaded that caused the case to be reclassified. On January 5, 2023, the Court struck Plaintiff’s “Notice of Errata.” (1-5-23 Minute Order.) On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Verified Amendment to and Correction of Complaint referencing the parts of the Complaint to be amended and corrected.

On January 25, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion Requesting the Court Exercise Its Discretion to Strike Plaintiff’s Amendment to His Complaint under Code of Civil Procedure § 436. As discussed above, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Strike.

On February 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Reclassify. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s Motion to Reclassify should be denied because (1) it was filed late, (2) it should not have remained on the calendar, and (3) there is no legal or factual basis for the Motion as the Complaint has been amended and no longer seeks the type of relief not permitted in limited jurisdiction court. (2-2-23 Oppos. pp. 2-3.) Moreover, the Court already ruled on the issue of reclassification on October 28, 2022, and thus, Defendant is collaterally estopped from bringing the instant Motion. (Mot. p. 8; See 10-28-22 Minute Order.) Plaintiff also seeks sanctions against Defendant and its counsel in the amount to f $2,257.26 for bringing a frivolous motion and leaving it on the calendar, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5. (Ibid. at pp. 9-10.)

On February 8, 2023, Defendant filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition. Defendant argues that in determining whether to reclassify the case, the Court should consider the Complaint as it was initially filed because amendments were precluded by Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. (2-8-23 Reply p. 6.) Given that the initial Complaint contains causes of action and requests for relief not permitted in limited civil jurisdiction, the action should be reclassified as an unlimited civil jurisdiction case. (Ibid. at p. 8.) Defendant also addresses Plaintiff’s argument regarding the late-filed Motion and Plaintiff’s arguments for collateral estoppel. (Ibid.) Finally, Defendant argues that all the arguments presented for reclassification demonstrate that its Motion is not frivolous and thus, sanctions are not warranted. (Ibid. at pp. 9-10.)

The basis of Defendant’s Motion for Reclassification is the original Complaint’s inclusion of causes of action and forms of relief not permitted in limited civil jurisdiction courts. As discussed above, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Amendment to Complaint. As a result, Defendant’s Motion to Reclassify becomes MOOT as the Complaint no longer contains causes of action or forms of relief that are not permitted in limited civil jurisdiction courts.

Finally, the Court addresses whether Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is warranted. According to Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5:

(a) A trial court may order a party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. This section also applies to judicial arbitration proceedings under Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1141.10) of Title 3 of Part 3.

(b) For purposes of this section:

(1) “Actions or tactics” include, but are not limited to, the making or opposing of motions or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading. The mere filing of a complaint without service thereof on an opposing party does not constitute “actions or tactics” for purposes of this section.

(2) “Frivolous” means totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.

Here, the Court does not find that Defendant’s Motion was “without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party” and it does not find sufficient evidence to justify granting Plaintiff’s request for sanctions. For this reason, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for sanctions.

III. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons,

The Motion Requesting that the Court Exercise Its Discretion to Strike Plaintiff’s Amendment to Complaint filed by Crestwood Hills Association is DENIED.

The Motion to Reclassify filed by Crestwood Hills Association is DENIED. Moreover, Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.