Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 22STCV38821, Date: 2025-01-10 Tentative Ruling

Counsel may submit on the tentative ruling by emailing Dept. 31 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. The email address is smcdept31@lacourt.org. Please do not call the court to submit on the tentative. Please do not submit to the tentative ruling on behalf of the opposing party. Please do not e-mail the Court if you plan to appear and argue.

In deciding whether to submit on the tentative ruling or attend the hearing and present oral argument, please keep the following in mind:

The tentative rulings authored by this court reflect that the court has read and considered all pleadings and evidence timely submitted to the court in connection with the motion, opposition, and reply (if any). Because the pleadings were filed, they are part of the public record.

Oral argument is not an opportunity to simply regurgitate that which a party set forth in its pleadings. Nor, is oral argument an opportunity to "make a record" when there is no court reporter present and the statements and arguments of counsel are already part of the record because they were set forth in the pleadings. Finally, simply because a party or attorney disagrees with the court's analysis and ruling or is not satisfied with it does not necessarily warrant oral argument when no new arguments will be articulated.

If you submit on the tentative, you must immediately notify all other parties email that you will not appear at the hearing. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. If all parties to the motion submit, this tentative ruling will become the final ruling after the hearing date and it will be memorialized in a minute order. This tentative ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such document will be considered by the Court.

**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.



Case Number: 22STCV38821    Hearing Date: January 10, 2025    Dept: 31

Tentative Order

 

Judge Kerry Bensinger, Department 31

 

 

HEARING DATE:     January 10, 2024                               TRIAL DATE:  August 14, 2025

                                                          

CASE:                         Raymond Salazar v. L.A. Downtown Medical Center

 

CASE NO.:                 22STCV38821

 

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

MOVING PARTY:               Defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center LLC

 

RESPONDING PARTY:     Plaintiff Raymond Salazar

 

 

I.          BACKGROUND

 

            This is a slip and fall case.  On December 14, 2022, plaintiff Raymond Salazar (Plaintiff or Salazar) commenced this action against defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center, LLC (erroneously sued and served as L.A. Downton Medical Center) (hereafter, Defendant or LADMC) for injuries arising from a slip and fall on Defendant’s premises at 1711 W. Temple St., Los Angeles, California 90026.  Plaintiff alleges that he was lawfully on Defendant’s premises as a patient when he slipped on water.  On August 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) for (1) negligence and (2) premises liability.

 

            On April 23, 2024, Defendant filed this Motion for Summary Judgment.  

 

            On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. 

 

On December 31, 2024, Defendant replied.

 

II.        LEGAL STANDARD

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿ (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)¿¿A motion for summary judgment must be granted “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)¿¿¿ 

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿ (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519 (Scalf).)¿ A defendant seeking summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)¿ A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿ A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action.¿ (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿¿¿ 

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿ (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿ It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿ (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891 (Gaggero).)¿ The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿ (Ibid.)¿ The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿ (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)¿¿¿ 

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿ A plaintiff opposing summary judgment defeats the motion by showing one or more triable issues of material fact exist as to the challenged element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.)¿ “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)¿¿¿ 

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿ (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.)¿ “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿ While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿ [Citation.]¿ Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿ “Put another way, have defendants conclusively negated a necessary element of the [plaintiff’s] case or demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of trial?”¿ (Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 853, 860, internal citation omitted.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿ [Citation.]¿ Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility.¿ [Citation.]” ¿(Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel.¿Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)¿¿¿ 

III.      EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

 

            Plaintiff submits twelve (12) objections to the medical records attached as Exhibit C to Defendant’s Evidence in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and one (1) objection to the Declaration of Sergio Avila. 

 

            The objections to Exhibit C are OVERRULED.  The Declaration of Guadalupe Garibay, the custodian of records, is attached to the medical records.  (See Kim Decl., Ex. C, p. 000468.) 

 

            The objection to the Declaration of Sergio Avila is OVERRULED.

 

IV.       DISCUSSION

           

A.  Material Facts

On December 9, 2021, Salazar was admitted to the Los Angeles Downtown Medical Center (LADMC) pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code § 5150 hold for severe delusional paranoia.  (Defendant’s Undisputed Material Facts (UMF) 1.)  On December 14, 2021, at approximately 10:45 p.m., Salazar experienced a fall in the hallway of LADMC’s Behavioral Health Unit (BHU).  (UMF 8.)  Aristotle Oris, R.N. (Nurse Oris), observed the fall.  (UMF 9.)  

At his deposition, Salazar testified there was water leaking from a thermostat for the A/C unit running down the wall and coming onto the floor.  (Salazar Depo., p. 65:10-23.)  Salazar further testified that his clothes “were wet all on my back.”  (Id.) 

Nurse Oris did not observe any foreign substance on the floor where Salazar fell, nor did he observe any water or slippery substance coming down from the walls.  (Oris Decl., ¶ 7.)  Nurse Oris did not observe any conditions or circumstances that caused him to believe they were the cause of Salazar’s sudden fall.  (Id.

There is no thermostat or air conditioning unit in the North Station of the BHU.  (Avila Decl., ¶ 4; Oris Decl., ¶ 15.)  The temperature in the North Station of the BHU is regulated by centralized air conditioning. The conditioned air flows into the North Station of the BHU through a ductwork.  (Avila Decl., ¶ 4.)  There is no record of any repairs or maintenance to the centralized air conditioning system that services the North Station of LADMC’s BHU on or subsequent to December 14, 2021, to address a leak, pooling water, or any similar condition.  (Avila Decl., ¶ 8.)  Avila has never received a report or information suggesting there has ever been an air conditioning unit-related leak that occurred in the North Station of the BHU.  (Avila Decl., ¶ 9.) 

According to the custom and practice at LADMC’s BHU, a janitorial staff would sweep and mop the area and abate any such slippery conditions on a daily basis.  (Avila Decl., ¶ 6.)  According to the custom and practice at LADMC’s BHU, all hospital staff are required to correct hazards when they find them, such as wiping up slippery substances on the floor.  If hospital staff are unable to correct hazards, they are to notify the appropriate staff member.  (Id.

B.  Analysis 

 

Two issues predominate: (1) whether there was a substance which caused Plaintiff to slip and fall, and (2) whether Defendant had notice of the condition.  For the reasons stated herein, the court finds there are triable issues of material fact.

 

1.      Legal Principles re: Premises Liability

 

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.¿ (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671; Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)¿ To prevail on a claim for premises liability, the plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant owned or controlled the subject property; (2) defendant was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property; (3) plaintiff was harmed; and (4) defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm.¿ (See CACI No. 1000; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.)¿¿A defendant may be negligent in the use or maintenance of the property if (1) a condition on the property created an unreasonable risk of harm; (2) the defendant knew or, through the exercise of reasonable care, should have known about it; and (3) the defendant failed to repair the condition, protect against harm from the condition, or give adequate warning of the condition.  (CACI No. 1003.)  A substantial factor in causing harm is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to have contributed to the harm.  It must be more than a remote or trivial factor.  It does not have to be the only cause of the harm.  (CACI No. 430; Yanez v. Plummer (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 180, 187.) ¿ 

A property owner is not the insurer of the safety of its guests.¿ (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205 (Ortega).)  The owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is key to establishing liability.¿ (Hall v. Rockcliff Realtors (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139-40.)  Whether a defendant had constructive notice of the condition that created the risk of harm depends on whether, under all the circumstances, the condition was of such a nature and existed long enough that defendant had sufficient time to discover it and, using reasonable care: (1) repair the condition; or (2) protect against harm from the condition; or adequately warn of the condition.  A defendant must make reasonable inspections of the property to discover unsafe conditions.  If an inspection was not made within a reasonable time before the accident, this may show that the condition existed long enough so that the owner using reasonable care would have discovered it.  (CACI No. 1011.)  

2.      Application

 

            Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment because Defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition and Plaintiff’s alleged harm was not foreseeable.[1]  In support, Defendant offers the declarations of Sergio Avila and Aristotle Oris to establish (1) there is no air conditioning unit or thermostat where Plaintiff fell (Avila Decl., ¶ 4; Oris Decl., ¶ 15); (2) there was no substance flowing from the wall or pooling on the floor where Plaintiff fell at the time the incident occurred (Oris Decl., ¶ 7); (3) janitorial staff sweep and mop the area and abate any such slippery conditions on a daily basis (Avila Decl., ¶ 6); (4) all hospital staff are required to correct hazards when they find them, such as wiping up slippery substances on the floor (Avila Decl., ¶ 6); and (5) there is no record of any repairs or maintenance to the centralized air conditioning system that services the North Station of LADMC’s BHU on or subsequent to December 14, 2021, to address a leak, pooling water, or any similar condition (Avila Decl., ¶ 8).  Based upon the foregoing Defendant meets its initial burden to demonstrate there was no dangerous condition which could have caused Plaintiff to fall and further, even if it existed, Defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition.   

The burden shifts.  Plaintiff argues there are triable issues of material fact concerning the existence of the dangerous condition and Defendant’s notice of the same.  In support, Plaintiff argues that after falling, his clothes “were wet all on my back.”  (Salazar Depo., p. 65:10-23.)  The reasonable inference to be drawn is that there was a liquid substance on the floor which caused Plaintiff to fall which wet the back of his clothes.  “Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.”  (Weiss v. People ex rel.¿Department of Transportation, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 864.)¿ Plaintiff’s testimony stands unrebutted. 

Plaintiff also points to the absence of any evidence presented by Defendant to establish whether any inspections of the premises where Plaintiff fell were conducted prior to Plaintiff’s fall, and if so, with what frequency.  Defendant submitted evidence to establish that “janitorial staff … sweep and mop the area and abate any such slippery conditions on a daily basis.”  (Avila Decl., ¶ 6.)  However, there are no records to support the assertion.  More to the point, there are no records that establish that the area where Plaintiff fell was inspected, or if so, when.  “If an inspection was not made within a reasonable time before the accident, this may show the condition existed long enough so that the [Defendant] owner using reasonable care would have discovered it.” (CACI No. 1011.)  Because there is no evidence establishing when, where, or if an inspection took place, the condition could have existed for any amount of time prior to Plaintiff’s fall.  The court cannot find as a matter of law that Defendant’s inspection efforts were reasonable. 

In sum, the court finds there are triable issues regarding the existence of a dangerous condition and whether Defendant had constructive notice of the condition.

V.          CONCLUSION

           

Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 

 

Plaintiff to give notice. 

 

 

Dated:   January 10, 2025                                        

 

   

 

  Kerry Bensinger  

  Judge of the Superior Court 

 



[1] Defendant also argues summary judgment is proper because Defendant’s staff conformed to the applicable standard of care at all times when providing care and treatment to Plaintiff, and no conduct on their part caused or contributed to his fall.  However, the FAC does not allege Defendant’s care and treatment of Salazar as a basis for Salazar’s claims. “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues: the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. [Citation.]”¿ (FPI Dev., Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 380.) Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations center on Defendant’s failure to clean or maintain Defendant’s premises.  (FAC, ¶ 17.)