Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 19STCV35695, Date: 2023-01-24 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 19STCV35695    Hearing Date: January 24, 2023    Dept: 27

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

MARTHE DE LA TORRE,

                   Plaintiff,

          vs.

 

ERJAEI SEYED HOSEIN, et al.,

 

                   Defendants.

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      CASE NO.: 19STCV35695

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS MICHAEL AARON LALEZARIAN CORPORATION’S AND MICHAEL AARON LALEZARIAN, M.S.’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS

 

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

Friday, July 22, 2022

 

          On October 7, 2019, Plaintiff Marthe De La Torre (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Erjaei Seyed Hosein and Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for injuries arising from a collision between Plaintiff, who was walking on a sidewalk, and Defendant Hosein, who was riding a Lyft motorized scooter.

On September 10, 2020, Lyft served an initial set of discovery requests on Plaintiff. After Plaintiff responded, the parties engaged in significant meet and confer efforts. On January 18, 2022, Plaintiff served supplemental responses to some of the requests at issue. The parties then engaged in multiple IDCs. When the IDCs were also unproductive, on June 28, 2022, Defendant Lyft propounded a second set of discovery. Lyft served Form Interrogatories Set Two, Special Interrogatories Set Two, Requests for Admission Set Two and Requests for Production of Documents Set Two, on Plaintiff.  Plaintiff responded on August 1, 2022 with objection-only responses.

          Defendant Lyft filed four (4) motions to compel further responses to these discovery requests on September 15, 2022. The motion to compel further responses to the Special Interrogatories was granted on December 22, 2022. This ruling addresses the two (2) motions to compel further responses to the Requests for Admission and the Form Interrogatories.

          On October 19, 2022, the parties had another IDC, where the issues remained unresolved.

          On December 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 17, 2023, Defendant Lyft filed a reply, in which Lyft reduced the number of responses at issue.

 

Legal Standard — Compel Further Responses

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300(a), and Section 2033.290, parties may move for a further response to interrogatories or requests for admission where an answer to the requests are evasive or incomplete or where an objection is without merit or too general.  

Notice of the motions must be given within 45 days of service of the verified response, otherwise, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (c).) The motions must also be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (b).)    

Finally, Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345 requires that all motions or responses involving further discovery contain a separate statement with the text of each request, the response, and a statement of factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345, subd. (a)(3)). 

 

Analysis

Timeliness and Meet and Confer

The Court finds that the motions are timely made. Plaintiff served responses on August 1, 2022, and Lyft filed these motions on September 15, 2022. (Chinn-Lu Decl. ¶ 9.) Thus, the motions were filed within 45 days of the responses. The Court also finds that moving Defendants have satisfied their obligation to meet and confer. (Chinn-Lu Decl. ¶ 10.)

 

Request for Admission, Set Two – Ruling on Plaintiff’s Objections

Lyft’s original motion asked that further responses be given to twelve Requests for Admission. However, in Lyft’s reply, Lyft only requests that further responses be given to RFAs Nos. 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, and 41.

 

Lyft states that these discovery requests seek information that is highly relevant to the subject matter of Plaintiff’s claims and damages. The Court agrees and finds that Lyft has good cause to make these requests, as they are related to Lyft’s liability and Plaintiff’s personal knowledge about Lyft’s liability.

          Plaintiff objects to RFAs Nos. 31, 33, 37, 39, and 41 stating that the requests have already been propounded and thus, are duplicative and oppressive and harassing. Although a Court can sustain an objection if it is burdensome, it must be shown that the burden of answering is so unjust that it amounts to oppression. (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Sup.Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 419.) In determining whether the burden is unjust, it must appear that the amount of work required to answer the questions is so great, and the utility of the information sought so minimal, that it would defeat the ends of justice to require the answers. (See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 19.) The burden is on the objecting party to sustain the objection by detailed evidence showing precisely how much work is required to answer; conclusionary statements are not sufficient. (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.2d at 417.) Plaintiff does not put forward any facts showing that responding to these requests would be harassing or oppressive.

Additionally, Plaintiff puts forward an example to show that these requests are duplicative, but the example demonstrates that the requests are different.  RFA No. 41 in Set Two asks for Plaintiff to admit that at the time the complaint was filed, Plaintiff did not have personal knowledge of Lyft’s ability to render its scooters inoperable to prevent them from being driven on public sidewalks. RFA No. 25 from Set One is asking for Plaintiff’s current knowledge or evidence relating to these subjects. These RFAs are distinct, as are the rest of the RFAs at issue. Plaintiff’s objections on this ground are overruled. 

          Plaintiff objects to RFAs Nos. 31, 33, 34, and 35 stating that Plaintiff’s personal knowledge of the subject matter is immaterial and not dispositive, and that Lyft has evidence of the subject matter of the request. These requests concern Plaintiff’s knowledge of Lyft’s liability. Plaintiff’s personal knowledge is relevant because it bears on Plaintiff’s ability to prove her allegations and the foundation for these allegations. Thus, these RFAs are not irrelevant, and Plaintiff puts forward no facts showing that Lyft has evidence of Plaintiff’s personal knowledge. These objections are overruled.  

          Plaintiff objects to RFAs No. 34 and 35 because she claims they are vague, ambiguous, or overbroad. These requests are not vague, ambiguous, or overbroad.

Ruling on Individual RFAs

 

Request for Admission

Response

GRANT/DENY & Reason

31. Admit that YOU did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was filed, have personal knowledge of an agency relationship between the defendants in this action.

Objection. This identical request has already been propounded as Request for Admission No. 15 in Set One and it is unauthorized. See also Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490 which held that, a litigant may not obtain through a second discovery request what has been lost in the untimely prosecution of a first request. Duplicative requests are oppressive and harassing. This is an improper request for admission as the Plaintiff’s “personal knowledge” of the subject matter is immaterial and not dispositive of the facts and issues in dispute for which a request for admission may be used, to settle a matter in controversy. (See Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 510.) The nature of the subject matter of the request may be proved by admissible evidence currently within Lyft’s exclusive possession and control to which Plaintiff currently has no access.

GRANT. This is not a valid objection. Plaintiff does not put forward facts showing that responding to this question would be oppressive. Additionally, Plaintiff’s personal knowledge is relevant to Lyft’s liability.

33. Admit that YOU did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was filed, have personal knowledge of LYFT’s relationship with the City of Santa Monica

Same response as RFA No. 31.

GRANT. This is not a valid objection. Plaintiff does not put forward facts showing that responding to this question would be oppressive. Additionally, Plaintiff’s personal knowledge is relevant to Lyft’s liability.

34. Admit that YOU have no personal knowledge of LYFT’s relationship with the City of Los Angeles.

Objection. This request is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. This is an improper request for admission as the Plaintiff’s “personal knowledge” of the subject matter is immaterial and not dispositive of the facts and issues in dispute for which a request for admission may be used, to settle a matter in controversy. (See Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 510.)

GRANT. This question is not vague, ambiguous, or overbroad.

35. Admit that YOU did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was filed, have personal knowledge of LYFT’s relationship with the City of Los Angeles.

Same as response to RFA No. 34.

GRANT. This question is not vague, ambiguous, or overbroad.

37. Admit that YOU did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was filed, have personal knowledge to support YOUR allegation that LYFT launched its electric scooters “in the City of Santa Monica without any business permits, or any consultation, approval and/or authorization whatsoever from the City of Santa Monica.”

Objection. This request has previously been propounded. See Request for Admission No. 5 in Set One. Duplicative requests are oppressive and harassing. See also Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490 which held that, a litigant may not obtain through a second discovery request what has been lost in the untimely prosecution of a first request.”

 

GRANT. This is not a valid objection. Plaintiff does not put forward facts showing that responding to this question would be oppressive.

39. Admit that YOU did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was filed, have personal knowledge to support YOUR allegation that LYFT “forced the City of Santa Monica to scramble and enact emergency measures in an attempt to protect the public.

Same response as to RFA No. 37.

GRANT. This is not a valid objection. Plaintiff does not put forward facts showing that responding to this question would be oppressive.

41.  Admit that YOU did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was filed, have personal knowledge to support YOUR allegation that LYFT “had the ability and technology to render [its] scooters inoperable in order to prevent the scooters from being driven on public sidewalks.”

Same response as RFA No. 37.

GRANT. This is not a valid objection. Plaintiff does not put forward facts showing that responding to this question would be oppressive.

 

Ruling on Plaintiff’s Objections to Form Interrogatories

Lyft’s original motion asked that further responses be given to nine Form Interrogatories. However, in Lyft’s reply, Lyft only requests that a further response be given to Form Interrogatory 17.1.

Form Interrogatory 17.1 states:

“Is your response to each request for admission served with these interrogatories an unqualified admission? If not, for each response that is not an unqualified admission: (a) state the number of the request; (b) state all facts upon which you base your response; (c) state the names, ADDRESSES, and telephone numbers of all PERSONS who have knowledge of those facts; and (d) identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your response and state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each DOCUMENT or thing.”

 

Plaintiff objected to this request stating:

 

“Objection. Plaintiff has objected to the Requests for Admissions to which this Form Interrogatory corresponds. This request is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. This request is duplicative, oppressive, and harassing as the corresponding Requests have previously been propounded and are unauthorized. Duplicative requests are oppressive and harassing. See also Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490 which held that, a litigant may not obtain through a second discovery request what has been lost in the untimely prosecution of a first request. Duplicative requests are oppressive and harassing. This is an improper request for admission as the Plaintiff’s “personal knowledge” of the subject matter is immaterial and not dispositive of the facts and issues in dispute for which a request for admission may be used, to settle a matter in controversy. (See Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 510.) The nature of the subject matter of the request may be proved by admissible evidence currently within Lyft’s exclusive possession and control to which Plaintiff currently has no access.”

 

 First, the Court finds that this interrogatory is standard and that this discovery request and the corresponding RFAs seek information that is highly relevant to the subject matter of Plaintiff’s claims and damages and the foundations of Plaintiff’s allegations as to Lyft’s liability. The Court agrees and finds that Lyft has good cause to make this request.

Second, this request is not vague, ambiguous, or overbroad.  Third, as stated above, this request is not duplicative, oppressive, or harassing because these requests are distinct from the previously propounded requests, and Plaintiff does not offer any facts that show that this request is oppressive.

Fourth, as stated above, Plaintiff’s personal knowledge is relevant because it forms the basis of the foundation of the allegations as to Lyft’s liability in this action.

Finally, Plaintiff cannot show, and does not attempt to show, that Lyft has “exclusive possession and control” of the subject matter of these questions, which pertain to Plaintiff’s personal knowledge of the incident and Lyft’s liability. 

Monetary Sanctions

Where the court grants a motion to compel further responses, sanctions shall be imposed against the party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel, unless the party acted with substantial justification or the sanction would otherwise be unjust.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.310, subd. (h), 2033.290, subd. (d).) 

Defendants’ request for sanctions is GRANTED.  Sanctions are imposed against Plaintiff and counsel of record, jointly and severally, for the two motions, in the amount of $2,670.00, consisting of 6 hours at defense counsel’s rate of $425 and a $60 filing fee.

 

CONCLUSION

Defendant Lyft’s motions to compel further responses to (1) Form Interrogatory Set Two No. 17.1 and (2) Requests for Admission, Set Two, Nos. 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, and 41 are GRANTED.

          Defendant Lyft’s motion for sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $2,670.00.

          Sanctions are to be paid and further responses are to be provided within 10 days.  

 

Moving party to give notice.

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Dated this 24th day of January 2023

 

 

 

 

Hon. Kerry Bensinger

Judge of the Superior Court