Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case 22STCV03142 2023-02-02 Tentative Ruling

On January 26, 2022, plaintiff Jimmy Martell (“Plaintiff”) filed this motor vehicle negligence action against defendant Zenesys Logistics, Inc. (“Defendant’).

Plaintiff seeks an order quashing the subpoena for Plaintiff’s employment records served on Lyft, Inc. Defendant opposes.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a): “[i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.”

Generally, discovery in California is a broad right. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010, see also Gonzalez v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546; Greyhound Corporation v. Superior Court of Merced County (1961), 56 Cal.2d 355, 376.) The standards for judicial limitations on discovery are governed by section 2017.020, which states that: “[t]he court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(a).)

The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id. at pp. 35–37, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.) The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. (Id. at pp. 37–40, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.)

When privacy rights are implicated, the broad sweep of discovery is significantly narrowed, such that information can be discovered on a showing of a particularized need by the party seeking discovery, and by demonstrating that the discovery sought is directly relevant to a claim or defense, and that there is no less intrusive alternative. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978 20 Cal.3d 844.) “Mere speculation as to the possibility that some portion of the records might be relevant to some substantive issue does not suffice” for showing direct relevance as to private information sought in discovery. (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017-1020 [directing trial court to grant motion to quash as to discovery request that was not narrowly drawn to enable the court to evaluate the appropriate extent of disclosure].) If the court determines that the records are directly relevant to the action, it must carefully balance the need for discovery against the right of privacy. (Id. at 525.) The party seeking the discovery must show that the information cannot be obtained through depositions or non-confidential sources, and if discovery is allowed it must be minimally intrusive. (Harding Lawson Assocs. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.) Whenever possible, judges should consider the possibility of a protective order limiting the intrusion or disclosure, for assuaging privacy concerns. (Alch v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1432.)

Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoena on the grounds that it is overly broad, seeks records which are protected from disclosure by Plaintiff’s Constitutional Right to Privacy, and seeks categories/records which are irrelevant, confidential, and protected from disclosure.

The subject subpoena seeks the following: All employment records, including but not limited to, employment applications, personnel files, job descriptions and assignments, performance evaluations, attendance records, correspondence, W2’s, wage and salary information, 1099s, medical records and medical bills, accident reports, compensation and disability claims, insurance coverage information, pension records, and all records relating to employee benefits.

In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks damages for physical injuries, medical bills, loss of earnings/earnings capacity, pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and other damages, as well as substantial property damage loss. On November 2, 2022, Plaintiff provided verified written discovery responses and claimed he suffered at least $145,000.00 in wage loss with an average monthly income of $5,000 when he was working for Lyft. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not provided any substantive documentation including pay statements, employment verification documents with Lyft, or any type of documents related to the wage loss claim. Plaintiff’s pay and time records are relevant to his purported damages, particularly for lost past and future earnings and other employment benefits. Defendant is correct that Plaintiff’s prior, subsequent, and concurrent employment experiences at the subject company Lyft are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims in this case. Without this information, Defendant cannot ascertain whether, and the extent to which, Plaintiff has met his duty to mitigate his economic damages, including by seeking subsequent employment opportunities after he stopped working for Lyft. Likewise, information concerning Plaintiff’s attendance history during his employment with Lyft is critical to Defendant’s ability to analyze the original working capacity for Plaintiff before the subject incident happened. Defendant is entitled to know whether Plaintiff formally reported this incident to his employer Lyft, and provided the reason that he stopped working and whether the reason he stopped working is related to the medical condition that was caused by the subject incident. Defendant is similarly entitled to know if Plaintiff has made any efforts to accommodate or mitigate his damages by requesting a different position with his current employer which could be less physically demanding, and therefore allow Plaintiff to continue working. The information sought by the subpoena is therefore relevant to these issues as well.

Defendant concedes they are not looking for Plaintiff’s tax returns, and Plaintiff need not disclose them.

On the other hand, Plaintiff argues the subpoena is overbroad, and not framed to obtain responsive documents. Plaintiff is correct. As phrased the subpoena is not limited to employment records from Lyft or after the incident. In fact, the subpoena has no time constraints at all. And, while Plaintiff asserts that he is agreeable to provide information regarding verification of employment, rate of pay, and hours worked, Plaintiff is correct that the subpoena’s sweep is far broader. By requesting “all” records of Plaintiff uncircumscribed by time or connection to the incident or the damages claimed, the subpoena is overbroad. Plaintiff is correct that if what Defendant is interested in relates to Defendant recent employment with Lyft and relevant records related thereto, the subpoena is not so limited.

Based on the forgoing, Plaintiff is correct the subpoena is overbroad. However, the defendant is also correct that the Plaintiff must disclose relevant employment records while employed at Lyft and for a relevant time period prior to the incident (for example 5 years) and subsequent thereto as well as medical records subsequent to the incident and any medical records related to the nature of Defendant requested damages. Plaintiff need not disclose his tax returns.

Based on the foregoing, the motion to quash is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED in part. Plaintiff is ordered to produce records consistent with this Court’s Order.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Kerry Bensinger

Judge of the Superior Court