Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case Number: 21STCV44769, Date: 2024-02-05 Tentative Ruling

On December 8, 2021, Plaintiff, Anna Bossenko. filed a Complaint against Defendants, Dong Park and Greta Park, for various breaches of a Marvin[1] agreement. On September 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC), alleging causes of action for:

As alleged in the FAC, Plaintiff and Defendant Dong Park (referred to hereinafter as “Defendant”) began dating and living together in 2016. From that time and into 2019, the two cohabitated as a de facto married couple. In 2017, following a temporary break up, Defendant pleaded with Plaintiff to resume their relationship, stating that he wanted to get married and have a child together. Defendant warranted that he would care for Plaintiff and their baby for the rest of their lives.

In reliance of that promise, Plaintiff resumed the relationship with Defendant. In December 2017, the couple engaged to be married. Thereafter, the parties underwent procedures to conceive a child. In March 2018, Plaintiff became pregnant. Plaintiff had wanted to attend cosmetology school and open her own business. After Plaintiff became pregnant, Defendant encouraged Plaintiff to wait until the baby was older and more independent to pursue her ambitions. Defendant renewed his promise to take care of Plaintiff and their child financially and agreed to help Plaintiff open her own business. Plaintiff did not go to cosmetology school in reliance on Defendant’s further assurances and representations.

Soon after Plaintiff became pregnant, Defendant began complaining that his businesses were failing. In fall of 2018, the parties moved to a less expensive residence because of Defendant’s stated financial woes. The baby arrived in December 2018.

In January 2019, Defendant claimed his financial problems were escalating. To ease the financial burden and the resulting emotional difficulties, Defendant convinced Plaintiff that it would be best for their family if Plaintiff and the baby temporarily moved to Estonia, Plaintiff’s country of origin, to live with Plaintiff’s parents. Defendant reiterated he would always take care of Plaintiff and their baby. Plaintiff reluctantly agreed to go. Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to store Plaintiff’s belongings in a storage locker while she and the baby were in Estonia. Defendant agreed to pay the monthly storage fee. Plaintiff’s belongings exceeded $100,000 in value.

Plaintiff later learned that Defendant’s financial woes and the need for Plaintiff and her baby to move to Estonia were a ruse. In 2018, Defendant began an affair with Defendant Greta Park. Convincing Plaintiff to move to Estonia was intended to allow Defendant to continue his affair with Greta Park. Defendant and Greta Park eventually married. Plaintiff is informed and believes that prior to marrying Greta Park, Defendant purchased a house in Yorba Linda, California which cost over $1,000,000.

After Plaintiff and her baby moved to Estonia, Defendant continued to provide financial support. However, over time, the monthly payments of $3,500, as agreed upon by Plaintiff and Defendant, eventually decreased to $1,300 a month. Further, Defendant stopped paying for the storage locker which contained Plaintiff’s belongings. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants took possession of her property and/or disposed of some or all of it.

On October 5, 2023, Defendant filed this Demurrer to the FAC, and concurrently filed a Motion to Strike allegations of punitive damages.

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face.¿ (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.)¿ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.¿ We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.¿ [Citation.]”¿ (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)¿ In construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations.¿ (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 769.)¿¿

A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)¿“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”¿(Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿¿

Where the complaint contains substantial factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty will be overruled or plaintiff will be given leave to amend.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)¿ Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.¿ (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)¿

Defense counsel has complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See 10/05/23 Declaration of Demurring or Moving Party Regarding Meet and Confer.)

Defendant argues the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Causes of Action do not state facts sufficient to constitute these causes of action against Defendant.

The elements of a breach of contract cause of action are: (1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, (2) the plaintiff’s performance, (3) the defendant’s unjustified failure to perform, and (4) damages to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s breach. (CACI No. 303; Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1388 (Careau); Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transportation (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 458.) “[T]he complaint must indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct.” (Otworth, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 458-459.) The elements of a breach of oral contract claim are the same as those for a breach of written contract. (Careau, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1388.)

Defendant advances two arguments in support of his Demurrer to the First Cause of Action: (1) this is not a Marvin case, and (2) the terms of the contract are vague and uncertain. Determining whether the FAC sufficiently alleges a Marvin agreement is dispositive.

Generally speaking, a Marvin agreement is an oral agreement between couples who live together in a nonmarital relationship which agreement includes how the parties will distribute the property acquired during the relationship if that relationship ends. In the seminal case, Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, the California Supreme Court held: “(1) The provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship; such a relationship remains subject solely to judicial decision. (2) The courts should enforce express contracts between nonmarital partners except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services. (3) In the absence of an express contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may also employ the doctrine of quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts, when warranted by the facts of the case.” (Marvin, 18 Cal.3d at p. 665.) “So long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such agreements.” (Id. at p. 674.)

Here, the FAC alleges, “Venue in this Court is proper as this case is, at its core, one arising of the breach of contract and other causes of action premised largely upon Marvin v. Marvin (1976), 18 Cal. 3d 660 and its progeny. The contracts and binding understandings at issue were formed within the venue of this Court as well as the performance and intended performance thereof.” (FAC, ¶ 5.) The FAC further alleges that Plaintiff and Defendant lived together as a de facto married couple for a total of six years. (FAC, ¶¶ 8, 48.) They managed their domestic relationship as co-equals. Plaintiff generally managed the house, performing such tasks as cooking cleaning, grocery shopping and the like. Defendant was the primary earner. (FAC, ¶ 8.) In addition to paying rent, utilities, and house-hold expenses, Defendant provided Plaintiff with $3,500 a month. (FAC, ¶ 9.) After a brief break up, the parties resumed their relationship on the promise that Defendant would take care of Plaintiff and their new baby for the rest of their lives. (FAC, ¶¶ 10, 13.) The couple became engaged. Plaintiff became pregnant with Defendant’s child. They welcome their baby in December 2018. (FAC, ¶¶ 11, 16.) Plaintiff forewent cosmetology school and moved to Estonia in reliance of Defendant’s promise. (FAC, ¶¶ 13, 17, 18, 19.)

Defendant argues this is not a Marvin case for three reasons: (1) Plaintiff does not allege that she and Defendant agreed that property acquired during their relationship would be treated like community property but instead seeks damages for alleged breaches of specific promises; (2) the agreement lacks consideration and are not severable from the nature of their non-sexual relationship; and (3) Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s relationship is not a long, stable, and significant relationship to qualify under Marvin.

Each argument fails. First, Marvin agreements are not restricted to property acquired during a relationship that would be treated like community property. “Support agreements between cohabitants are enforceable under the Marvin case.” (Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1063.) So too are property agreements between cohabitants. (Id, at p. 1067.) Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover for breaches of the support agreement. (See FAC, ¶¶ 10, 13, 39-46.)

Second, there are no allegations that the offer of sex forms any part of the consideration supporting Defendant’s promises. Moreover, uncertainty as to the consideration of a Marvin agreement does not render the agreement unenforceable. As the Court of Appeal observed in Byrne, “the modern trend of the law favors carrying out the parties' intention through the enforcement of contracts and disfavors holding them unenforceable because of uncertainty. [Citation.] Marvin endorsed a policy based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship.” (Byrne, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1065–66.) Further, courts have enforced general and nonspecific Marvin agreements such as in Alderson v. Alderson (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 450 463, where “[t]he parties never bothered to actually spell out the terms of their agreement or the consideration therefor.” The First Cause of Action is not susceptible to demurrer on these grounds.

Third, the length and nature of Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s relationship is a factual challenge to the FAC that is improper at the pleading stage. The court accepts as true the allegations that Plaintiff and Defendant were in a six-year relationship wherein they lived together as a de facto married couple.[3]

In sum, the FAC adequately alleges the existence of a Marvin agreement. For this reason, Defendant’s challenge to the First Cause of Action fails.[4]

CACI No. 305 provides, “In deciding whether a contract was created, you should consider the conduct and relationship of the parties as well as all the circumstances of the case. [¶] Contracts can be created by the conduct of the parties, without spoken or written words. Contracts created by conduct are just as valid as contracts formed with words. [¶] Conduct will create a contract if the conduct of both parties is intentional and each knows, or has reason to know, that the other party will interpret the conduct as an agreement to enter into a contract.”

Defendant argues the Second Cause of Action fails because Plaintiff is requesting spousal support for which only a court can order if a dissolution or legal separation action is pending. In support, Defendant cites Civil Code section 43.5, which provides, no cause of action arises for breach of a promise to marry. (Civ. Code, § 43.5, subd. (b).)

This argument lacks merit for two reasons. First, Marvin addressed this very argument and rejected the premise “that a promise of marriage impliedly includes a promise of support and to pool property acquired after marriage.” (Marvin, at p. 674.) Second, as Plaintiff argues, her claim is premised upon Defendant’s broken promise to provide support to Plaintiff. The claim is not based upon a broken promise to marry. The Second Cause of Action is sufficiently pled.

3. Third Cause of Action for Breach of Implied in Law Contract/Promissory Estoppel

“The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.’ [Citation.]” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 945.)

Defendant advances the same Civ. Code, § 43.5 argument. The argument fails for the reasons discussed above. Further, the FAC sufficiently alleges a promissory estoppel cause of action. Defendant promised to take care of Plaintiff and their baby for the rest of their lives. Based on that representation, Plaintiff agreed to move to Estonia with her parents to allow Defendant to alleviate his purported financial woes. Plaintiff was injured by the misrepresentation because Defendant knew that Plaintiff, as U.S. citizen, would be prohibited from working in Estonia, thereby stranding Plaintiff in Estonia. The Third Cause of Action is sufficiently pled.

The elements of promissory fraud are: 1) a promise made regarding a material fact; 2)¿promisor’s lack of any intention of performing at the time of making the promise, based upon: a)¿specific factual circumstances beyond contract breach; or b) inferring a contemporaneous intent not to perform; 3) the promise was made with an intent to induce action by plaintiff; 4) plaintiff reasonably relied on the promise; 5) defendant did not perform the promised act; 6) plaintiff was injured/harmed; and 7) plaintiff’s reliance on defendant’s promise was a substantial factor in causing the harm.¿ (CACI No. 1902.)¿¿

In California, fraud, including negligent misrepresentation, must be pled¿with specificity. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc.¿(2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) “The particularity demands that a plaintiff plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Cansino¿v. Bank of America¿(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.) Fraud allegations need not be liberally construed, general pleading of the legal conclusion of fraud is insufficient, and every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged fully, factually and specifically. (Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1331; see also Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47 [explaining the rule of particularity in pleading is specific to fraud and “is required to enable the court to determine, on the basis of the pleadings alone, whether a foundation existed for the charge ...”].)

Defendant argues the Fourth Cause of Action fails because the FAC does not allege a specific factual representation. The argument lacks merit. Defendant does not acknowledge or otherwise ignores the allegations that Defendant induced Plaintiff to move to Estonia under false pretenses then stopped providing financial support. Defendant represented that he was experiencing financial woes which necessitated Plaintiff’s move to Estonia with their baby and to live with her parents. The Fourth Cause of Action is pled with sufficient specificity.

The elements of a cause of¿action for negligent misrepresentation are (1) that defendant represented to him that a fact was true, (2) that defendant’s representation was false, (3) that defendant knew that the representation was false when it was made or that said statement was made without regard for its truth, (4) that defendant intended that plaintiff rely on the representation, (5) that plaintiff reasonably relied on defendant’s representation, (6) plaintiff was harmed, and (7) plaintiff’s reliance on defendant’s representation was a substantial factor in causing him harm. (Civ. Code § 1710(1); CACI No. 1903.)

Defendant lodges the same lack-of-specificity argument to the Fifth Cause of Action. It fails for the same reason discussed above. The Fifth Cause of Action is pleaded with sufficient specificity.

The elements of a breach of contract cause of action are: (1) the existence of a valid contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance, (3) the defendant’s unjustified failure to perform, and (4) damages to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s breach. (CACI No. 303.)

Defendant argues the Seventh Cause of Action is vague and uncertain because the FAC does not allege what the agreement requires from the parties nor its terms. The argument lacks merit. As alleged, Plaintiff agreed to temporarily move to Estonia and Defendant orally agreed to maintain and pay the monthly cost of the storage locker for the purpose of keeping Plaintiff’s property safe until Plaintiff’s return from Estonia. Plaintiff’s move to Estonia served the purpose of alleviating Defendant’s financial woes. Defendant breached the agreement by failing or refusing to maintain the storage locker. (FAC, ¶¶ 78-82.) The terms of the agreement are sufficiently clear.

Defendant argues the FAC does not sufficiently identify the property to which Plaintiff refers. However, for the purposes of pleading, Plaintiff alleges the items stored in the storage locker. The Seventh Cause of Action is sufficiently pleaded.

The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) plaintiff owned/possessed or had the right to possess certain personal property; (2) defendant knowingly or intentionally substantially interfered with plaintiff’s property by (i) taking possession of the property; (ii) preventing plaintiff from access to the property; (iii) destroying the property; or (iv) refusing to return the property after plaintiff demanded its return; (3) plaintiff did not consent; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (CACI No. 2100.)

Defendant argues the Eighth Cause of Action fails because there is no allegation Defendant intended to exercise ownership over any property which belonged to Plaintiff. Defendant is incorrect. A plaintiff need not allege a defendant’s intention to exercise ownership over the plaintiff’s property to state a cause of action for conversion. (See CACI No. 2100.) It is sufficient to state, as is alleged here, that Defendant substantially interfered with Plaintiff’s property by preventing Plaintiff from accessing her belongings and refusing to return them. (FAC, ¶¶ 84, 85.) The Eighth Cause of Action is sufficiently pleaded.

“Section 496, subdivision (a) (section 496(a)) defines the criminal offense of what is commonly referred to as receiving stolen property. As amended in 1972 (Stats. 1972, ch. 963, § 1, p. 1739), it provides in relevant part: ‘Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained,” is subject to incarceration.” (Siry Inv., L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 346.)

In Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, the Court of Appeal discussed the crimes constituting theft, stating in relevant part:

A violation of section 496(a) may, by its own terms, relate to property that has been “stolen” or “that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion.” (§ 496(a), italics added.) As reflected in Bell v. Feibush, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 546, the issue of whether a wrongdoer's conduct in any manner constituted a “theft” is elucidated by other provisions of the Penal Code defining theft, such as Penal Code section 484. In 1927, the Legislature consolidated the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and theft by false pretense in Penal Code section 484, subdivision (a), under the single term “theft.” (Bell v. Feibush, at p. 1048, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 546; see also People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 640–641, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 556, 377 P.3d 805 [although the distinctive substantive elements of each offense remained the same, each constituted the crime of “theft”]; People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 255, fn. 4, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 179 P.3d 917.) Section 484, subdivision (a), states as follows: “Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft.” (Italics in original.)

“Section 496(c), similar to some provisions in other statutory schemes, articulates a right to special civil remedies when a violation of section 496(a) has occurred. Subdivision (c), as also amended in 1972, states that any person who has been injured by a violation of section 496(a) ‘may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney's fees.’” (Siry Inv., L.P., 13 Cal.5th at. pp. 346-47, footnotes omitted.) A criminal conviction is not a prerequisite to recovery of treble damages. (Switzer, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 126.)

Defendant argues the Ninth Cause of Action fails because Plaintiff fails to show how any property was stolen or taken in a manner constating theft. Not so. The FAC alleges that Defendants took possession of Plaintiff’s property and carried it away.[5] (See FAC, ¶¶ 37, 38.) The Ninth Cause of Action is sufficiently pled.

Defendant argues the Tenth Cause of Action fails because unjust enrichment is not a cause of action. However, as observed in O’Grady v. Merchant Exchange Productions, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 771, “even if unjust enrichment does not describe an actual cause of action, the term is ‘synonymous with restitution,’ which can be a theory of recovery. (Dinosaur Development, Inc. v. White (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1314–1315, 265 Cal.Rptr. 525 [recognizing possibility of restitution cause of action but concluding it was not made out in the complaint]; Lauriedale Associates, Ltd. v. Wilson (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1439, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 774 [same]; McBride v. Boughton, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387–388, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 115 [“we construe McBride's purported cause of action for unjust enrichment as an attempt to plead a cause of action giving rise to a right of restitution”]; Rest.3d Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, § 1, com. b, p. 6 [“In no instance does the fact or extent of liability in restitution depend on whether the source of that liability is conceived or described as unjust enrichment”], com. c, p. 7 [“When used in this Restatement ... the terms ‘restitution’ and ‘unjust enrichment’ will generally be treated as synonymous”].) This is accepted even by the courts which do not consider unjust enrichment a proper cause of action. (See Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1132, 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 832; Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 347.)” (O'Grady, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 791–92.)

Here, the Plaintiffs seeks restitution for the full value of her property maintained in the storage locker. Defendant does not offer any other argument to show the Tenth Cause of Action fails.

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)¿ On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)¿¿

“The grounds for a motion to strike are limited to matters appearing on the face of the challenged pleading or matters which must or may be judicially noticed. (§ 437, subd. (a); Evid. Code, §§ 451, 452.).” (Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17, 20.)

Defendant moves for an order to strike allegations of and requests for punitive damages from the FAC. As such, the motion to strike is relevant only to the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Causes of Action.

Defendant argues the motion to strike should be granted because the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Causes of Action do not allege any conduct with sufficient egregiousness to merit punitive damages. Given the court’s finding that the FAC states facts sufficient to state causes of action for fraud, conversion, and violation of Penal Code section 496, the court further finds punitive damages are adequately pleaded.

Defendant Dong Park is to file and serve his Answer within 10 days of this order.

[1] Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660.

[2] The court notes Plaintiff did not timely file her oppositions. “All papers opposing a motion so noticed shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days, and all reply papers at least five court days before the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) Here, Plaintiff filed her oppositions on January 24, 2024 and January 25, 2024 which are eight and seven court days, respectively, before the hearing. Nevertheless, the court exercises its discretion to consider Plaintiff’s oppositions. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(c).)

[3] The court also notes that Bryne, supra, concerned an unmarried couple who cohabitated for five years. (See Bryne, at pp. 1059-61.)

[4] Defendant advances two other arguments: (1) the agreement is invalid under the Statute of Frauds because, as alleged, Defendant’s promise to provide for Plaintiff and their baby for the rest of their lives exceeds one year, and (2) Plaintiff seeks to recover spousal support which should proceed in family court. First, as Marvin noted most cohabitation agreements are oral, and that cases had “expressly rejected defenses [to such agreements] grounded upon the statute of frauds.” (Marvin, 18 Cal.3d at 674, fn. 9.) “In light of Marvin's endorsement of ‘equitable remedies to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship’ (Marvin v. Marvin, supra, at p. 684, fn. 25), the court's observations on the enforcement of oral cohabitation agreements can only be interpreted as an approval of the use of equitable estoppel by cohabitants in appropriate cases.” (Byrne, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072.) Moreover, a promise to provide for the rest of a person’s life is predicated upon how long the promisee lives, which could be less than a year. Second, the FAC does not and cannot seek spousal support. Plaintiff and Defendant never married. Rather, the FAC seeks recovery for breach of the support agreement which are enforceable under Marvin. (Byrne, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1063.)

[5] Plaintiff alleges she learned that Defendant Greta Park was posting selfies wearing Anna’s clothing, shoes, jewelry and other items. (FAC, ¶¶ 37-38.)