Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case Number: 19STCV13270, Date: 2024-08-12 Tentative Ruling

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**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.

This Song-Beverly action arises out of Adolfo and Olga Flores’s (“Plaintiffs”) purchase of a used Kia Sorrento, VIN number 5XYKW4A7XEG452856 (the “Subject Vehicle”). The Subject Vehicle was sold with a warranty. Plaintiffs allege that, following their purchase, the engine of the Subject Vehicle had serious defects and nonconformities that made the Subject Vehicle prone to risk of an engine fire.

On April 17, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. (“KIA” or “Defendant”). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act—Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act—Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2; (4) Fraudulent Inducement—Concealment; and (5) Fraudulent Inducement—Misrepresentation.

On November 11, 2021, Defendant moved for summary adjudication of the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. The court granted summary adjudication as to the fourth and fifth causes of action and denied adjudication as to the second and third causes of action.

On September 9, 2022, the court denied Kia’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first, second, and third causes of action.

On October 7, 2022, Kia filed a motion for summary judgment, or summary adjudication, of the first, second, and third causes of action, based in part on the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209 (Rodriguez). On April 25, 2023, the court denied Kia’s motion.

Kia requests a stay of this action pending the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Rodriguez which may impact the viability of Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action.

The court has “the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.”¿ (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489; Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a).)¿

Here, the court finds a stay of these proceedings is appropriate because, in part, it is the most expedient use of resources. In Rodriguez, the Court of Appeal “acknowledge[d] that in isolation the phrase ‘other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’ could arguably refer to any car sold with a manufacturer’s warranty still in force,” but it agreed “that context clearly requires a more narrow interpretation.”¿ (Rodriguez, supra,¿77 Cal.App.5th at p. 220.)¿ The court noted that “the phrase appears in a definition of¿new¿motor vehicles,” strongly suggesting that “the Legislature did not intend the phrase to refer to used (i.e., previously sold) vehicles.”¿ (Ibid.)¿ The court also noted that “more importantly, the phrase is preceded by ‘a dealer-owned vehicle and demonstrator,’ which comprise a specific and narrow class of vehicles.”¿ (Ibid.)¿ The Rodriguez court therefore concluded that “the phrase ‘other motor vehicles sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’ refers to cars sold with a full warranty, not to previously sold cars accompanied by some balance of the original warranty.”¿ (Id.¿at p. 225.)¿ This holding conflicts with Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112.)

Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims concern the purchase of a used vehicle with a balance remaining on the express warranty. The facts of this case align with Rodriguez. Given that review of Rodriguez has been granted, and indeed the issues are fully briefed, the California Supreme Court’s ruling will likely determine whether Plaintiff can maintain his Song-Beverly claims.

Plaintiff opposes a stay on the following grounds: (1) this motion is an improper motion for reconsideration of the court’s April 25, 2023 order wherein the court denied Kia’s request for a stay pending resolution of Rodriguez; and (2) Code of Civil Procedure section 128 does not a grant this court the power to grant the stay requested.

Plaintiff is mistaken. First, the court’s April 25, 2023 did not rule on Kia’s request for a stay. Indeed, the request is not mentioned at all. (See Minute Order, 4/25/23.)

Second, Code of Civil Procedure section 128 expresses the court’s broad power in controlling its processes. Subdivision (a)(8), in particular, states that very principle. The court’s power to issue a stay such as the one requested by Kia is within the court’s authority. The court, where necessary and not violative of the law, may even create new processes. (See James v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 169, 175 [referencing Code of Civil Procedure section 128(a)(8) as a source of the court’s inherent power to create new forms of procedure in particular cases].)

In sum, Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to address the principal issue raised by Kia’s motion: the Supreme Court’s pending decision is determinative of the viability of Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims. A stay will serve the interests of justice by preventing potentially unnecessary litigation.

The court sets a Status Conference on January 10, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. re: California Supreme Court’s ruling in Rodriguez.

Kerry Bensinger

Judge of the Superior Court