Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 22STLC08223, Date: 2023-03-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STLC08223 Hearing Date: March 1, 2023 Dept: 25
PROCEEDINGS: DEMURRER
WITH MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Maria Carmen Ramos, D.D.S.
RESP. PARTY: None
DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE
(CCP § 430.10, et seq., 436)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant Maria Carmen Ramos, D.D.S.’s Demurrer to the
Complaint’s cause of action for intentional tort is SUSTAINED with 20 days
leave to amend.
Defendant’s Motion to Strike
portions of the Complaint is DENIED.
SERVICE:
[X]
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK
[X]
Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK
[X]
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK
OPPOSITION: None filed as of February
26, 2023. [ ] Late [X] None
REPLY: None filed as of
February 26, 2023. [ ] Late [X] None
ANALYSIS:
I.
Background
On December 9, 2022, Plaintiffs Mrs. Sonia Pulliam (“Sonia”)
and Mr. Derrik Pulliam (“Derrik”), (collectively “Plaintiffs”), in propria
persona, filed an action against Defendants Brian Withers D.D.S. dba Withers
Dental (“Withers”) and Carmen Ramos (“Ramos”), (collectively “Defendants”), for
(1) general negligence, (2) intentional tort, and (3) common counts.
On January 6, 2023, Defendant Brain Withers, D.D.S,
individually and as dba Withers Dental, filed an Answer to the Complaint.
On January 17, 2023, Defendant Maria Carmen Ramos, D.D.S.
(erroneously named and sued as Carmen Ramos, DMD) filed the instant Demurrer (“Demurrer”)
with Motion to Strike (“MTS”).
Immediately after filing the Demurrer with Motion to Strike, Defendant
Ramos filed an Answer to the Complaint.
The Court notes that a party may file a demurrer and answer at the same
time, according to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.30(c).
II.
Legal Standard
A demurrer is a pleading that may
be used to test the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in the
complaint. (Code of Civ. Proc. §
430.10.) There are two types of
demurrers – general demurrers and special demurrers. (See McKenney v. Purepac
Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 77.)
General demurrers can be used to
attack pleadings for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e); McKenney,
167 Cal.App.4th at 77.) Such
demurrers can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the
pleading or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable;
evidence or extrinsic matters are not considered. (Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 430.30, 430.70;
Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the
purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the Court admits “all material
facts properly pleaded” and “matters which may be judicially noticed,” but does
not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.
[Citation].” (Blank, 39 Cal.3d at
318.) It gives these facts “a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Ibid.). At the pleading
stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the
defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal.
App. 3d 714, 721.) The face of the
complaint includes exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) "If facts
appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits
take precedence." (Holland v.
Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.)
Special demurrers can be used to
attack the pleadings on grounds that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, and
unintelligible, or in a contract case, for failure to allege whether a contract
is oral or written. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(f).) However, special demurrers are not allowed in
limited jurisdiction civil actions and any grounds for special demurrers must
be raised as affirmative defenses in the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92(c).)
Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure
§ 430.41 requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring
party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed
the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether
an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in
the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least
five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file
and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(3).)
III.
Discussion
A.
Meet and Confer Requirement
Defendant’s counsel Ted D. Conley
states that on December 27, 2022, he sent written correspondence to Plaintiffs
to schedule a time to discuss a potential demurrer and motion to strike
portions of the Complaint. (Conley Decl.
¶ 4, Ex. A.) Plaintiff Derrik responded
that none of the four dates/times suggested by defense counsel worked for
Plaintiffs and requested additional dates before January 11 or after January
16. (Ibid. at ¶ 5, Ex. B.) Defense counsel responded on January 5, 2023,
and offered January 9 and 10 as dates to speak by telephone. (Ibid. at ¶ 6, Ex. C.) Plaintiff Derrik stated that “[p]robably the
10th is good” and explained that Mr. Michael Howard, as Plaintiff’s assignee
through a Power of Attorney would be speaking on their behalf. (Ibid. at ¶ 7, Ex. D.) On January 8, 2023, defense counsel sent an
email to Plaintiffs, asking them to confirm a time to speak on January 10, and
requesting to speak to Plaintiffs, not Mr. Howard. (Ibid. at ¶ 8, Ex. E.) On the same day, Plaintiff Derrik responded
that he would not speak to defense counsel without Mr. Howard. (Ibid. at ¶ 9, Ex. F.) Defense counsel responded that Mr. Howard
could be on the line, but he would need to speak to Plaintiffs, and again asked
to set a time to speak on January 10, 2023.
(Ibid. at ¶ 10, Ex. G.)
Plaintiff Derrik responded that they did not agree to a meeting unless
defense counsel spoke to Mr. Howard. (Ibid.
at ¶ 11, Ex. H.) On January 9, 2023, Defense
counsel wrote to Plaintiffs reiterating that Mr. Howard is not an attorney and
does not have authority to represent Plaintiffs. (Ibid. at ¶ 12, Ex. I.) Plaintiff Derrik responded that he would not
be on the call; however, his wife and Mr. Howard would speak with defense
counsel on Tuesday, January 10, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. (Ibid. at ¶ 13, Ex. J.) Plaintiff added that his wife “speaks English
but doesn’t always understand everything.”
(Ibid.) Defense counsel
responded, objecting to Plaintiff Derrik’s absence, and stating that he will be
conferring with Plaintiffs “via the attached written correspondence (also being
sent via 1st Class U.S. Mail)” which includes “facts, authorities and arguments
establishing good cause for a demurrer and motion to strike portions of
Plaintiffs’ Complaint.” (Ibid. at
¶ 14, Ex. K.) On January 10, 2023,
Defense counsel sent another email to Plaintiffs adding that “none
of the elements of the 2nd Cause of Action for General Negligence are plead as
to [Plaintiff Derrik Pulliam]. Instead, the entire Cause of Action relates only
to matters purportedly affecting [Plaintiff Sonia Pulliam]. So the Cause of
Action is fatally flawed for lack of sufficient factual allegations to
establish the elements of duty, breach, damages and causation as to [Plaintiff
Derrik Pulliam].” (Ibid. at ¶ 15, Ex. L.) On January 11, 2023, Plaintiff Derrik emailed
defense counsel stating that he is not a party to the lawsuit and given that
English is not his wife’s first language, Michael Howard has Power of Attorney to
handle Plaintiffs’ legal matters as their assignee. (Ibid. at ¶ 16, Ex. M.) On January 11, 2023, Michael Howard sent an
email to defense counsel explaining his role in the case and attaching a copy
of the Power of Attorney, “under which he purported to have the authority to
act on the Plaintiffs behalf in this litigation.” (Ibid. at ¶ 17, Ex. N.) On the same day, defense counsel replied to
Plaintiff Derrik’s email citing to the Court’s docket showing that he is a
party to the case. (Ibid. at ¶ 18,
Ex. O.)
The Court finds that defense
counsel’s declaration and the attached correspondence are sufficient to show Defendant’s
attempts to meet and confer with Plaintiffs regarding the instant Demurrer with
Motion to Strike.
B.
Demurrer
Defendant Ramos demurs to the Complaint’s cause of action
for intentional tort on the basis that it “fails to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action” and “is uncertain.” (Demurrer p. 3.) Specifically, Defendant states
that Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to establish the elements for an
intentional tort cause of action. (Ibid.
at p. 6.) The Court notes that special demurrers on the basis of
uncertainty are not permitted in limited jurisdiction civil actions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 92(c).)
The Complaint sets forth the
following causes of action: (1) general negligence, (2) intentional tort, and
(3) common counts. (Compl. ¶ 10.) While Plaintiffs make allegations regarding
their claims for common counts and general negligence, there are no facts
pleaded for the cause of action for intentional tort. (Ibid. at pp. 5-6.)
Therefore, the Court SUSTAINS
Defendant Ramos’s Demurrer to the Complaint’s cause of action for intentional
tort.
C.
Leave to Amend
When a demurrer
is sustained, the Court determines whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the defect can be cured by amendment.
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) When a plaintiff “has pleaded the general set
of facts upon which his cause of action is based,” the court should give the
plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, since plaintiff should not “be
deprived of his right to maintain his action on the ground that his pleadings
were defective for lack of particulars.”
(Reed v. Norman (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 892, 900.) Generally, the court will allow leave to
amend on at least the first try, unless there is absolutely no possibility of
overcoming the issue. (See Angie
M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227 ("Denial of
leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the complaint shows on
its face it is incapable of amendment.
[Citation.] Liberality in
permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect
has not been given.").)
Although
Plaintiffs have not opposed the Demurrer, the Court finds that there is a
reasonable possibility that Plaintiff may cure the defect by amending the
Complaint.
Accordingly,
Defendant Ramos’s Demurrer to the cause of action for intentional tort is
SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.
D.
Motion to Strike
According
to Code of Civil Procedure § 436:
The court may, upon a motion made
pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it
deems proper:
(a) Strikeout any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.
(b) Strike out all or any part of
any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a
court rule, or an order of the court.
However, motions to strike in limited jurisdiction courts
may only challenge pleadings on the basis that “the damages or relief sought
are not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc. §
92(d).) The Code of Civil Procedure also authorizes the Court to act on its own
initiative to strike matters, empowering the Court to enter orders striking
matter “at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436.) Furthermore, § 435.5
requires that “[b]efore filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the
moving party shall meet
and confer in person or by telephone with the
party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the
purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that resolves the
objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a).)
Here, Defendant moves to strike
the following portions of the Complaint:
1. “This
pleading, including attachments and exhibits, consists of the following number
of pages: ” [Complaint, ¶ 2];
2.
“Intentional Tort” [Complaint ¶ 10(c)];
3. “Form
lntergatories [sic] both Defendants 8 pages total” [Complaint ¶ 15];
4. Document
entitled “DECLARATION;”
5. “the sum
of $2000.00 approximate the reasonable value.” [Complaint ¶ CC1(b)(2)];
6.
“according to proof”” [Complaint ¶ CC-2].
(MTS p. 2.) Defendant argues that these allegations are
subject to a motion to strike because “they are irrelevant, immaterial, false,
improper and not drawn in conformity with the laws and Rules of Court of this
State.” (Ibid. at p. 3.)
As discussed above, the Court
finds that defense counsel’s declaration is sufficient to show that Defendant
has satisfied the meet and confer requirement.
The Court reiterates that motions
to strike in limited jurisdiction
courts may only challenge pleadings on the basis that “the damages or relief
sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc.
§ 92(d).) Given that Defendant’s Motion
to Strike is not brought on any grounds permissible in a limited jurisdiction
court, the Motion to Strike is DENIED.
However, Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the Court to
act on its own initiative to strike matters, empowering the Court to enter
orders striking matter “at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems
proper.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436.) The Court finds that it is proper to strike
the following portions of the Complaint:
1. Complaint ¶ 15: “Form
Interogatories both Defendants 8 pages total;”
2. Complaint pages 23-35 – Form
Interrogatories.
IV.
Conclusion
& Order
For
the foregoing reasons,
Defendant Maria Carmen Ramos, D.D.S.’s Demurrer to the
Complaint’s cause of action for intentional tort is SUSTAINED with 20 days
leave to amend.
Defendant’s Motion to Strike
portions of the Complaint is DENIED. On
the Court’s own motion, Paragraph 15 of the Complaint is stricken as are pages
23-35 (Form Interrogatories).
Moving party is ordered to give
notice.