Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 20STCV22189, Date: 2023-04-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV22189 Hearing Date: April 6, 2023 Dept: 27
SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF
LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
|
CARL BAKER, Plaintiff, vs.
JORGE MARTINEZ,
Defendant.
|
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
|
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DISMISSAL BASED ON ATTORNEY’S EXCUSABLE NEGLECT (C.C.P. §473)
Dept. 27 1:30 p.m. April 6, 2023 |
I. BACKGROUND
On
June 11, 2020, plaintiff Carl Baker (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant
Jorge Martinez (“Defendant”) for injuries arising from a June 14, 2018 motor
vehicle accident. At the time of the
alleged accident, Plaintiff was working in the course and scope of his
employment with the City of Los Angeles (“City”). City filed a subrogation action against
Defendant to recover worker’s compensation benefits paid on Plaintiff’s behalf
in the related case City of Los Angeles v. Martinez, Case No. 20STCV20865.
On
June 29, 2022, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice
after Plaintiff did not appear at the final status conference or non-jury trial.
On
November 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to set aside the
dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).
Defendant
opposes.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Code of Civil
Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) provides that a court may “relieve a
party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or
other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” In addition, a court must vacate a default or
dismissal when a motion for relief under Section 473, subdivision (b) is filed
timely and accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to the
attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect “unless the court finds
that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or neglect.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)
The party or
the legal representative must seek such relief “within a reasonable time, in no
case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding
was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473,
subd. (b); see Rappleyea v. Campbell
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 [“because more than six months had elapsed from the
entry of default, and hence relief under section 473 was unavailable”]; People v. The North River Ins. Co.
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 712, 721 [motion for relief under section 473 must be
brought “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months”].)
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s
counsel declares that he is unsure how the incorrect trial date was entered into
the calendar, but that the error, whatever the cause, is excusable. (See Panah Decl.) Further, Plaintiff sought relief within six
months after the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint.
In
opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not provided a reasonable
explanation as to why Plaintiff delayed nearly five months before seeking
relief from dismissal.
Defendant
correctly points out Plaintiff’s
counsel provides a poor explanation for the nearly five-month delay in seeking
relief under section 473. However,
“[t[he general underlying purpose of section 473(b) is to
promote the determination of actions on their merits.” (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling,
Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 838.) Here, Plaintiff’s counsel stated he and/or
his office miscalendared the trial date, and the delays are attributable to his
errors and neglect. The only saving
grace from the Plaintiff is that his motion was made within the six-month jurisdictional
period. Given the foregoing reasons, and
the Legislative intent that actions be determined on their merits, the Court is
inclined to grant Plaintiff relief from dismissal.
However,
Defendant
argues he would be prejudiced if Plaintiff’s motion is granted because
Defendant has already resolved the related case, City of Los Angeles v.
Martinez, Case No. 20STCV20865. In
support, Defendant cites Labor Code section 3850 et seq. for the proposition
that Plaintiff is barred from seeking double recovery against Defendant. “The statutory scheme of section 3850 et seq.
is designed to prevent double recovery by an employee or an employer, and to
preclude double liability being imposed on a third-party tortfeasor.” (McKinnon v. Otis Elevator Co. (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1130.) The parties
fail to sufficiently address this issue.
Nor does Defendant provide a record to enable the Court to determine
whether City provided notice to Plaintiff that City and Defendant had reached a
settlement or whether Plaintiff provided his consent to the settlement agreement. (See Labor Code section 3859, subdivision (a)
[“No release or settlement of any claim under this chapter as to either the
employee or the employer is valid without the written consent of both. Proof of service filed with the court is sufficient
in any action or proceeding where such approval is required by law.”]; see also
Labor Code section 3860, subdivision (a) [“No release or settlement under this
chapter, with or without suit, is valid or binding as to any party thereto
without notice to both the employer and the employee, with opportunity to the
employer to recover the amount of [workers’] compensation he has paid or become
obligated to pay and any special damages to which he may be entitled under
Section 3852, and opportunity to the employee to recover all damages he has
suffered....”].) Given the risk of
prejudice to Defendant if Plaintiff’s action is reinstated, and the undeveloped
record as to the preclusive effect of Labor Code section 3850 et seq. to Plaintiff’s
action, the Court will hear argument from the parties at the hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court will hear argument from the parties
regarding Defendant’s settlement with the City of Los Angeles in related case, City
of Los Angeles v. Martinez, Case No. 20STCV20865, and
whether reinstatement of Plaintiff’s action in this case will prejudice
Defendant by permitting a potential double recovery against Defendant.
Moving party to give notice.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit
on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s
website at www.lacourt.org. Please be
advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the
hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue
the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If
the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on
this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court
may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the
motion off calendar.
Dated this 6th
day of April 2023
|
|
|
|
|
Hon. Kerry
Bensinger Judge of the Superior Court |