Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 21STCV19391, Date: 2023-05-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV19391    Hearing Date: May 25, 2023    Dept: 27

Tentative Ruling

Judge Kerry Bensinger, Department 27

HEARING DATE:     May 25, 2023                         TRIAL DATE:  August 16, 2023

CASE:                                Pedram Panahi v. Alejandro Barraza Mendez, et al.

CASE NO.:                 21STCV19391

MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE ACTIONS

MOVING PARTY:               Plaintiff Pedram Panahi

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendants Alejandro Barraza Mendez and Contractors Plumbing & Fire Supply

I.          INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Pedram Panahi, seeks to consolidate this action (the “Mendez Action”) with the case captioned Pedram Panahi v. Hannah McCormack, et al., LASC Case No. 21STCV33857 (the “McCormack Action”).  The Mendez Action involves a motor vehicle collision that occurred four months before the motor vehicle collision underlying the McCormack Action.

On December 21, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff’s September 26, 2022 motion to consolidate the Mendez and McCormack actions for procedural deficiencies.  Specifically, there was no court order deeming the cases related into the same department, nor had Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion to consolidate the actions in each case sought to be consolidated.

On December 21, 2022, the Court deemed the matters related.  Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion to consolidate the actions in the McCormack Action on January 23, 2023.  Plaintiff now moves to consolidate the Mendez and McCormack Actions on the grounds that both cases involve the same parties and the same injuries.

Defendants, Alejandro Barraza Mendez and Contractors Plumbing & Fire Supply, oppose.

II.        LEGAL STANDARD

            Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 states, in pertinent part: “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd. (a).)  

California Rules of Court, Rule 3.350 provides, “[a] notice of motion to consolidate must: (A) [l]ist all named parties in each case, the names of those who have appeared, and the names of their respective attorneys of record; (B) [c]ontain the captions of all the cases sought to be consolidated, with the lowest numbered case shown first; and (C) [b]e filed in each case sought to be consolidated.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.350, subd. (a)(1).)  Rule 3.350 further provides, “[t]he motion to consolidate: (A) [i]s deemed a single motion for the purposes of determining the appropriate filing fee, but memorandums, declarations, and other supporting papers must be filed only in the lowest numbered case; (B) [m]ust be served on all attorneys of record and all nonrepresented parties in all of the cases sought to be consolidated; and (C) [m]ust have a proof of service filed as part of the motion.”  (Id., rule 3.350, subd. (a)(2).)  

Further, Los Angeles County Court Rules, Rule 3.3, subd. (g) states, “[c]ases may not be consolidated unless they are in the same department.  A motion to consolidate two or more cases may be noticed and heard after the cases, initially filed in different departments, have been related into a single department, or if the cases were already assigned to that department.”  (Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rule 3.3, subd. (g).)

III.       DISCUSSION

A.    Procedural Requirements

The Court finds that Plaintiff has complied with the procedural requirements outlined in California Rules of Court, Rule 3.350, subdivision (a)(1).  The Court further observes that Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Motion to consolidate in the McCormack Action.

However, as Defendants point out, it is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks to consolidate the action for all purposes or for the limited purposes of trial and discovery.  “Under the statute and case law, there are two types of consolidation: a complete consolidation resulting in a single action, and a consolidation of separate actions for trial.  Under the former procedure, which may be utilized where the parties are identical and the causes could have been joined, the pleadings are regarded as merged, one set of findings is made, and one judgment is rendered. In a consolidation for trial, the pleadings, verdicts, findings and judgments are kept separate; the actions are simply tried together for the sake of convenience and judicial economy.”  (Sanchez v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1391, 1396.)  Here, the notice of motion suggests the former (consolidation for all purposes) while the caption of the motion and Plaintiff’s argument (see Motion, p. 4:24-25) suggests the latter (consolidation for trial and discovery).  Plaintiff’s motion is defective.  Additionally, there is no consolidation for the purposes of trial and discovery. (See Sanchez, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396.)  Nonetheless, the Court proceeds to the merits of the motion.

B.     Substantive Requirements

Plaintiff seeks to consolidate the Mendez Action and McCormack action because both cases involve motor vehicle accidents in which liability is very clear, which leaves Plaintiff’s injury causation and damages as the only substantive issues in dispute.  Further, Plaintiff has suffered pain in the same body parts (neck, spine, and bi-lateral shoulders) as a result of both accidents.  And, Plaintiff has undergone two surgeries (neck and spinal fusion) more than a year after the second accident, which means that Plaintiff will have the same overlapping injuries at issue with the same treating doctors, economic damages, and expert witnesses for both cases.  For these reasons, Plaintiff argues good cause exists to consolidate these actions.

Defendants present several arguments against consolidation.  The Court focuses on three of the arguments.  First, Defendants argue that consolidation for all purposes is improper because the actions do not involve identical parties.  That much is clear.  The defendants in each action are not the same.  Defendant further argues that consolidation for trial purposes is also improper because Plaintiff’s verified discovery responses show that he claims neck and shoulder injuries arising from the first accident (see Opposition, p. 6) whereas his deposition testimony indicates he suffered lower back injuries in the second accident.  Second, Defendants argue there are no common questions of fact in each case.  Specifically, the first accident involved a rear-ended collision whereas the second accident involved a side collision.  And, building off the contention that the injuries are not same, Defendants again point to Plaintiff’s discovery responses which indicate that Plaintiff complains of injuries to his neck and shoulder only as a result of the first accident.  Third, Defendants argue that there are no common questions of law.  Indeed, Plaintiff does not point to any in his moving papers.

Based on the foregoing, the Court is persuaded that good cause does not exist to consolidate the actions.  Defendants demonstrate that the Mendez and McCormack Actions are similar on the surface only: they each involve the same plaintiff and injuries sustained in the car accident.  But beneath the surface, each action presents distinct factual scenarios with different injuries.  Given this background, consolidation of these actions would result in prejudice to Defendants by allowing Plaintiff to present evidence at trial of all his claimed injuries, even if they do not arise from the alleged accident with Defendants.

IV.       CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the motion to consolidate is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice. 

Dated:   May 25, 2023                                                ___________________________________

                                                                                    Kerry Bensinger

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court

            Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.