Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case Number: 19STCV24213, Date: 2025-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Counsel may submit on the tentative ruling by emailing Dept. 31 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. The email address is smcdept31@lacourt.org. Please do not call the court to submit on the tentative. Please do not submit to the tentative ruling on behalf of the opposing party. Please do not e-mail the Court if you plan to appear and argue.

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The tentative rulings authored by this court reflect that the court has read and considered all pleadings and evidence timely submitted to the court in connection with the motion, opposition, and reply (if any). Because the pleadings were filed, they are part of the public record.

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**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.

CASE: Jerome Nash, As Trustee of the Jerome J. Nash Revocable Trust of 2001 U/D/T Dated May 21, 2001, et al. v. Bong Ik Lee, et al.

The action arises from the alleged contamination of the real property located at 4297-4299 South Leimert Boulevard in Los Angeles, California (“Subject Property”). The Subject Property is owned by Jerome Nash, as Trustee of the Jerome J. Nash Revocable Trust of 2001 dated May 21, 2001, Micharl East, Tanisha Gonzalez, and Henry Ocasio (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs allege that the Subject Property has been or was contaminated with Perchloroethylene (“PCE”), a hazardous substance. Plaintiffs allege the PCE contamination is attributable to the operation of a cleaning business, known as Flaire Cleaners, which is owned and operated by Bong Ik Lee and Chang Lee (“Defendants”), and was previously located upon the Subject Property. Plaintiffs allege that, throughout the operation of Defendants’ business from as early as 1981, Defendants used, handled, and stored PCE upon the Subject Property.

On July 11, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants alleging causes of action for (1) Continuing Nuisance; (2) Continuing Trespass; (3) Contribution; (4) Equitable Indemnity; (5) Contribution under HSAA § 25363; and (6) Declaratory Relief.

On April 1, 2022, defendant Bong Ik Lee filed a motion for leave to file a cross-complaint. On May 3, 2022, the court granted the motion and deemed the Cross-Complaint filed that same day. The Cross-Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) Cost Recovery under Hazardous Substances Account Act; (2) Nuisance; (3) Negligence; (4) Contribution; (5) Equitable Indemnity; and (6) Declaratory Relief against cross-complainants Anthony Bedford, individually and dba Flaire Cleaners; Estate of Sidney Allen McMurdo, Deceased; Lynn Kennedy, as administrator of the Estate of Sidney Allen McMurdo; Estate of Kenneth McMurdo, Deceased, as administrator of the Estate of Sidney Allen McMurdo; Sherman Johnson, individually and dba Sherman’s Auto Body; Nhan Duc Hong, individually and dba Super Auto Body and Car Repair; Lester Leighton, individually and dba Leimert Top & Body Shop.

On August 2, 2022, the Estate of Anthony Bedford, Deceased, was named as Roe 1 to the Cross-Complaint.

On September 18, 2024, Plaintiffs were named as Roes 2-5 to the Cross-Complaint.

On November 14, 2022, cross-complainant The Hanover Insurance Company (“Hanover”) filed an Answer to the Cross-Complaint as the insurer of the Estate of Anthony Bedford, Deceased.

On December 31, 2024, defendant Bong Ik Lee filed a Notice of Settlement. The Notice states that Plaintiffs, Defendant, the Estate of Chang Ik Lee, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, American Automobile Insurance Company, Allianz Resolution Management, Inc., and Hanover have settled this action.[1]

On January 16, 2025, defendant Bong Ik Lee (hereafter, “Settling Defendant”) filed this Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement. Settling Defendant, Plaintiffs, and Hanover (on behalf of the Estate of Bedford), move jointly for an order determining that their settlement was made in good faith.

On February 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Joinder to Defendant’s Motion for Good Faith Settlement Determination.

“Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or coobligors on a contract shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or coobligors ….”¿ (Code of Civ. Proc., § 877.6.)¿ Good faith settlements further two sometimes competing policies: (1) the equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault, and (2) the encouragement of settlements.¿ (Erreca’s v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1487.)¿¿

A court must consider several factors including “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial.”¿ (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 (Tech-Bilt).)¿¿“Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.” ¿(Id.)¿¿¿

The evaluation of whether a settlement was made in good faith is¿ required to “be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.”¿ (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.) ¿“[A] court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor’s potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury.” ¿(TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)¿ “Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.”¿ (Id.)¿¿

In City of Grand View Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261, the court provided the following guidance regarding a motion for a good faith settlement determination:¿¿

“If the good faith settlement is contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the contesting party. Once there is a showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. If contested, declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could require the moving party to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the lack of good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party.”

Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors, upon giving notice in the manner provided in subdivision (b) of Section 1005.¿ (Code of Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1).)¿¿

Here, Settling Defendant served this Motion on all parties who have appeared in this action by electronic service on January 16, 2025. The hearing for the Motion was scheduled for April 10, 2025. Settling Defendant complied with Code of Civil Procedure section 1005. The procedural requirements are satisfied.

To avoid litigation expenses and the risks of trial, Plaintiffs, Settling Defendant, and their insurers or alleged insurers, reached a settlement with an outside mediator. Under the terms of the agreement, the insurers or alleged insurers for Settling Defendant agree to pay Plaintiffs the total sum of $2,598,000.00, up to $1,000.000 of which Plaintiffs must use to implement a remedial action plan and to purse a further remediation determination for the Subject Property in exchange for mutual release of claims.¿

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes the settlement between Plaintiffs, Settling Defendant, and Hanover was made in good faith.¿ The unopposed Joint Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is GRANTED.

Kerry Bensinger

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] According to the declaration of Bret A. Stone, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company and American Automobile Insurance Company issued insurance policies to Defendants, and claims against those policies are handled by Allianz Resolution Management, Inc. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company and American Automobile Insurance Company have defended Defendant Bong Ik Lee in this action subject to their reservation of rights. (Stone Decl., ¶ 3.) Hanover allegedly issued insurance policies to Anthony Bedford and Bong Ik Lee and agreed to participate in the defense of Defendant and the Estate of Bedford, Deceased, in this action subject to their reservation of rights.