Judge: Kenneth J. Medel, Case: 37-2023-00031245-CU-WT-CTL, Date: 2024-03-01 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - February 29, 2024

03/01/2024  09:30:00 AM  C-66 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Kenneth J Medel

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Civil - Unlimited  Wrongful Termination Motion Hearing (Civil) 37-2023-00031245-CU-WT-CTL GARCIA-CASTELLANOS VS JPMORGAN CHASE & CO [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion - Other, 12/01/2023

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., JPMorgan Chase & Co., and Brendan Jepsen's Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

This is a case involving claims of wrongful termination, gender and sex discrimination as well as retaliation and emotional distress. Plaintiff filed the action on 7/21/23 alleging nine causes of action.

Defendants move to compel arbitration. Defendants rely on an arbitration that plaintiff purportedly electronically signed on May 17, 2022, three weeks before Plaintiff began her employment with Chase.

See Valkenburg Decl.¶ 6, Exh. A and Henderson Decl. ¶ 5 The agreement in question provides: 'This offer of employment is subject to all the terms, conditions and attachments included in this document, the Binding Arbitration Agreement and all Firm policies and procedures, including but not limited to the JPMorgan Chase Code of Conduct.' Valkenburg Decl.¶ 6, Exh. A (Binding Arbitration Agreement), p. 4. In this case, the signature on the agreement that included the Binding Arbitration Agreement is electronic.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1633.9, subd. (a) provides: 'An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.' See Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Grp. (2014) 232 Cal. App. 4th 836, 843.

Evidence supporting Signature Defendants first challenge whether there is sufficient evidence to support whether plaintiff actually signed the agreement. Garcia states she has never seen the arbitration agreement, and that she did not electronically sign the agreement. (Garcia Decl. ¶¶2-3) According to plaintiff, defendants have failed to attribute the alleged electronic signature to Garcia by a preponderance of the evidence.

The motion relies on declarations Maribel Ponce (VP of Recruiting) and Sarah Henderson (VP and Assistant General Counsel responsible for managing and the preservation of electronically stored information). The Court finds that these declarations are sufficient in that they describe 'the efficacy of [Chase's] security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable,' thereby showing that the electronic signature was 'the act of' Plaintiff. Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 843.

Contrary to the case examples relied upon by plaintiff, Chase sufficiently described the circumstances surrounding how it sent Plaintiff's Offer Letter and Binding Arbitration Agreement, and that the signature was the 'act of' Plaintiff.

To access her offer of employment, Plaintiff first needed to provide her email address to Chase's online program. Ponce Decl. ¶ 4. Once Plaintiff provided her email address, Chase's online program generated a link that was sent to Plaintiff's email address. Ponce Decl. ¶ 5. To open the link and view her Offer Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3080626  44 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  GARCIA-CASTELLANOS VS JPMORGAN CHASE & CO [IMAGED]  37-2023-00031245-CU-WT-CTL Letter, Plaintiff had to re-enter her email address. Id. The online program then sent Plaintiff a unique verification code to that email address, which had to be entered within ten minutes to view the Offer Letter. Id. Therefore, to open the link to view the letter, Plaintiff had to log-in to her own personal email account using her unique email password. Id. By providing her email address, then opening the link sent to her email address to obtain the Offer Letter, Plaintiff agreed to conduct the employment offer and acceptance by electronic means. Id. Ponce declared that Plaintiff could not have accessed 'Chase's offer letter without the link and verification code that Chase sent separately' to her email address.(Id. at ¶ 5.) Ponce further declared that Chase extended the offer letter on May 17, 2022 and Plaintiff accepted on the same date. (Ponce Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) Further, Sarah Henderson's declaration ('Henderson Decl.') supports that the metadata related to Plaintiff's employment application, identifies her 'signature date and time as May 17, 2022 at 4:25 p.m.' (Henderson Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff admits that she reviewed the Offer Letter and Binding Arbitration Agreement in 2022, and does not dispute accepting Chase's offer of employment. (Plaintiff Decl. ¶ 2.) Although she declares 'never' signing the Offer Letter and Binding Arbitration Agreement attached to Chase's Motion, she does 'recall reviewing' an 'offer letter' that Chase sent her. (Id.) This admission establishes that Plaintiff accessed the only Offer Letter Chase ever generated and sent her. Plaintiff offers no evidence establishing that she did not receive Chase's unique link containing her Offer Letter, that she did not sign the Offer Letter she 'recall[ed] reviewing,' or that other persons had access to her personal email account or the unique link necessary to access her Offer Letter with Chase. (Plaintiff Decl. ¶ 2.) There was no method in place for Plaintiff to reject the Binding Arbitration Agreement and still accept the position with Chase.

Unconscionability Plaintiff argues that the agreement is unconscionable. Procedural and substantive unconscionability must both be present for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce an arbitration provision under the doctrine of unconscionability. (See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, 24 Cal.4th 83, 114 (2000).) The two types of unconscionability are evaluated on a sliding scale whereby ''the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.'' 'Arbitration clauses in employment contracts have been upheld despite claims that the clauses were unconscionable because they were presented as part of an adhesion contract on a take-it-or leave-it basis.' Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1292.

The agreement here was not hidden or a surprise. The 13-page Offer Letter and Binding Arbitration Agreement uses the term 'arbitration' in the introductory letter and 56 times across the five consecutive pages dedicated to binding arbitration. Three times arbitration is in boldface and in all capital titles (pp. 7, 10, 13) Plaintiff argues that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it seeks to waive plaintiff's ability to bring a PAGA claim. Waiving PAGA does not render the entire agreement unconscionable given the development in the law related to PAGA claims. Here, Chase's Binding Arbitration Agreement contains a severability provision that states, '[i]f any part of this Agreement is held to be void or unenforceable, the remainder of the Agreement will be enforceable and any part may be severed from the remainder as appropriate, to the extent permitted by law.' (Valkenburg, Exh. 1, p. 12). Under Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, Chase would be able to compel to arbitration any individual PAGA related claims.

Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that the Binding Arbitration Agreement contains 'terms that are overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one sided,' such that it renders it substantively unconscionable. Sonic Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109.

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