Judge Katherine Chilton, Case LAM02CJ4852 2023-04-18 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Katherine Chilton, Case: LAM02CJ4852, Date: 2023-04-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: LAM02CJ4852 Hearing Date: April 18, 2023 Dept: 25

PROCEEDINGS: MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND ENTER DISMISSAL

MOVING PARTY: Judgment Assignee Cavalry Investments, LLC

RESP. PARTY: None

MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND ENTER DISMISSAL

(CCP § 473)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Judgment Assignee Cavalry Investments, LLC’s Motion to Vacate Default and Enter Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant/Judgment Debtor Tyrone E. Tinson is GRANTED. Defendant/Judgement Debtor Tyrone E. Tinson is DISMISSED with prejudice.

SERVICE:

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK

OPPOSITION: None filed as of April 16, 2023. [ ] Late [X] None

REPLY: None filed as of April 16, 2023. [ ] Late [X] None

ANALYSIS:

I. Background

This case arises from a Motor Vehicle Contract signed between Tyrone E. Tinson (“Defendant” or “Debtor”) and Jama Auto House, a car dealership in Hermosa Beach, CA, for the purchase of a 1986 Ford Thunderbird. (Burrows Decl. ¶ 3.) The account was assigned to Fireside Bank. (Ibid.) A lawsuit was initiated against Mr. Tinson, who defaulted on the Contract, and judgment was entered against him. (Ibid.) On December 13, 2002, an Application for Renewal of Judgment was filed with the Court. (Ibid. at ¶ 4) On August 16, 2012, the Judgment was assigned to Cavalry Investments, LLC (“Cavalry”). (Ibid. at ¶ 6.) Subsequently, in December 2012, the judgment was again renewed. (Ibid. at ¶ 7.) On November 17, 2022, Cavalry filed another Application for Renewal of Judgment. (Ibid. at ¶ 9.) Afterwards, Cavalry’s counsel “received credible evidence of Defendant’s lack of capacity to understand the nature of this matter, [which] potentially calls into question his knowledge and understanding of the original agreement. (Ibid. at ¶ 10.)

On January 17, 2023, Judgment Assignee Cavalry Investments LLC filed the instant Motion to Vacate Judgment and Enter Dismissal with Prejudice against Defendant Tyrone E. Tinson (“Motion”).

No opposition has been filed.

II. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b), both discretionary and mandatory relief is available to parties from “judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her.” Discretionary relief is available under the statute as “the court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) Alternatively, mandatory relief is available when “accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Ibid.) Under this statute, an application for discretionary or mandatory relief must be made no more than six months after entry of the judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding from which relief is sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b); English v. IKON Business Solutions (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 143.)

“‘[W]hen relief under section 473¿is¿available, there is a strong¿public¿policy¿in¿favor¿of granting relief and allowing the requesting party his or her day in court…[Citation.]” (Rappleyea v. Campbell¿(1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975, 981-82.)

Furthermore, “[a]pplication for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein.” (Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b).)

“Even where relief is no longer available under statutory provisions, a trial court generally retains the inherent power to vacate a default judgment or order on equitable grounds where a party establishes that the judgment or order was void for lack of due process or resulted from extrinsic fraud or mistake.” (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228; Bacon v. Bacon (1907) 150 Cal. 477, 491-92; Olivera v. Grace, 122 P.2d 564, 567-68; Stiles v. Wallis (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1147 (“There are four grounds which a court, utilizing its equity capacity may rely upon to provide relief from default. Those areas are (1) void judgment, (2) extrinsic fraud, (3) constructive service, and (4)¿extrinsic mistake.”) In limited civil cases, grounds for equitable relief also include “inadvertence or excusable neglect.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 86(b)(3).)

III. Discussion

Judgment Assignee Cavalry Investments seeks to set aside judgment entered against Debtor Tyrone E. Tinson based on the moving party’s “extrinsic fraud or mistake.” (Mot. p. 4.) Cavalry argues that extrinsic mistake may involve the “excusable neglect of a party, or could include capacity.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, “[a] judgment is void on its face is subject to set aside at anytime.” (Ibid.)

Here, Cavalry’s counsel has “received credible evidence of Defendant’s lack of capacity to understand the nature of this matter” which could also mean that he did not understand the original agreement. (Burrows Decl. ¶ 10.)

Although more than six months have passed since the entry of judgment and the judgment has been renewed several times, the Court has inherent power to vacate a default judgment on equitable grounds if the judgment is void or was entered due to extrinsic fraud or mistake. Moreover, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(d), the Court “may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.”

Here, the Court finds sufficient basis to vacate the judgment based on Cavalry’s Counsel’s sworn statement that the judgment entered against Mr. Tinson was void due to his incapacity.

Accordingly, Judgment Assignee’s Motion is GRANTED.

IV. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons,

Moving parties are ordered to give notice.