Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case Number: 22STCV01555, Date: 2024-01-04 Tentative Ruling

On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff, Courtney Lee, filed this action against Defendant, FCA US LLC, for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code § 1790, et seq. Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint on February 16, 2022.

On May 19, 2023, Defendant served, and Plaintiff accepted, an Offer to Compromise and Acceptance Under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement on May 22, 2023.

Defendant objects to Exhibits 2-6 of the Declaration of Richard M. Wirtz. Plaintiff objects to portions of the Declaration of Michael J. Gregg, as well as Exhibits, B, D, E, G-I, and Q-X attached to the Gregg Declaration. As the objections are not material to the disposition of this motion, the Court declines to rule on the parties’ objections.

Plaintiff seeks a total award of $80,524.50 in attorney’s fees. The requested award includes a 1.5 multiplier.

On May 19, 2023, the parties agreed to settle the matter. (Wirtz Decl., Ex. 7, at ¶ 3.) The settlement provides for attorney’s fees by motion under Civil Code section 1794. (Id.)

(d) If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees as the prevailing party. The only matter at issue is the reasonableness of the fees requested.

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.) “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’” “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.’” (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664.) The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness of the fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615.)

The Court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393-94.) The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-75.)

Two firms worked on this matter for Plaintiff: JSGM Law LLP and Wirtz Law. This involved work by attorneys Guy Mizrahi, Pouyan Bohloul, Amy Rotman, Jessica R. Underwood, and Alana Mellgren, billing at rates of $525, $395, $550, $550, and $450 per hour, respectively. (Mizrahi Decl., ¶¶ 11, 12; Wirtz Decl., ¶¶ 15-17.) Supporting staff also billed a portion of the hours at $300 and $250 per hour. (Wirtz Decl., ¶¶ 18-23.)

Defendant argues that hourly billing rates ranging between $395 to $550 for attorneys and $250 to $300 for paralegals is excessive and unsupported. (Opp., p. 5.)

Based upon general prevailing rates in the Los Angeles area for this type of litigation, the Court finds the reasonable rate for attorney billing is as follows: for Lodestar purposes, the Court will award a “blended” hourly rate of $500.00 per hour. (See, e.g., Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240 [trial court has discretion to award a “blended hourly rate” for attorney’s fees motion].) The Court further finds the reasonable rate for paralegal billing to be $200.00 per hour. This determination considers the complexity of the case, the quality of services provided, and the attorneys’ experience.

Plaintiff’s records reflect a total of 144.4 hours billed, which includes an expected 14.4 hours to review the opposition, draft a reply, and appear at the hearing for this motion, and an estimated 3.3 hours for Defendant’s anticipated motion to strike/tax costs. (Wirtz Decl., ¶¶ 51, 52, Exs. 26, 27.)

“[I]t is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged [within the moving party’s verified billing invoice], with a sufficient argument and citations to evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488.)

Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s counsel’s use of block billing, excessive time spent on tasks which Defendant asserts were routine filings and template discovery, and for duplicative work. (Opp., pp. 7-8.) Defendant also objects to tasks performed by attorneys billing at high rates, such as Mr. Mizrahi’s billing for preparing form discovery. Defendant submits that a member of the support staff, and not Mr. Mizrahi, should have taken care of this administrative task. This Court agrees with these observations in considerable part.

The Court appreciates that this case progressed towards trial. Along the way, Plaintiff served and responded to standard written discovery, filed a motion to compel, filed then withdrew a motion to compel further, participated in mediation, and prepared motions in limine for trial. (Mot., pp. 1-4.) Defendant also represents that it will not file a motion to strike or tax costs. There has been little law and motion practice.

Moreover, there was nothing particularly complex or unique about this case. The issues involved were applicable to other consumers’ vehicles, thereby triggering economies of scale in terms of Plaintiff’s counsel’s efficiency in litigating this type of lemon law case. Both lead attorneys are highly experienced in Song-Beverly litigation. (See Mizrahi Decl., ¶¶ 10-11; Wirtz Decl., ¶¶ 8-12.) Litigating this matter should not have required anything more than slight factual modification to existing boilerplate. The Court also notes that two law firms, five attorneys, and six paralegals working on this case is not reasonable.

Considering these facts, the Court agrees that in some instances, the time quoted is excessive or unreasonable under the circumstances.

Based on the foregoing, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total amount of reasonable attorney’s fees in this case, using a lodestar methodology, is $48,000. This was calculated by (1) multiplying the hourly rate of $500.00 by 80 hours, which the Court deems to be the total amount of reasonable attorney’s fees expended in this matter, and (2) multiplying the hourly rate of $200.00 by 40 hours, which the Court deems to be the total number of reasonable paralegal’s fees expended in this matter.

The Court in its discretion declines to apply a multiplier given this Song-Beverly case did not involve novel or complex issues of law.

Kerry Bensinger

Judge of the Superior Court