Judge: Kenneth J. Medel, Case: 37-2023-00036689-CU-OR-CTL, Date: 2024-04-26 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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TENTATIVE RULINGS - April 25, 2024

04/26/2024  09:30:00 AM  C-66 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Kenneth J Medel

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Civil - Unlimited  Other Real Property Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2023-00036689-CU-OR-CTL GOMEZ VS BARNES [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Demurrer, 11/15/2023

Jason Barnes' Demurrer to the First, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action is OVERRULED.

The Complaint alleges that GOMEZ and BARNES began an intimate relationship, desiring to create a home together. In 2016, they purchased a condominium in Mission Valley. Defendant BARNES promised to share everything equally with GOMEZ and make a down payment on a house 'as a gift', if GOMEZ agreed to help purchase it and live there with him to make it their home. Complaint ¶ 6-10. The parties took title in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship. Both parties contributed to financing the property, with GOMEZ regularly contributing significant funds toward expenses. After seven years of living in the subject property together, BARNES informed GOMEZ that he no longer wanted to share the home with him. When GOMEZ requested negotiations for a buyout, BARNES denied that GOMEZ had any interest in the home. Complaint ¶15. Plaintiff seeks his equal share of equity in the property and injunctive relief to enjoy his ownership rights peacefully during litigation. Complaint ¶16 The Complaint alleges 7 causes of action: 1. Breach of Express Contract 2. Breach of Implied Contract 3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 4. Partition by Sale [CCP § 872.210] 5. Partition by Appraisal [CCP § 873.91 O] 6. Promissory Estoppel 7. Preliminary and Permanent Injunction Defendant Jason Barnes brings a demurrer to three causes of action: (1) Breach of Express Contract; (5) Partition by Appraisal and (6) Promissory Estoppel. Breach of Express Contract First Cause of Action for Breach of Express Contract Defendant demurs on the grounds of 'failure to state a cause of action' but argues first that that Complaint is 'uncertain', specifically with respect to language on the down payment for the subject property. Defendant argues that the downpayment by Barnes was a 'gift' as alleged, which is inconsistent with consideration for contract.

The Complaint is simple: In 2016, Defendant offered to enter into an agreement with Defendant wherein they would BARNES would contribute a down payment on a house in exchange for GOMEZ' agreement to help him purchase it, live there with him and make it their home. GOMEZ accepted the offer and performed according to its terms. Defendant breached the parties' agreement by seeking to have GOMEZ vacate the property and by denying that GOMEZ has an equal interest in it.

BARNES explicitly pledged to make a down payment on a house as a gift, predicated on GOMEZ's reciprocal commitment to participate in the purchase, cohabit, and make it their shared home.

Complaint, ¶ 6-10. This was breached. (This is like a Marvin v. Marvin claim) The Complaint sufficiently alleges consideration for a contract, notwithstanding the allegation that the downpayment was a 'gift'. The allegation of a 'gift' would only be significant if the parties were contending that the house itself was at issue. Title is 'joint and several.' Plaintiff is not, and cannot, argue, that defendant does not have a stake in the property itself. The 'gift' language is thus not significant to the claim.

Defendant also argues full performance of the contract. Defendant contends that full performance of the Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3052075  39 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  GOMEZ VS BARNES [IMAGED]  37-2023-00036689-CU-OR-CTL contract has been achieved. However, the complaint goes beyond the house itself. Plaintiff alleges defendant is preventing plaintiff from fully enjoying his property interest - a fundamental aspect of the agreement. Denying access to the property, as explicitly articulated in the complaint, goes beyond a mere contractual dispute; it interferes directly with Plaintiff's property rights. Complaint ¶ 15.

Defendant argues 'no breach'. However, the interference with Plaintiff's property interest is breach.

Fifth Cause of Action for 'Partition by Appraisal.' Defendant argues lack of jurisdiction because under Code of Civil Procedure section 873.910, the parties have to agree to a partition by appraisal. A partition by appraisal requires an agreement between the parties and a noticed motion to the court. The inclusion of this remedy as a cause of action is no harm. It is a potential remedy for partition. 'When the interests of all parties are undisputed or have been adjudicated, the parties may agree upon a partition by appraisal.' The absence of an agreement does not automatically strip the court of its jurisdiction.

Sixth Cause of Action for Promissory Estoppel Defendant argues that the promises attributed to him lack clarity and specificity, rendering them unenforceable under promissory estoppel. However, the Complaint articulates promises made by Defendant, including an express commitment to 'share everything he had' and contribute to the down payment on the subject property in exchange for joint living arrangements. The promise at the core of Plaintiff's claim pertains specifically to the subject property.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to establish detrimental reliance, asserting that there was no substantial change in Plaintiff's position. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff justifiably relied upon and trusted Defendant's assurances to equitably divide the subject property. FAC, 3 ¶ 6-10. Additionally, it asserts that Plaintiff actively acted upon these representations, thereby evincing the necessary reliance.

Plaintiff's cause of action for promissory estoppel adequately pleads the necessary elements, and Defendant's demurrer should be denied.

Jason Barnes' Motion to Strike Punitive Damages is GRANTED.

A motion to strike punitive damages allegations may lie where the claim sued upon would not support an award of punitive damages as a matter of law. 'A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged do not rise to the level of 'malice, fraud, or oppression' required to support a punitive damages award.' Turman v. Turning Point of Central Cal, inc. (2019) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.

Punitive damages are only available: 'In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice .... ' (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) As a matter of law, punitive damages are not available for COA's No.1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, which are entirely based on a breach of an obligation arising from contract. (1. Breach of Express Contract 2. Breach of Implied Contract 4. Partition by Sale [CCP § 872.210] 5. Partition by Appraisal [CCP § 873.91 O] 6.

Promissory Estoppel 7. Preliminary and Permanent Injunction) The only possible recovery for punitives would be breach of fiduciary duty.

'In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth in the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice .... While the third amended complaint does allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for gender discrimination, it fails to state facts sufficient to support allegations that respondent acted with malice, oppression or fraud, as required by statute.

As explained in detail in Defendant's Motion to Strike, none of the conduct alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint rises to the level of 'outrage' or a 'fraudulent or evil motive' necessary for a finding of malice, oppression or fraud, and Plaintiffs Opposition does not provide any argument to the contrary. The Complaint alleges that- 'After a child was born [to Barnes' former wife] BARNES became more interested in being involved in the child's life, and became estranged from the GOMEZ.' (Complaint, 14.) 'After seven years of living in the subject property together, BARNES informed GOMEZ that he no longer wanted to share the home with him.' (15) 'When GOMEZ requested negotiations for a buyout, BARNES denied that GOMEZ had any interest in the home.' 'Thereafter, BARNES started to make GOMEZ' living arrangements very uncomfortable by changing various passwords on household accounts, maintaining the home at a very cold temperature with the air conditioning, unplugging the cable, having friends stay for extended periods of time, and suspending GOMEZ' home service.' This conduct alleged does not rise to the level of malice, fraud or oppression.

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