Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 22STLC07014, Date: 2023-02-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STLC07014 Hearing Date: February 16, 2023 Dept: 25
PROCEEDINGS: DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO
STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendants Stacey Hale, et
al.
RESP. PARTY: Plaintiff Quanda King
DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE
(CCP §§ 430.10, 435 et seq.)
TENTATIVE RULING:
The hearing on the Demurrer with
Motion to Strike filed by Defendants Stacey Hale, et al. is CONTINUED to MARCH 16, 2023 at 10:30
a.m. in Department 25 at the
SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. At least 16
court days before the next scheduled hearing, Defendants must file and serve
supplemental papers addressing the errors discussed herein. Failure to do so may result in the Motion
being placed off calendar or denied.
SERVICE:
[ X ] Proof of Service Timely Filed
(CRC, rule 3.1300) OK
[ X ] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013,
1013a) NOT
OK[1]
[ X ] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§
12c, 1005(b)) OK
OPPOSITION: Filed
on January 23, 2023. [ ]
Late [ ] None
REPLY: None
filed as of February 8, 2023. [ ] Late [X] None
ANALYSIS:
I.
Background
On October 21, 2022, Plaintiff Quanda
King (“Plaintiff”), in propria persona, filed an action against Defendants
Stacey Hale (“Hale”), FDC Management (“FDC Management”) and FDC Equities, Inc.
(“FDC Equities”), (collectively “Defendants”) for:
(1) Disability Discrimination:
Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodations in Violation of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”);
(2) Landlord Harassment in
Violation of FEHA, California Civil Code § 1940.2, Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 and
L.A. County, Cal., Mun. Code § 8.52.170;
(3) Retaliatory Discrimination in
Violation of FEHA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5, and L.A. County, Cal., Mun. Code §
8.52.170;
(4) Failure to Prevent
Discrimination, Retaliation, and Landlord Harassment in Violation of FEHA,
California Civil Code Section 1940.2, Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 and L.A. County,
Cal., Mun. Code § 8.52.170; 5
(5) Breach of Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealings;
(6) Disparate Treatment in
Violation of Unruh Act;
(7) Negligent and Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress;
(8) Injunctive Relief.
On November 30, 2022, Defendants
filed a Declaration of Demurring or Moving Party in Support of Automatic
Extension.
On December 30, 2022, Defendants
filed a Demurrer (“Demurrer”) with Motion to Strike (“MTS”).
Plaintiff filed an Exhibit List on
January 17, 2023. Plaintiff also filed
an Opposition to the Demurrer and Motion to Strike (“Opposition”) on January
23, 2023.
No reply has been filed.
II.
Legal Standard
a. Demurrer
A demurrer is a pleading that may
be used to test the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in the
complaint. (Code of Civ. Proc. §
430.10.) There are two types of
demurrers – general demurrers and special demurrers. (See McKenney v. Purepac
Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 77.)
General demurrers can be used to
attack pleadings for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e); McKenney,
167 Cal.App.4th at 77.) Such
demurrers can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the
pleading or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable;
evidence or extrinsic matters are not considered. (Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 430.30, 430.70;
Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the
purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the Court admits “all material
facts properly pleaded” and “matters which may be judicially noticed,” but does
not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.
[Citation].” (Blank, 39 Cal.3d at
318.) It gives these facts “a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Ibid.). At the pleading
stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the
defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.
App. 3d 714, 721.) The face of the
complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) "If facts
appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits
take precedence." (Holland v.
Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.)
Special demurrers can be used to
attack the pleadings on grounds that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, and
unintelligible, or in a contract case, for failure to allege whether a contract
is oral or written. (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.10(f).) However, special demurrers
are not allowed in limited jurisdiction civil actions and any grounds for
special demurrers must be raised as affirmative defenses in the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92(c).)
Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure
§ 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring
party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed
the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether
an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in
the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least
five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file
and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(3).)
b.
Motion to Strike
According
to Code of Civil Procedure § 436:
The court may, upon a motion made
pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it
deems proper:
(a) Strikeout any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(b) Strike out all or any part of
any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a
court rule, or an order of the court.
However, motions to strike in limited jurisdiction courts
may only challenge pleadings on the basis that “the damages or relief sought
are not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc. §
92(d).) The Code of Civil Procedure also authorizes the Court to act on its own
initiative to strike matters, empowering the Court to enter orders striking
matter “at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436.) Furthermore, §
435.5 requires that “[b]efore filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the
moving party shall meet
and confer in person or by telephone with the
party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the
purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that resolves the
objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a).)
III.
Discussion
a.
Demurrer
Defendants demur to all eight causes of action on the basis
that each cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action and each cause of action is uncertain. (Demurrer pp. 2-3.) As an initial matter, special demurrers on the
ground that pleadings are uncertain are not allowed in limited jurisdiction
civil actions and any grounds for special demurrers must be raised as
affirmative defenses in the answer.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 92(c).)
Defendants make the following
arguments in support of their Demurrer.
First, the first four causes of
action fail to plead sufficient facts because Plaintiff does not identify the
disability or medical condition that forms the basis of her protected
status. (Demurrer pp. 9-10.) Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate “any
causal relationship between her claims of disability and any action by
Defendants.” (Ibid. at p. 10.) Second, Stacey Hale, an employee of
Defendants FDC Management and FDC Equities, as an individual, cannot be held
liable under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. (Ibid.) Third, Plaintiff refers to ten incidents of
harassment, but does not “plead what actions constitute harassment, that she is
disabled, and that any harassment is because of her disability.” (Ibid. at p. 11.) Fourth, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does
not apply to the circumstances of the instant case. (Ibid. at pp. 11-12.) Moreover, it cannot apply to Defendant Hale,
as she was not party to any contract with Plaintiff. (Ibid. at p. 12.) Fifth, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for
violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act fails because Plaintiff has not
identified a disability, a protected class, or any disparate treatment by
Defendants. (Ibid. at pp. 12-13.) Sixth, Plaintiff does not allege any facts
showing extreme or outrageous conduct that would be sufficient to plead a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Ibid. at p. 13.) Finally, Plaintiff does not plead facts sufficient
to show why injunctive relief is appropriate.
(Ibid. at p. 14.)
Plaintiff opposes the Demurrer. Plaintiff argues that she filed and served a
first amended complaint on January 18, 2022.
(Oppos. p. 2.) Given that the
Complaint was filed in October 2022, the Court presumes that Plaintiff intended
to state that she filed an amended complaint on January 18, 2023. However, the Court is not in receipt of an
amended complaint.
Plaintiff also states that she is
“dissatisfied with the meet and confer process” and Defendants’
attorney did not produce any legal support for seeking a demurrer during the
telephonic meet and confer process with Plaintiff. (Ibid. at pp. 2-3.) Having review Defendants’ counsel’s declaration
and the meet and confer letter sent to Defendant by overnight mail, the Court
finds that Defendants have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Duarte Decl., ¶¶ 3-5, Ex. 2.)
However, the Court notes that the
moving papers have been improperly served on self-represented Plaintiff by
electronic transmission. (Demurrer p.
15; MTS p. 7.) Code of Civil Procedure § 1010.6 authorizes service of
documents by electronic service (service by e-mail) in certain enumerated circumstances. Code of Civil Procedure § 1010.6(a)(2)(A)(ii)
provides, “[f]or cases filed on or after January 1, 2019, if a document may be
served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission,
electronic service of the document is authorized” only: (1) “if a party . . .
has expressly consented to receive electronic service in that specific action”,
(2) “if . . . the court has ordered electronic service on a represented party
or other represented person under subdivision (c) or (d)”, or (3) “if . . . the
document is served electronically pursuant to the procedures specified in
subdivision (e)”, that is, electronic service is made upon a party who is
represented by counsel. (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 1010.6(a)(2)(A)(ii), (c), (d), (e).) Here, Plaintiff is not represented by an
attorney and there is no indication that she has consented to electronic
service.
Moreover,
Plaintiff states that she has filed an amended complaint. However, the Court is not in receipt of any
amended pleadings.
For these reasons, the hearing on
the Demurrer with Motion to Strike is CONTINUED. Defendants are ordered to properly serve
Plaintiff with the moving papers.
Furthermore, prior to the next scheduled hearing, Plaintiff may file an
amended complaint.
b.
Motion to Strike
Defendants move to strike several
portions of the Complaint on the basis that (1) self-represented Plaintiff
cannot recover attorney’s fees, (2) Plaintiff has not pled facts demonstrating
malice, oppression, or fraud, and (3) Plaintiff’s Complaint contains irrelevant
language. (MTS pp. 2-6.)
For reasons discussed above, the
hearing on the Demurrer with Motion to Strike is CONTINUED.
c. Leave
to Amend
When a demurrer is sustained, the Court determines whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985)
39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) When a plaintiff
“has pleaded the general set of facts upon which his cause of action is based,”
the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since
plaintiff should not “be deprived of his right to maintain his action on the
ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of particulars.” (Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d
892, 900.) Generally, the court will
allow leave to amend on at least the first try, unless there is absolutely no
possibility of overcoming the issue. (See
Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227
("Denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the
complaint shows on its face it is incapable of amendment. [Citation.]
Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to
correct any defect has not been given.").)
Given that the hearing on the Demurrer with Motion to Strike
is CONTINUED, the Court will not determine whether leave to amend is necessary at
this hearing.
IV.
Conclusion & Order
For the foregoing reasons,
The hearing on the Demurrer with
Motion to Strike filed by Defendants Stacey Hale, et al. is CONTINUED to MARCH 16, 2023 at 10:30
a.m in Department 25 at the
SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. At least 16
court days before the next scheduled hearing, Defendants must file and serve
supplemental papers addressing the errors discussed herein. Failure to do so may result in the Motion
being placed off calendar or denied.
Moving party is
ordered to give notice.