Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 21STCV09545, Date: 2023-02-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV09545 Hearing Date: February 22, 2023 Dept: 27
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs.
joel torres,
et al.
Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO
CCP § 473
Dept.
27 1:30
p.m. February
22, 2023 |
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 10, 2021, plaintiff Magdalena Torres
filed this action against Joel Torres (“Defendant”) for injuries arising from
motor vehicle negligence and general negligence.
On
July 20, 2022, the Court granted Defendant’s discovery motions and ordered
Plaintiff to provide verified responses to Defendant’s written discovery and
pay monetary sanctions within 20 days. Plaintiff
did not oppose Defendant’s discovery motions or appear at the hearing. On July 27, 2022, Defendant filed notice of
the Court’s ruling and proof of service of the same.
On
September 13, 2022, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for terminating
sanctions after Plaintiff failed to provide responses, pay the monetary
sanctions, or oppose the motion for terminating sanctions. The Court ordered Plaintiff’s complaint dismissed
without prejudice.
Plaintiff
now moves to set aside the dismissal based on the grounds of excusable neglect. Defendant filed an opposition and Plaintiff
filed a reply.
II. LEGAL
STANDARDS
“[T]he court
shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after
entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn
affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect,
vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her
client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting
default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the
court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the
attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) “Excusable neglect exists when ‘a reasonably
prudent person in similar circumstances might have made the same error.’ [Citation.]” (County of San Bernardino v. Mancini (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.)
“Because the
law favors disposing of cases on their merits, any doubts in
applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party
seeking relief from default.” (Fasuyi
v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 696, quotations omitted.)
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks an order to set aside the
order dismissing her Complaint because of Plaintiff’s counsel Ameer Shah’s
excusable neglect. In support of this
motion, Plaintiff submits the declaration of Ameer Shah (“Shah”), Plaintiff’s
Counsel, wherein Shah attests that the dismissal was the result of his own
mistake, inadvertence or neglect. In his
declaration, Shah states it is his customary practice to attend all hearings,
meet all calendared deadlines, to review his discovery calendar and hearings
calendar on a regular basis, and to consult with plaintiffs and respond to all
written discovery. (Shah Decl., ¶¶
6-8.) However, Shah states that he did
not appear at the hearings for the motions to compel discovery and for
terminating sanctions and failed to respond to Defendant’s written discovery because
Patrick Welch (“Welch”), Shah’s calendar clerk and paralegal, did not calendar
the hearings and actively concealed the discovery issues in this case. (Shah Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) Shah further states that he first learned of
the dismissal in this case in late November 2022 while conducting an inventory
of his files. (Shah Decl., ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff also submits Welch’s
declaration in support of this motion.
In his declaration, Welch states that his work performance was affected
by medical issues, which included attending numerous medical appointments for
orthopedic and vascular issues, hospitalization due to an adverse reaction to a
COVID-19 booster shot, later testing positive for COVID-19, and hospitalization
due to a pulmonary embolism. (Welch
Decl., ¶¶ 5, 6, 8, 9, 12.) Particularly
relevant here is that Welch confirms Shah’s representations (Welch Decl., ¶¶ 8-11)
and further states that he did not inform Shah of the Court’s ruling on
Defendant’s motions to compel for fear of getting fired (Welch Decl., ¶
10). Welch also states that became aware
of the Court’s order granting terminating sanctions in late October 2022 but
failed to apprise Shah of the dismissal (Welch Decl., ¶ 12).
Defendant contends that Plaintiff is
not entitled to relief under Section 473 because Shah was notified by email about
outstanding discovery and Defendant’s intention to file motions to compel and for
terminating sanctions. In support of
this contention, Defendant submits email correspondence which shows that written
discovery, meet and confer letters, the motions, and the Court’s tentative and
final rulings on the motions to compel were sent to Shah’s email address at
ameer@ashahlaw.com. (See Tsymbaloff
Decl., Exs. A-O.)
In reply, Plaintiff argues that the
email ameer@ashahlaw.com is commonly used by the staff at the Law Offices of
Ameer Shah. Shah does not use the email
address to communicate. Moreover, Shah
never personally responded to any of the emails. In support of this argument, Plaintiff submits
email correspondence which shows that Welch responded to Defendant’s counsel,
not Shah. (Reply, Exs. A-H.)
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds
that Plaintiff is entitled to an order setting aside the dismissal of her
Complaint. Shah’s failure to attend the
hearings at issue and to respond to written discovery fall within the
definition of excusable neglect because Shah reasonably relied on Welch to
calendar the hearings and to apprise Shah that Defendant had propounded written
discovery. In sum, Plaintiff
demonstrates that dismissal was entered because of the neglect of Shah and
Shah’s office alone. The Court further notes Plaintiff has filed
this motion within six months after this Court ordered dismissal of her
Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Motion to set aside
the September 13, 2022 dismissal is granted and the action is reinstated.
Trial is set for _____________________
at 8:30 a.m. in Department 27 and the final status conference is set for ________________,
at 10:00 a.m. in Department 27.
Moving party to give notice.
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to
appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the
hearing and argue the matter. Unless you
receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume
that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the
parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.
Dated
this 22nd day of February 2023
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Hon. Kerry Bensinger Judge of the Superior Court
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