Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 19STCV44733, Date: 2023-05-17 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 19STCV44733    Hearing Date: May 17, 2023    Dept: 27

Tentative Ruling

 

Judge Kerry Bensinger, Department 27

 

 

HEARING DATE:     May 17, 2023                         TRIAL DATE:  September 19, 2023

                                                          

CASE:                         Rosa Cordova v. Garden Fresh Restaurants, LLC, et al.

 

CASE NO.:                 19STCV44733

 

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant Macerich Management Company

 

RESPONDING PARTY:     No opposition

 

 

I.          BACKGROUND

 

            On December 11, 2019, Plaintiff, Rosa Cordova, filed this action against Defendant, Garden Fresh Restaurants, LLC, for negligence and premises liability.  On March 24, 2021, Plaintiff designated Macerich Lakewood LP (erroneously named as “Lakewood Mall Shopping Center Company”) as Doe 1, Brooke & Mack, Inc. as Doe 2, and SPLW Properties, LTD., as Doe 3.  On August 30, 2021, Plaintiff designated Construction State Service, LLC as Doe 4, and Macerich Management Company as Doe 5

 

            On December 8, 2022, defendant Macerich Management Company (hereinafter, “Defendant”) filed this motion for summary judgment.  

 

            Factual Allegations

 

            As framed by the Complaint, on November 18, 2018, Plaintiff sustained injuries while at the Souplantation restaurant at 4720 Candlewood St., Lakewood, California 907212 when an employee struck her in the back and right side by brutally opening the kitchen door with a cart full of dishes.  (Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 17.)

 

III.       LEGAL STANDARDS

 

A.     Summary Judgment

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) 

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) 

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)  It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.  (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)  The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”  (Ibid.)¿ The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.) 

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”  (Ibid.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

B.     Negligence and Premises Liability

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.¿ (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671; Civil Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)¿ Therefore, to prevail on a claim for premises liability, Plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant owned or controlled the subject property; (2) defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3) plaintiff was harmed; and (4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.¿ (See CACI No. 1000; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.)¿ A substantial factor in causing harm is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to have contributed to the harm.  It must be more than a remote or trivial factor.  It does not have to be the only cause of the harm.  (CACI No. 430; Yanez v. Plummer (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 180, 187.)

A property owner is not the insurer of the safety of its guests.¿ The owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is key to establishing liability.¿ (Hall v. Rockcliff Realtors (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139-40.)

 

IV.       JUDICIAL NOTICE

 

            Defendants request that the Court to take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Garden Fresh’s Answer, Plaintiff’s doe amendments, Defendant’s Answer, and the Court’s order granting Garden Fresh’s attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel.  The unopposed request is GRANTED.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

 

V.        DISCUSSION

 

            This action arises from the alleged injuries Plaintiff, Rosa Cordova, allegedly sustained on or around November 18, 2018 when she was dining at a Souplantation restaurant located at 4720 Candlewood Street, Lakewood, California (“Subject Premises”).  (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) 1.)  Plaintiff contends she was injured inside the restaurant when she was struck by “an employee who abruptly opened the kitchen door with a cart full of clean dishes and striking plaintiff in the back and right side.”  (UMF 2.)  Defendant, Macerich Lakewood LP, owns the Subject Premises.  (UMF 3.)  Defendant Macerich Management Company, manages the Subject Premises.  (UMF 4.)  Brooke & Mack Inc., named as Doe 2, is the entity which leased the Subject Premises from Defendant Macerich Lakewood LP and which operated the Souplantation restaurant.  (UMF 5.)  At the time of the incident, the Macerich Defendants did not have control or possession of the Subject Premises and did not maintain or operate it.  (UMF 6.)  The Macerich Defendants did not employ any individual at the Subject Premises, let alone the individual who “abruptly opened the kitchen door with a cart full of clean dishes and striking plaintiff in the back and right side.”  (UMF 7.)  Pursuant to the agreement between Defendant Macerich Lakewood LP (landlord) and Brooke & Mack Inc./Garden Fresh Restaurant (tenant), the tenant is to maintain the Subject Premises and have possession of the Subject Premises during the term of lease.  (UMF 8.)  With regard to Defendant Macerich Management Company, it has no interest in the Subject Premises and merely acts as a liaison between the landlord and tenant as it relates to the Lease Agreement.  (UMF 9.)  Defendant Macerich Management Company also does not perform any maintenance on behalf of either the landlord or tenant.  (UMF 10.)  On or around February 6, 1987, Defendant Macerich Lakewood LP (formerly Lakewood Mall Shopping Center Company) entered into a 20-year Lease Agreement with Defendant Brooke & Mack, Inc. dba Souplantation. The tenancy was extended on a month-to-month lease.  (UMF 11.)  At the time of the Subject Incident, which occurred on or around November 18, 2018, the Subject Premises was leased by Brooke & Mack, Inc.  (UMF 12.)  The Lease Agreement expressly states that the tenant (Brooke & Mack, Inc.) is to maintain the premises as follows: “ARTICLE 7 REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE Landlord shall not be obligated to make any repairs, alterations, additions or improvements in, to or upon the Leased Premises. Tenant at its sole expense, shall maintain the Leased Premises and the whole thereof in a clean and sanitary condition. Without limiting the foregoing, Tenant shall maintain and repair all walls, plate glass, sewers, sewer connections, .drains, pipelines, sidewalks and other improvements which may be required at any time by law to be constructed, maintained or repaired upon said Leased Premises.”  (UMF 13.)  Defendants Macerich Lakewood LP nor Macerich Management Company did not have any actual knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition which allegedly injured Plaintiff and had no right or ability to cure the alleged dangerous condition.  (UMF 14.)

 

Defendant’s Arguments

 

Defendant argues it did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care because Defendant did not possess or control the Subject Premises, was not obligated to maintain the Subject Premises, and did not have actual knowledge of any dangerous condition.  

 

“[B]efore liability may be thrust on a landlord for a third party’s injury due to a dangerous condition on the land, the plaintiff must show that the landlord had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition in question, plus the right and ability to cure the condition.”  (Stone v. Center Trust Retail Properties, Inc. 92008) 163 Cal.App.4th 608, 612, citing Mata v. Mata (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1131-32.) 

 

Here, Defendant managed the Subject Premises.  (UMF 3, 4.)  At the time of the incident, Defendant Brooke & Mack, Inc. (hereinafter, “B&M”) leased the Subject Premises.  (UMF 11, 12.)  Under the Lease Agreement, Defendant was not obligated “to make any repairs, alterations, additions or improvements in, to or upon the Leased Premises.”  (UMF 13.)  Nor did Defendant maintain, control, operate, possess, repair, inspect, manage, and/or clean the Subject Premises.  (UMF 6-11, 14.)  Rather, B&M, as the tenant of the Subject Premises, was obligated to maintain the Premises and to make any necessary repairs or improvements.  (UMF 13.)  Nor did Defendant employ the individual who allegedly injured Plaintiff by opening the kitchen door with a cart full of dishes.  (UMF 7.) 

 

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant did not owe a duty of care to Plaintiff.  Per the Lease Agreement, Defendant did not maintain and could not have maintained the Subject Premises at the time of the incident.  Having so established, Defendant further establishes that Defendant did not cause Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.  Defendant meets its initial burden.  As Plaintiff has not opposed the motion, Plaintiff does not meet her burden to show that there is a triable issue of material fact.  Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 

 

VI.       CONCLUSION

 

            The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

 

Moving party to give notice. 

 

 

Dated:   May 17, 2023                                    ___________________________________

                                                                                    Kerry Bensinger

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

 

            Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.