Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: 23STCP00745, Date: 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP00745     Hearing Date: May 9, 2023    Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS:      MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT  

MOVING PARTY:   Defendant Anytime Auto Group  

RESP. PARTY:          Ronen Levy   

MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT

(Civ. Code § 1710.40) 

TENTATIVE RULING: 

Defendant Anytime Auto Group’s motion to vacate the default judgment entered on sister-state judgment is GRANTED. 

SERVICE:   

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300)                    OK 

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a)                                                        OK 

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b))                        OK  

OPPOSITION:           Filed as of April 24, 2023                            [   ] Late                          [   ] None 

REPLY:                         Filed as of May 2, 2023                            [   ] Late                          [   ] None 

ANALYSIS: 

                I. Background

Plaintiff Ron Levy (“Plaintiff”) filed an application for entry of judgment on sister-state judgment entered in the state of New York on September 26, 2022, against judgment debtor/Defendant Anytime Auto Group (“Defendant”).  The New York Court entered a default judgment against Defendant awarding Plaintiff $11,000.00 plus costs arising from Plaintiff’s car purchase in California from Defendants. Plaintiff contends that the car was not in the condition it appeared to be in from the photos and virtual inspection after it arrived in New York via flatbed and sued Defendant in New York court. 

Defendant moves to vacate default judgment entered on sister-state judgment.

Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant filed a reply.

              II. Legal Standard & Discussion

Defendant moves to vacate the default judgment entered on sister-state judgment arguing that the sister-state judgment was procured without personal jurisdiction.

With respect to vacating sister-state judgments, the power of the trial court is limited to those grounds set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.40, subdivision (a).  (Fishman v. Fishman (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 815, 819-820.)  That section reads, "A judgment entered pursuant to this chapter may be vacated on any ground which would be a defense to an action in this state on the sister state judgment, including the ground that the amount of interest accrued on the sister state judgment and included in the judgment entered pursuant to this chapter is incorrect."  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.40(a).) 

In determining whether to give full faith and credit to a sister state judgment, the permissible scope of inquiry is limited to whether the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the relevant parties, often referred to as “fundamental jurisdiction.”  (Bank of America v. Jennett (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 104, 114.)  Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant depends upon the satisfaction of three criteria.  (Id., at 115.)  First, a statute of the forum state must allow for the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant under the circumstances presented.  (Id.)  Second, the assertion of personal jurisdiction must be constitutionally permissible.  (Id.)  Third, jurisdiction must be acquired by service of process in strict compliance with the requirements of that state's service statutes.  (Id.)  But, even as to jurisdiction, the judgment may be challenged only if the issue of jurisdiction was not litigated in the foreign state; if the court of the first state has expressly litigated the question of jurisdiction, its determination is res judicata and is itself protected by the full faith and credit clause.  (Id., at 114.)

Here, Defendant moves to vacate the default judgment entered on sister-state judgment arguing that the sister-state judgment was procured without personal jurisdiction.

As to New York’s statutory authority to assert jurisdiction, New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR § 302, provides that a New York court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary who in person or through an agent (1) “transacts any business within the state” or (2) “contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.”  (CPLR § 302(a)(1).)  Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract for the sale of a 2006 Pontiac Grand Prix, VIN No. 2G2WC54C751324212 (the “Vehicle”).  The Vehicle was advertised by Defendant on multiple marketing platforms, and it was located on Defendant’s lot in Sherman Oaks, California.  Plaintiff explained to Defendant he intended to take the vehicle outside of California to New York, and Plaintiff took delivery of the Vehicle in New York via flatbed transportation.  Therefore, New York’s statute allows for the assertion of jurisdiction over the Defendant under the circumstances presented.

Turning to the second criteria, did Defendant’s contact with New York make assertion of jurisdiction over it constitutionally permissible?  Thus, the question is whether Defendant had sufficient contacts with New York so that the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  (International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, supra (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.)  A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum “if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’  [Citations.]”  (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.)  In addition, the assertion of personal jurisdiction must “ ‘comport with “fair play and substantial justice.” ‘ [Citations.]”  (Id. at pp. 447-448.) 

            Evidence presented by Defendant demonstrates that Defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York.  Defendant is a California corporation that rents and resells vehicles and does not have any connection with New York.  (Tsymbalov Decl., ¶¶ 3, 23.)  In 2011, Defendant became licensed to sell used vehicles.  (Id., at ¶ 5.)  Out of 5,000 of Defendant’s subsequent sales transactions pre-dating this motion, there are only three instances, including the one subject to the underlying litigation, where a vehicle was subsequently transported to New York.  (Id., at ¶ 19.)  Defendant utilizes five marketing platforms: www.craigslist.com, www.cargurus.com, www.trucar.com, www.edmunds.com, and www.carsforsale.com.  (Id., at ¶ 13.)  Defendant’s Craigslist’s’ advertisements “cannot be seen using any location filter, other than specifically searching for vehicles located in Los Angeles County.”  (Id., at ¶ 14.)  For the other platforms, Defendant “tags each advertised vehicle to Sherman Oaks, California…a potential buyer must specifically search for a vehicle in Sherman Oaks, California.”  (Id., at ¶¶ 15-16.)  Defendant’s average car price is “around $9,000.00,” and thus, “[t]he delivery costs of such unexpensive vehicles removes any benefit for remote buyers….”  (Id., at ¶ 18.)  Defendant does not maintain any service facilities in any state other than California.  (Markov Decl. ¶ 10.) 

On the other hand, Plaintiff presents sparse evidence on the issue of purposeful availment, namely that Defendant had arranged delivery of the Vehicle to New York by a transport company.  (Levy Decl., ¶ 4.)  Such evidence by Plaintiff may, however, support that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant arises out of or relates to Defendant’s contact with New York.  But, then again, Defendant does not advertise itself in New York or maintain service facilities in any other state besides California, Plaintiff was the one who found Defendant by conducting a nation-wide search, and there are only two other instances out of Defendant’s 5,000 sales transactions where a vehicle was subsequently transported to New York.  Even if Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with New York, the contacts must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.  Defendant has shown the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable based on the foregoing as well as that Defendant is not a large company doing business throughout the country.  There are a total of five employees who perform all the tasks required for Defendant’s business.  (Tsymbalov Decl., ¶ 11.)  Therefore, the second criterion that the assertion of personal jurisdiction must be constitutionally permissible is not met. 

Accordingly, Defendant Anytime Auto Group’s motion to vacate the default judgment entered on sister-state judgment is GRANTED.

            III. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Anytime Auto Group’s motion to vacate the default judgment entered on sister-state judgment is GRANTED.

Moving Party is ordered to give notice.