Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 22STCV32548, Date: 2024-07-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV32548 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 Dept: 31
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kerry Bensinger, Department 31
HEARING DATE: July
25, 2024 TRIAL DATE: Not set
CASE: Bay Area Development Co. v. PLM Lender
Services, Inc., et al.
CASE NO.: 22STCV32548
DEMURRER
WITHOUT MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendants
PLM Lender Services, Inc., and Secured Income Fund-II, LLC
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Bay
Area Development Co.
I. BACKGROUND
On October
4, 2022, Plaintiff, Bay Area Development Co., filed this action against
Defendants Secured Income Fund-11, LLC (“Secured Income”); PLM Lender Services,
Inc. (“PLM Lender”); Mo Taxon; and Fedora Taxon. Plaintiff later filed a First Amended
Complaint (FAC) which alleged causes of action for (1) Intentional Interference
with Contract, (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,
(3) Declaratory Relief, (4) Unjust Enrichment, (5) Breach of Implied Terms of
Written Forbearance, (6) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, (7) Interference with Contract, and (8) Declaratory Relief. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes
of Action are asserted against Secured Income and PLM Lender only.
On October
27, 2023, PLM Lender and Secured Income (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a
demurrer to the FAC. On March 14, 2024,
the court sustained Defendants’ demurrer with leave to amend.
On April 8,
2024, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint (SAC). The SAC asserts the same causes of action as
the FAC, and alleges as follows:
Plaintiff obtained a loan in the amount of $725,000 from
Secured Income, the repayment of which was secured by a Deed of Trust recorded
against the real property located at 419 North Highland Ave., Los Angeles,
CA. Within two years, Plaintiff
defaulted on its obligations owing on the loan.
In August 2021, Plaintiff, Secured Income, through its agent, PLM Lender,
entered into a forbearance agreement whereby the latter agreed to refrain from
foreclosing for a period of ninety (90) days. On July 13, 2022, the parties entered into
another forbearance agreement providing for the foreclosure to remain on hold
until at least August 1, 2022.
Later in July 2022, Plaintiff entered into a written
agreement with a third-party buyer of the Property, which would have resulted
in the balance owing on the Loan being paid in full. In order to buy time for the sale to close
before the foreclosure sale, Plaintiff negotiated a further postponement on the
foreclosure sale by offering to immediately pay down the balance due by
$100,000. PLM Lender accepted the
agreement. Pursuant to the agreement,
the parties executed a new (third) forbearance agreement which provided in
relevant part that (1) PLM Lender must be in receipt of the (third) signed forbearance
agreement before August 2, 2022; and (2) PLM must be in receipt of the sum of
$100,475 on or before August 2, 2022.
Satisfaction of both terms would trigger a postponement of the
foreclosure sale. However, Plaintiff did
not return the signed forbearance agreement nor tender the payment before the
forbearance deadline. On August 4, 2022,
Secured Income and PLM Lender proceeded with the foreclosure sale and sold the
subject property for half its value. Plaintiff
alleges the failure to tender the $100k payment was due to Secured Income and
PLM Lender proceeding to foreclosure before Plaintiff could convince the
buyer/escrow to release $100,000 to Plaintiff.
As a result, Plaintiff lost equity of approximately one million
dollars.
On April 29, 2024, Defendants filed this demurrer to the
SAC.
Plaintiff filed an opposition. Defendants replied.
II. LEGAL
STANDARD
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and
will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face.¿ (City
of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 445, 459.)¿ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or
law.¿ We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also
consider matters which may be judicially noticed.¿ [Citation.]”¿ (Mitchell
v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del
E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604
[“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable
they may be”].)¿ Allegations are to be liberally construed.¿ (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 452.)¿ In construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific
factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory
allegations.¿ (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189
Cal.App.3rd 764, 769.)¿¿
A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated
to support the cause of action asserted.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd.
(e).)¿“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint
is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under
modern discovery procedures.”¿(Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc.
(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿¿
Where the complaint contains substantial factual allegations
sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a
demurrer for uncertainty will be overruled or plaintiff will be given leave to
amend.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135,
139, fn. 2.)¿ Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable
possibility of successful amendment.¿ (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18
Cal.3d 335, 348.)¿ The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a
pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)¿¿
III. DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
Defense counsel has complied with the meet and confer
requirement.¿ (See Declaration of Demurring or Moving Party Regarding Meet and
Confer, 4/29/24.)
Analysis
The SAC alleges
the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action against Defendants only. Defendants base their demurrer to the SAC on
the same grounds raised against the FAC: the allegations asserted against them
are uncertain. The court agrees. In sustaining the demurrer to the FAC, the
court stated:
“The
gravamen of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants is that Defendants frustrated
the third-party sale of the subject property by proceeding with the foreclosure
sale before Plaintiff could secure $100,000 from the third-party sale so that
Defendants could provide the money to satisfy the forbearance agreement. As alleged, return of a signed forbearance
agreement and payment of the $100,000 by August 2, 2022 was required to
postpone the foreclosure sale long enough to permit the pending third-party sale
of the subject property. (FAC, ¶ 49.)
Plaintiff did not return a signed forbearance agreement by August 2, 2022. (FAC, ¶ 51.)
Plaintiff did not tender the $100,000 payment by August 2, 2022. (Id.)
Plaintiff did not satisfy the terms of the agreement. Under these allegations, any defendant would
be hard-pressed to understand what allegations they are called to answer. Plaintiff does not explain how Defendants
frustrated the satisfaction of the forbearance agreement if Plaintiff intended
to obtain the $100,000 from escrow but the house was to close after the
expiration of the forbearance agreement.
Hence, the uncertainty.”
(Minute Order, 3/14/24.)
In an effort to address this uncertainty, Plaintiff adds
only one new allegation, Paragraph 54, in the SAC. Paragraph 54 does not clarify Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants. Paragraph 54
states, in full:
Plaintiff's
prior attorney, Jeffrey A. Slott, described Plaintiff's position in
"Opposition of Plaintiff to Defendants' [Taxon] Motion to Expunge Lis
Pendens" filed January 24, 2023 at page 5,
"Plaintiff
and the Lender, Secured Income Fund-I 1, LLC and its loan servicing agent PLM
Lender Services, Inc. had a long standing relationship for many years, much of
which was contentious. Nevertheless, during the many years of the lending
relationship they developed a course of dealing which included great
flexibility when it came to meeting payment deadlines. On several occasions
prior to the foreclosure in August, 2022 the lender would accept payments made
a day or two late. There were communications between Plaintiff's counsel and
the lender the day before the foreclosure and Plaintiff's counsel had every
reason to believe that since money was being released to the Lender directly
from the purchase escrow, the Lender would have no problem receiving it on
August 3 or 4, 2022.
The
Lender had agreed to extend the foreclosure date in exchange for payment of
approximately $100,000 as a loan forbearance fee for 30 days, and although the
agreement required payment of the fee by August 2, 2022 the Lender never
notified Plaintiff again that it was proceeding with the foreclosure based on
any claim that the agreement had not been complied with. Plaintiff will
generate admissible evidence to support the above through discovery."
In other words, Plaintiff alleges time was not of the
essence because of the parties’ course of dealing, notwithstanding the
requirements that Plaintiff return a signed forbearance agreement and payment
of $100,000 by a date and time certain. In
support, Plaintiff cites Leiter v. Eltinge (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 306 (Leiter)
and Magic Carpet Ride LLC v. Rugger Investment Group LLC 2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 357 (Magic Carpet Ride) in its opposition. However, Leiter and Magic Carpet
Ride are legally and factually inapposite.
For instance, Plaintiff relies on Leiter and Magic Carpet Ride
for the proposition that “performance at a time later than that specified
in the contract is ‘substantial performance.’” (See Opposition, p. 2.) But there are no allegations in the SAC
showing that Plaintiff performed at a time later than specified in the
forbearance agreement. This silence
cannot be construed as anything close to substantial performance.
Further, as
the court noted in sustaining Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC, Plaintiff did
not comply with the terms of the forbearance agreement. The court repeats that observation here. Plaintiff does not plead anything new to
avoid demurrer.
Ultimately,
the SAC remains uncertain. Plaintiff fails
to adequately address or explain how the sale was going to allow Plaintiff to
pay the $100,000 forbearance, which was due prior to the close of the
sale. The lack of any explanation ends
the inquiry.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants PLM Lender’s and Secured Income’s demurrer to the
Second Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED. Leave
to amend is DENIED.
Defendants to give notice.
Dated: July 25, 2024
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Kerry Bensinger Judge of the Superior Court |