Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 20STCV29024, Date: 2023-02-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV29024    Hearing Date: February 2, 2023    Dept: 27

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

 

ADAM WILLIAMS, an individual

                        Plaintiff(s),

            vs.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CALTRANS, and DOES 1-25, INCLUSIVE,

 

                        Defendant(s).

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      CASE NO: 20STCV29024

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO STRIKE

 

Filed: July 31, 2020

Dept.: 27

1:30pm

February 2, 2023

 

DEMURRER

I.          BACKGROUND

 

Factual Background -

Adam Williams (plaintiff) commenced this action on July 31, 2020, by suing City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, CalTrans, and Does 1-25 (collectively, defendants) for (1) premises liability and (2) general negligence (See Complaint, p. 4-5).

Plaintiff alleges that July 17, 2019, he was riding his bicycle northbound on Lincoln Boulevard, at the intersection of Lincoln Boulevard and Fiji Way (the premises) when due to defendant’s negligence, he fell off his bicycle after coming into contact with a dangerous condition (Ibid.). Plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries and damages, and that each defendant is liable.

 

            Procedural Background –

            After commencing this suit, plaintiff attempted to file three amended complaints, each of which was rejected because no leave of court to amend was granted (See Notice of Rejection of Electronic Filing on (1) 8/19/2022, (2) 8/19/2022, and (3) 1/24/2023). On January 6, 2023, defendant filed the Defendant’s Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof; Declaration of Paul M. Dipietro (Demurrer). Defendant additionally filed a Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof; Declaration of Paul M. Dipietro (Motion to Strike.).

            Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

                       

II.        LEGAL STANDARD OF A DEMURRER

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.)  In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (CCP § 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.  (Id.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

 

III.       ANALYSIS

First Cause of Action – Premises Liability

             “The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) “Premises liability is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158, quotation marks omitted.)

            Plaintiff has not stated a cause of action

            Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant breached the duty to maintain the premises in a safe manner, and that this breach caused a dangerous condition which caused plaintiff to fall off his bicycle and sustain injuries (See Complaint, ¶ Prem. L-2). However, as defendant points out in the Demurer, nowhere in the complaint does the plaintiff expand on the nature of the dangerous condition, how it caused him to fall off of his bicycle, nor what injuries he sustained. (Demurer, p. 2, see also Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899) The facts as alleged are insufficient to constitute a cause of action for premises liability.

 

Second Cause of Action – General Negligence

In order to state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Put simply, plaintiff needs to show duty, breach, causation, and damages.

            Plaintiff has not stated a cause of action

            Here, plaintiff alleges the same facts in the first cause of action. The deficiency is the same. In addition to not pleading sufficient facts to constitute negligence, defendant correctly points out that absent a statute, common law negligence cannot be maintained against a public entity (See Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899).  Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

Therefore, as to the first cause of action, premises liability, the demurrer is SUSTAINED. As to the second cause of action, general negligence, the demurrer is SUSTAINED.

            Leave to Amend

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”] As to the first cause of action, there may be a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. The court notes that plaintiff has made three faulty amendments, however, the only reasons the amendments were rejected was because plaintiff did not properly seek leave from the court. Further, in their moving papers the defendant acknowledges that the plaintiff should be given leave to amend.

In conclusion, as to the first cause of action, premises liability, the demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.  However, as to the second cause of action of general negligence, because common law negligence is barred against a public entity absent statute, leave for the second cause of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

 

MOTION TO STRIKE

I.          LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to strike lies either (1) to strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of court.  (CCP § 436.)

“A motion to strike does not lie to attack a complaint for insufficiency of allegations to justify relief; that is a ground for general demurrer.”  (Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342; see also Warren v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 41 [the grounds that the allegations were insufficient as a matter of law to constitute the cause of action were grounds for demurrer and were not proper grounds for a motion to strike].)  “[A] motion to strike is generally used to reach defects in a pleading which are not subject to demurrer.”  (Id, at p. 342.)

II.        DISCUSSION

            Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the Motion to Strike.  Given the foregoing, the Motion to strike is moot and denied on that basis. 

CONCLUSION

The Demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the first cause of action with leave to amend.

Plaintiff is ordered to file and serve her Second Amended Complaint within 30 days of this ruling.

Defendants are ordered to file and serve their responsive pleading within 30 days of service of the Second Amended Complaint.

The Demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the second cause of action without leave to amend.

The Motion to Strike is DENIED.

           

DATED: February 2, 2023

 

 

                                                                         ___________________________

                                                                              Hon. Kerry Bensinger

                                                                              Judge of the Superior Court