SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On February 26, 2021, plaintiff Ralph Johnson (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant Target Corporation (“Defendant”) for premises liability arising from injuries Plaintiff sustained in a slip and fall occurring on March 2, 2019.  

On June 6, 2022, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment.  The motion is unopposed.  

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

On March 2, 2019, Plaintiff was walking down a main aisle of a Target store when he was “catapulted,” fell forward, and then ended up sliding head first.  (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1, 4, 7, 8.)  Prior to the fall, Plaintiff estimates being in the subject Target store for about 15 to 20 minutes.  (UMF No. 3.)  Plaintiff had walked through the same area where the incident occurred on his way into the store.  (UMF No. 5.)  Plaintiff did not see anything on the floor when he walked through the area the first time.  (UMF No. 6.)  Plaintiff never saw a spill on the date of the incident, even after his fall.  (UMF No. 10.)  After falling, Plaintiff saw employees cleaning something on the floor.  (UMF No. 11.)  In surveillance footage of the incident in question, an employee can be seen cleaning the floor in the area where Plaintiff landed.  (UMF No. 19.) Plaintiff does not know what the spill was, nor its color.  (UMF No. 12.)  Plaintiff does not know the source of the spill, nor how long it may have been on the floor prior to his fall.  (UMF No. 13.)    

III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A.  Summary Judgment  

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) 

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) 

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)  It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.  (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)  The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”  (Ibid.)¿ The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.) 

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”  (Ibid.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

B. Negligence and Premises Liability 

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.  (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)  Therefore, to prevail on a claim for premises liability, Plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant owned or controlled the subject property; (2) defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3) plaintiff was harmed; and (4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.  (See Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.)  

A plaintiff must prove (1) “[a] condition on the property created an unreasonable risk of harm”; (2) that defendant “knew or, through the exercise of reasonable care, should have known about it,” and (3) that defendant “failed to repair the condition, protect against harm from the condition, or give adequate warning of the condition.”  (CACI No. 1003)  

A property owner is not the insurer of the safety of its guests.  The owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is key to establishing liability.  (Hall v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139-40; Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206 [“to impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to a defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises”].)   

VI. DISCUSSION 

As framed by the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was seriously injured on Defendant’s property when Defendant negligently maintained the premises. (Complaint, ¶ 10.)¿ Plaintiff alleges that the location where he was injured was under Defendant’s exclusive ownership, control, and management.  (Complaint, ¶ 6.)  Further, Defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to lessen the probability of injury to Plaintiff, and as such, breached their duty of reasonable care.  (Complaint, ¶ 9.)   

Defendant’s Arguments 

Defendant moves for summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot establish that a dangerous condition caused him to fall or that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of any dangerous condition.   

A.  Dangerous Condition 

Defendant relies on Plaintiff’s testimony, surveillance footage of the incident, and Declaration of Brian Stover, and the Declaration of Susanna Hernandez to negate the allegation that an unsafe condition caused Plaintiff to fall.   

1.  Plaintiff’s Testimony.  Defendant argues Plaintiff is unable to identify the unsafe condition that caused him to fall.  At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that “probably … a clear liquid or something” caused him to slip because “[he] didn’t see anything before the fall.”  (Johnson Depo., 25:6-17.)  Plaintiff surmises a liquid caused him to catapult forward because he saw people “running back there and cleaning [the area] up with spray bottles.”  (Johnson Depo., 25:19-21.)  However, when presented with surveillance footage of the incident, Plaintiff acknowledged that the Target employee was wiping up an area about six to ten feet away from where Plaintiff started to fall.  (Johnson Depo., 45:8-46:4.)  

2. Declaration of Brian Stover.  In his declaration, Brian Stover (“Stover”) states he was working at the subject Target store on the day of the incident as an Executive Team Leader.  After being informed that a man had fallen on the main aisle, Stover walked to the scene of the incident.  Once there, Stover saw Plaintiff seated on the floor off to the side of the main aisle.  Stover observed water on the floor near the area where Plaintiff was seated.  The water was contained in that area and did not trail anywhere.  Stover inspected the area in the main aisle where Plaintiff’s fall started and did not find any water in that area.  (Stover Decl., ¶¶ 2-4, 9.)  He states, “There was no water in the areas leading up to where Mr. Johnson was seated on the Hoor, and no water in the area where Mr. Johnson's fall started. The location where Plaintiff’s fall started did not have to be cleaned, and was not part of the post-incident clean up.” (Stover Decl., ¶¶ 9.)  

3.  Declaration of Susanna Hernandez.  In her declaration, Susanna Hernandez (“Hernandez”) states that she was working at the subject Target store on the day of the incident.  Hernandez inspected the main aisle eight minutes prior to Plaintiff’s alleged fall and did not see any water there.  Hernandez states she would have guarded the area until the water had been cleaned if there had been water present.  (Hernandez Decl., ¶¶ 2, 5, 6.)   

Citing Ortega, supra, and Parker v. McCrory Stores Corp. (1954) 376 Pa. 122, Defendant argues that evidence of regular sweeps of a premises is sufficient to allow an inference that an unsafe condition did not exist long enough to give the owner the opportunity to discover and remedy it.  In Ortega, a slip and fall case, the Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff sustains injuries upon encountering a dangerous condition in a defendant’s store, but there is “no evidence of the source of the dangerous condition or the length of time it existed,” then “evidence of the owner’s failure to inspect the premises within a reasonable period of time is sufficient to allow an inference that the condition was on the floor long enough to give the owner the opportunity to discover and remedy it. [Citation.]”  (Ortega, at p. 1203, fn. omitted.)   

The Court finds Parker persuasive.  In Parker, a slip and fall case, the plaintiff slipped on a pool of water caused by melted snow that had existed for three to five minutes.  (Parker, 376 Pa. at p. 124.)  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania opined “[n]o court has ever held that five minutes is sufficient constructive notice of a dangerous condition; to so hold would be to make the defendant an insurer.”  (Id. at p. 125.)   

Defendant meets its burden to show the dangerous condition that proximately caused his fall did not exist and, even if it did, Defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.  The burden shifts to Plaintiff to raise triable issues of material facts on both topics.   

Plaintiff has not filed opposition.   

VI. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, based upon the evidence presented by Defendant and Plaintiff’s lack of opposition, Plaintiff fails to show there is triable issues of material fact. 

The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

Moving party to give notice.   

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. 

             Dated this ¿8th¿ day of ¿March¿ 2023