Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 19STCV35695, Date: 2023-01-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV35695 Hearing Date: January 24, 2023 Dept: 27
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs.
ERJAEI
SEYED HOSEIN, et al.,
Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS MICHAEL AARON LALEZARIAN CORPORATION’S AND MICHAEL AARON
LALEZARIAN, M.S.’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM
INTERROGATORIES, SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AND
REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
Dept.
27 1:30
p.m. Friday,
July 22, 2022 |
On October 7,
2019, Plaintiff Marthe De La Torre (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants
Erjaei Seyed Hosein and Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for
injuries arising from a collision between Plaintiff, who was walking on a
sidewalk, and Defendant Hosein, who was riding a Lyft motorized scooter.
On September 10, 2020, Lyft served an
initial set of discovery requests on Plaintiff. After Plaintiff responded, the
parties engaged in significant meet and confer efforts. On January 18, 2022,
Plaintiff served supplemental responses to some of the requests at issue. The
parties then engaged in multiple IDCs. When the IDCs were also unproductive, on
June 28, 2022, Defendant Lyft propounded a second set of discovery. Lyft served
Form Interrogatories Set Two, Special Interrogatories Set Two, Requests for
Admission Set Two and Requests for Production of Documents Set Two, on Plaintiff. Plaintiff responded on August 1, 2022 with
objection-only responses.
Defendant
Lyft filed four (4) motions to compel further responses to these discovery
requests on September 15, 2022. The motion to compel further responses to the Special
Interrogatories was granted on December 22, 2022. This ruling addresses the two
(2) motions to compel further responses to the Requests for Admission and the
Form Interrogatories.
On October
19, 2022, the parties had another IDC, where the issues remained unresolved.
On December
9, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 17, 2023, Defendant Lyft
filed a reply, in which Lyft reduced the number of responses at issue.
Legal Standard — Compel Further Responses
Under Code of Civil Procedure sections
2030.300(a), and Section 2033.290, parties may move for a further response to
interrogatories or requests for admission where an answer to the requests are
evasive or incomplete or where an objection is without merit or too
general.
Notice of the motions must be given
within 45 days of service of the verified response, otherwise, the propounding
party waives any right to compel a further response. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2030.300, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (c).) The motions must
also be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2030.300, subd. (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd.
(b).)
Finally, Cal. Rules of Court, Rule
3.1345 requires that all motions or responses involving further discovery
contain a separate statement with the text of each request, the response, and a
statement of factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses. (Cal.
Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345, subd. (a)(3)).
Analysis
Timeliness and Meet and Confer
The Court finds that the motions are
timely made. Plaintiff served responses on August 1, 2022, and Lyft filed these
motions on September 15, 2022. (Chinn-Lu Decl. ¶ 9.) Thus, the motions were
filed within 45 days of the responses. The Court also finds that moving
Defendants have satisfied their obligation to meet and confer. (Chinn-Lu Decl.
¶ 10.)
Request for Admission, Set Two – Ruling on Plaintiff’s
Objections
Lyft’s original motion asked that
further responses be given to twelve Requests for Admission. However, in Lyft’s
reply, Lyft only requests that further responses be given to RFAs Nos. 31, 33,
34, 35, 37, 39, and 41.
Lyft states that these discovery
requests seek information that is highly relevant to the subject matter of
Plaintiff’s claims and damages. The Court agrees and finds that Lyft has good
cause to make these requests, as they are related to Lyft’s liability and
Plaintiff’s personal knowledge about Lyft’s liability.
Plaintiff
objects to RFAs Nos. 31, 33, 37, 39, and 41 stating that the requests have
already been propounded and thus, are duplicative and oppressive and harassing.
Although a Court can sustain an objection if it is burdensome, it must be shown
that the burden of answering is so unjust that it amounts to oppression. (West
Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Sup.Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 419.) In
determining whether the burden is unjust, it must appear that the amount
of work required to answer the questions is so great, and the utility of
the information sought so minimal, that it would defeat the ends of justice to
require the answers. (See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Sup.Ct.
(1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 19.) The burden is on the objecting party to
sustain the objection by detailed evidence showing precisely how much work
is required to answer; conclusionary statements are not sufficient. (West
Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.2d at 417.) Plaintiff does
not put forward any facts showing that responding to these requests would be
harassing or oppressive.
Additionally, Plaintiff puts forward an
example to show that these requests are duplicative, but the example demonstrates
that the requests are different. RFA No.
41 in Set Two asks for Plaintiff to admit that at the time the complaint was
filed, Plaintiff did not have personal knowledge of Lyft’s ability to
render its scooters inoperable to prevent them from being driven on public
sidewalks. RFA No. 25 from Set One is asking for Plaintiff’s current knowledge
or evidence relating to these subjects. These RFAs are distinct, as are the
rest of the RFAs at issue. Plaintiff’s objections on this ground are
overruled.
Plaintiff objects
to RFAs Nos. 31, 33, 34, and 35 stating that Plaintiff’s personal knowledge of
the subject matter is immaterial and not dispositive, and that Lyft has
evidence of the subject matter of the request. These requests concern
Plaintiff’s knowledge of Lyft’s liability. Plaintiff’s personal knowledge is
relevant because it bears on Plaintiff’s ability to prove her allegations and
the foundation for these allegations. Thus, these RFAs are not irrelevant, and
Plaintiff puts forward no facts showing that Lyft has evidence of Plaintiff’s personal
knowledge. These objections are overruled.
Plaintiff
objects to RFAs No. 34 and 35 because she claims they are vague, ambiguous, or
overbroad. These requests are not vague, ambiguous, or overbroad.
Ruling on Individual RFAs
|
Request for Admission |
Response |
GRANT/DENY & Reason |
|
31. Admit that YOU did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was
filed, have personal knowledge of an agency relationship between the
defendants in this action. |
Objection. This identical request has already been
propounded as Request for Admission No. 15 in Set One and it is unauthorized.
See also Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490 which held that, a litigant may not obtain
through a second discovery request what has been lost in the untimely
prosecution of a first request. Duplicative requests are oppressive and
harassing. This is an improper request for admission as the Plaintiff’s
“personal knowledge” of the subject matter is immaterial and not dispositive
of the facts and issues in dispute for which a request for admission may be
used, to settle a matter in controversy. (See Brooks v. American Broadcasting
Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 510.) The nature of the subject matter of the
request may be proved by admissible evidence currently within Lyft’s exclusive
possession and control to which Plaintiff currently has no access. |
GRANT. This is not a valid objection. Plaintiff does not
put forward facts showing that responding to this question would be
oppressive. Additionally, Plaintiff’s personal knowledge is relevant to
Lyft’s liability. |
|
33. Admit that YOU did not, at the time
YOUR COMPLAINT was filed, have personal knowledge of LYFT’s relationship with
the City of Santa Monica |
Same response as RFA No. 31. |
GRANT. This is not a valid objection. Plaintiff does not
put forward facts showing that responding to this question would be
oppressive. Additionally, Plaintiff’s personal knowledge is relevant to
Lyft’s liability. |
|
34. Admit that YOU have no personal knowledge of LYFT’s
relationship with the City of Los Angeles. |
Objection. This request is vague, ambiguous, and
overbroad. This is an improper request for admission as the Plaintiff’s
“personal knowledge” of the subject matter is immaterial and not dispositive
of the facts and issues in dispute for which a request for admission may be
used, to settle a matter in controversy. (See Brooks v. American Broadcasting
Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 510.) |
GRANT. This question is not vague, ambiguous, or
overbroad. |
|
35. Admit that YOU did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was
filed, have personal knowledge of LYFT’s relationship with the City of Los
Angeles. |
Same as response to RFA No. 34. |
GRANT. This question is not vague, ambiguous, or
overbroad. |
|
37. Admit that YOU did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was
filed, have personal knowledge to support YOUR allegation that LYFT launched
its electric scooters “in the City of Santa Monica without any business
permits, or any consultation, approval and/or authorization whatsoever from
the City of Santa Monica.” |
Objection. This request has
previously been propounded. See Request for Admission No. 5 in Set One.
Duplicative requests are oppressive and harassing. See also Professional
Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 490 which held that, a litigant may not obtain through a second
discovery request what has been lost in the untimely prosecution of a first
request.”
|
GRANT. This is not a valid objection. Plaintiff does not put
forward facts showing that responding to this question would be oppressive. |
|
39. Admit that YOU did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was
filed, have personal knowledge to support YOUR allegation that LYFT “forced
the City of Santa Monica to scramble and enact emergency measures in an
attempt to protect the public. |
Same response as to RFA No. 37. |
GRANT. This is not a valid objection. Plaintiff does not
put forward facts showing that responding to this question would be
oppressive. |
|
41. Admit that YOU
did not, at the time YOUR COMPLAINT was filed, have personal knowledge to
support YOUR allegation that LYFT “had the ability and technology to render
[its] scooters inoperable in order to prevent the scooters from being driven
on public sidewalks.” |
Same response as RFA No. 37. |
GRANT. This is not a valid objection. Plaintiff does not
put forward facts showing that responding to this question would be
oppressive. |
Ruling on Plaintiff’s Objections to Form Interrogatories
Lyft’s original motion asked that
further responses be given to nine Form Interrogatories. However, in Lyft’s
reply, Lyft only requests that a further response be given to Form
Interrogatory 17.1.
Form Interrogatory 17.1 states:
“Is your response to each request for admission served with
these interrogatories an unqualified admission? If not, for each response that
is not an unqualified admission: (a) state the number of the request; (b) state
all facts upon which you base your response; (c) state the names, ADDRESSES,
and telephone numbers of all PERSONS who have knowledge of those facts; and (d)
identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your response and
state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each
DOCUMENT or thing.”
Plaintiff objected to this request stating:
“Objection. Plaintiff has objected to the Requests for
Admissions to which this Form Interrogatory corresponds. This request is vague,
ambiguous, and overbroad. This request is duplicative, oppressive, and
harassing as the corresponding Requests have previously been propounded and are
unauthorized. Duplicative requests are oppressive and harassing. See also
Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 490 which held that, a litigant may not obtain through a second
discovery request what has been lost in the untimely prosecution of a first
request. Duplicative requests are oppressive and harassing. This is an improper
request for admission as the Plaintiff’s “personal knowledge” of the subject
matter is immaterial and not dispositive of the facts and issues in dispute for
which a request for admission may be used, to settle a matter in controversy. (See
Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 510.) The nature
of the subject matter of the request may be proved by admissible evidence
currently within Lyft’s exclusive possession and control to which Plaintiff
currently has no access.”
First,
the Court finds that this interrogatory is standard and that this discovery
request and the corresponding RFAs seek information that is highly relevant to
the subject matter of Plaintiff’s claims and damages and the foundations of
Plaintiff’s allegations as to Lyft’s liability. The Court agrees and finds that
Lyft has good cause to make this request.
Second, this request is not vague,
ambiguous, or overbroad. Third, as
stated above, this request is not duplicative, oppressive, or harassing because
these requests are distinct from the previously propounded requests, and
Plaintiff does not offer any facts that show that this request is oppressive.
Fourth, as stated above, Plaintiff’s
personal knowledge is relevant because it forms the basis of the foundation of
the allegations as to Lyft’s liability in this action.
Finally, Plaintiff cannot show, and does
not attempt to show, that Lyft has “exclusive possession and control” of the
subject matter of these questions, which pertain to Plaintiff’s personal
knowledge of the incident and Lyft’s liability.
Monetary Sanctions
Where the court grants a motion to
compel further responses, sanctions shall be imposed against the party who
unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel, unless the party acted with
substantial justification or the sanction would otherwise be unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.310, subd. (h), 2033.290,
subd. (d).)
Defendants’ request for sanctions is
GRANTED. Sanctions are imposed against Plaintiff
and counsel of record, jointly and severally, for the two motions, in the
amount of $2,670.00, consisting of 6 hours at defense counsel’s rate of $425
and a $60 filing fee.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Lyft’s motions to compel
further responses to (1) Form Interrogatory Set Two No. 17.1 and (2) Requests
for Admission, Set Two, Nos. 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, and 41 are GRANTED.
Defendant
Lyft’s motion for sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $2,670.00.
Sanctions are
to be paid and further responses are to be provided within 10 days.
Moving party to give notice.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to
appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the
hearing and argue the matter. Unless you
receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume
that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the
parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.
Dated
this 24th day of January 2023
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Hon. Kerry Bensinger Judge of the Superior Court
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