Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case 21STCV10021 2023-02-09 Tentative Ruling

JUEL ISSA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IMRAAN R. ALI,

Defendant.

)

CASE NO.: 21STCV10021

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

February 9, 2023

On March 15, 2021, Juel Issa (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Imraan R. Ali (“Defendant”) arising from a June 26, 2020 incident in which Plaintiff fell on the steps on Defendant’s property. The complaint alleges causes of action for (1) premises liability and (2) general negligence.

On November 21, 2022, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition on January 26, 2023. Defendant filed a reply on February 2, 2023.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.) The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

As framed by the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant negligently owned, maintained, manages, and operated the premises at 2120 North Valley Street, Burbank, California, and failed to warn against a dangerous condition. This negligence and failure to warn caused Plaintiff to fall from the top step of the front entrance of the premises. (Complaint p. 4.)

Defendant argues that based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant at the time of the accident, making this accident barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule.

· Defendant Imraan R. Ali is the owner of the home at 2120 North Valley Street, Burbank, California. (UMF No. 1.)

· In or around May 20202, Imraan R. Ali hired Juel Issa to serve as an attendant for his mother. (UMF No. 5.)

· At the end of Juel Issa’s working day, unless Imraan R. Ali was home to let her out the kitchen door, she would leave out the front entranceway of Imraan R. Ali’s house at 2120 North Valley Street, Burbank, California, and close the door behind her. (UMF No. 22.)

· On June 26, 2020, at about 2:00 p.m., Juel Issa fell outside Imraan R. Ali’s house at 2120 North Valley Street, Burbank, California, as she left through the front entranceway and was attempting to close the door behind her. (UMF No. 25.)

· Juel Issa contends that the entranceway and steps at the front of Imraan R. Ali’s house at 2120 North Valley Street, Burbank, California, were dangerous because they would and did cause her to lose her balance and fall. (UMF No. 26.)

· From May 2020 through June 26, 2020, Imraan R. Ali had in effect a policy of insurance that provided for workers’ compensation coverage to individuals employed by him at his home. (UMF No. 28.)

Labor Code section 3600 mandates compensation for injuries to employees against their employers that arise out of and in the course of the employment. (Lab. Code, § 3600.) The relevant conditions of the worker’s compensation statute are as follows: (1) the employer and employee are subject to the terms of the worker’s compensation law, (2) the worker is injured while performing services incident to the employment and is acting within the course of his or her employment, and (3) the injury is proximately caused by the employment. (Lab. Code., § 3600(a).) Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 occur, the right to recover compensation is, except as specifically provided, the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee against the employer. (Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (a).)

There is no dispute that Defendant was a covered employer. It is undisputed Defendant hired Plaintiff to serve as an attendant for his mother. (UMF No. 5; Ali Decl. ¶ 4; Exhibit C [Issa Depo.17:9-11, 28:3-6].) Additionally, it is undisputed that, during Plaintiff’s employment, Defendant had a policy of insurance for worker’s compensation coverage to individuals employed at his home. (UMF No. 28; Ali Decl. ¶ 20; Exhibit H [State Farm General Insurance Company policy no. 71-S2-4330-9].)

Additionally, Plaintiff does not dispute that she was a covered employee.[1] Defendant puts forward evidence that shows Plaintiff would not be a qualified “domestic worker.” (UMF Nos. 12-15, 16-18; Ali Decl. ¶ 11-14; Exhibit C [Issa Depo. 14:24-15:16, 18:20-24, 19:20-22, 28:3-6; Exhibits D & E [Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 14-18].) Defendant also puts forward evidence that Plaintiff was not an independent contractor, and Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion. (UMF Nos. 9-11, 16-18; Ali Decl. ¶ 7, 10, 12-13, 16.)

The issue herein turns on whether Plaintiff’s fall happened within the course and scope of her employment. It is undisputed that the accident occurred as follows: “On June 26, 2020, at about 2:00 p.m., Juel Issa fell outside Imraan R. Ali’s house at 2120 North Valley Street, Burbank, California, as she left through the front entranceway and was attempting to close the door behind her.” (Ali Decl. ¶ 19; Exhibit C [Issa Depo. 25:25-26:3, 26:14-16, 27:5-18, 32: 16-25, 40:10-14]; Exhibit A [Plaintiff’s Complaint p. 4-5].) It is also undisputed that the fall occurred as Plaintiff was leaving work. (UMF No. 24-25.) Plaintiff was still on Defendant’s property when she fell.

Generally, injuries sustained by employees when going to or returning from their regular place of work do not “arise out of and in course of employment.” (Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1946) 28 Cal.2d. 329.) This is commonly referred to as the “goings and comings” rule. However, injuries sustained by an employee while going to or from his place of work on premises owned and controlled by his employer are generally deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment; commonly referred to as the “premises line” exception to the general rule. (Id. at 336; Greydanus v. Industrial Acc. Commission (1965) 63 Cal.2d 490; Peterson v. Moran (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 766, 769 [“it is a well-established rule that the protective scope of the Workmen’s Compensation Act applies not only while a servant is actively at work on the employer’s premises, but also while he is properly traversing the premises in going to or coming from work so long as his act involves no unreasonable delay”].)(Emphasis added.)

The Greydanus Court relied heavily on Pacific Indem. Co., which stated that when applying the general rule (the goings and comings rule) to “borderline cases, the term ‘employment’ has been held to include ‘not only the doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done.’ (Citations) In further clarification of the general rule it has been held that injuries sustained by an employee while going to or from his place of work upon premises owned or controlled by his employer are generally deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment.” (Emphasis added) (Greydanus, 63 Cal.2d at p. 492; Santa Rosa Junior College v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 345, 353 fn. 11.)

Additionally, where a risk associated with employment causes injury just outside employer’s premises, the “special risk” exception applies. (Price v. W.C.A.B. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 559, 566.)

It is undisputed Defendant owned the premises on which Plaintiff fell, and that, at the time of the fall, Plaintiff was leaving work. (See Complaint p. 3-4; UMF No. 24-25.) As Plaintiff is suing her employer for premises liability, Plaintiff is alleging that the accident occurred on Defendant’s/her employer’s premises. The Court finds that, as a matter of law, the “premises line” exception to the “goings and comings” rule applies.

Plaintiff argues the issue regarding the scope of employment, application of the goings and comings rule, and its exceptions raise a triable issues of material fact. Not so here. The are no material facts in dispute. (See Santa Rosa Junior College, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 351 [“[W]here as here, there is no real dispute as to the facts, ‘the question whether an injury was suffered in the course of employment is one of law….”].) It is undisputed Plaintiff fell while “traversing the premises” where she worked and still on Defendant’s property. Defendant has made a prima facie case showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. Plaintiff has not rebutted that showing.

The only question is a legal one: based on these undisputed facts, does the “premises line” exception to the general “going and coming” rule apply? On these undisputed facts, the answer is, yes.[2] Because Plaintiff was an employee and the fall happened within the course and scope of her employment, the accident is covered by the Worker’s Compensation Act. Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the worker’s compensation exclusivity rule.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

[1] Plaintiff does not contend she was an independent contractor.

[2] The “special risk” exception would similarly apply.