Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case Number: 22STCV38821, Date: 2024-01-08 Tentative Ruling

This is a slip and fall case. On December 14, 2022, Plaintiff, Raymond Salazar, filed this action against Defendant, L.A. Downtown Medical Center LLC (erroneously sued and served as L.A. Downton Medical Center), for injuries arising from a slip and fall on Defendant’s premises at 1711 W. Temple St., Los Angeles, California 90026. Plaintiff alleges that he was lawfully on Defendant’s premises as a patient when he slipped on a substance on the floor. The original Complaint alleged causes of action for medical negligence, negligence, and premises liability. On August 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) which advances the same allegations but omits the previous cause of action for medical negligence.

On September 5, 2023, Defendant filed this Demurrer and Motion to Strike the FAC.

“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.)

“A¿demurrer¿tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court does not “read passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we read the complaint ‘as a whole and its parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)

A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Where the complaint contains substantial factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty will be overruled or plaintiff will be given leave to amend. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

As part of its Reply, Defendant requests judicial notice of Plaintiff’s original Complaint. The request is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)

Defense counsel has satisfied the meet and confer requirement.¿ (Declaration of Aaron J. Weissman, ¶¶ 3, 4.)¿¿¿¿

Defendant argues the FAC should be viewed as one for medical negligence, not for negligence and premises liability. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s deletion of the medical negligence cause of action attempts improperly to circumvent the limitations of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). In support, Defendant points to the now-omitted allegations from the original Complaint which state that the Defendants “were health care providers” (Complaint, ¶ 5), that Plaintiff was lawfully on the premises of Defendants’ facility as a patient, (Complaint, ¶ 17), that Plaintiff “consulted with Defendants, and each of them, specifically for the purpose of obtaining Defendants' professional advice regarding Plaintiffs symptoms and medical care” (Complaint, ¶ 9), and that “Plaintiff was overly medicated the night before and allowed to walk within the Defendants' premises unsupervised and unassisted when he slipped and fell on water and/or a slippery, greasy and/or hazardous substance on the floor” (Complaint, ¶ 10). According to the Defendant, the foregoing and deleted allegations should be resuscitated to reconfigure Plaintiff’s current causes of action for negligence and premises liability into causes of action for medical negligence.

Defendant’s argument is not persuasive. Defendant overlooks the allegation in the original Complaint that the “Defendants were the owners, lessors, sub-lessors, managing agents, landlords, renters, managers, operators, marketers, inspectors, maintainers and controllers, of a commercial property located at 1711 W Temple St., Los Angeles, CA 90026, (hereinafter referred to as "THE SUBJECT PREMISES"), to which building the general public is invited to come.” (Complaint, ¶ 7.) This same allegation appears in the FAC. (See FAC, ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff alleged causes of action against Defendant in its capacity as an owner of the subject premises. The allegations in the original Complaint, and more importantly, in the FAC, are not based solely upon Defendant’s professional negligence. Defendant does not cite any authority for the proposition that a single defendant may not be held liable for medical and non-medical causes of action in the same action. (See, e.g., Waters v. Bourhis (1985) 40 Cal.3d 424 436 [noting that, in an attorney’s fees case concerning MICRA and non-MICRA causes of action, there is nothing “in the legislative history of MICRA which suggest that the Legislature intended either to require a plaintiff to make an election between two viable theories of recovery—one MCRA and one non-MICRA—or to prohibit such a plaintiff from joining MICRA and non-MICRA causes of action in a single proceeding.”].)

Further, Plaintiff has since filed the FAC which advances only the non-medical causes of action of negligence and premises liability.[1] Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the allegations as to either claim.

Accordingly, the Demurrer is OVERRULED. As Defendant’s Motion to Strike is based upon the same grounds as the Demurrer, the Motion to Strike is DENIED.

Kerry Bensinger

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.¿ (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671; Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)¿ Therefore, to prevail on a claim for premises liability, Plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant owned or controlled the subject property; (2) defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3) plaintiff was harmed; and (4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.¿ (See CACI No. 1000; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.)