Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 23STCV03115, Date: 2023-12-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV03115 Hearing Date: December 21, 2023 Dept: 31
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kerry Bensinger, Department 31
HEARING DATE: December
21, 2023 TRIAL
DATE: Not set
CASE: Bashar Alabi, et al. v. Equity Residential Management, LLC, et al.
CASE NO.: 23STCV03115
DEMURRER
WITH MOTION TO STRIKE
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
TransUnion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Or
Vardi, Joseph Schuetz, Chaninthon Thammasan, and Stephanie Steiner
I. BACKGROUND
This action[1]
is brought by prospective tenants of various rental properties regarding
alleged violations of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act
(ICRAA). On February 14, 2023, Plaintiffs[2],
Or Vardi (“Vardi”), Joseph Schuetz (“Schuetz”), Chaninthon Thammasan
(“Thammasan”), and Stephanie Steiner (“Steiner”), filed a Complaint, against
Defendants, Equity Residential Management, LLC (“ERM”) and TransUnion Rental
Screening Solutions, Inc. (sued as Doe 1, hereafter, “TransUnion”), asserting causes
of action for (1) Violations of the ICRAA, (2) Invasion of Privacy, and (3)
Declaratory Relief.
The
Complaint alleges as follows: ERM
manages and operates rental properties, including, in relevant part, the Hesby
Apartments and Altitude Apartments (the “Subject Properties”). Plaintiffs were prospective tenants of the Subject
Properties. Specifically, Vardi,
Schuetz, and Thammasan applied for housing at the Hesby Apartments; Steiner
applied for housing at the Altitude Apartments. The application required a release of
information permitting Defendants to obtain private and personal information
from third parties about the Plaintiffs, including information on Plaintiffs’
criminal background and previous evictions.
Plaintiffs consented to the release of information. ERM then requested and obtained investigative
consumer reports about Plaintiffs without complying with the mandatory
requirements disclosures, and authorizations required under the ICRAA. That is, ERM concealed from Plaintiff the
nature and type of the investigative consumer reports they would procure about
the Plaintiffs, the date the reports would be procured, the entity or entities
which would provide the reports, and Plaintiffs’ rights regarding investigative
consumer reports, among other things.
Defendants were aware of the requirements of the ICRAA prior to
committing the above violations.
On August 10,
2023, TransUnion filed this Demurrer to each cause of action in the Complaint
and concurrently filed a Motion to Strike portions of the Complaint. Plaintiffs filed Oppositions. TransUnion replied.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR DEMURRER
“The primary function of a
pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in
a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect
substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th
203, 240.)
“A¿demurrer¿tests the legal sufficiency of the factual
allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A.¿(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) The Court looks to whether
“the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause
of action or discloses a complete defense.” (Id.) The Court does not “read
passages from a complaint in isolation; in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we
read the complaint ‘as a whole and its
parts in their context.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 804.) The Court “assume[s] the
truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred
from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Harris, supra,
56 Cal.4th p. 240.) “The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or
conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)
A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated
to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd.
(e).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a
complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified
under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California,
Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
Where the complaint contains substantial factual
allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to
meet, a demurrer for uncertainty will be overruled or plaintiff will be given
leave to amend. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185
Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there
is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant
to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)
III. DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
Defense counsel has satisfied the
meet and confer requirement. (Declaration of Ritika Singh, ¶¶ 2-6.)
Analysis
TransUnion demurs to each cause of
action on the basis that the Complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute any cause of action against TransUnion. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
1. First Cause of
Action for Violation of the ICRAA
TransUnion argues the First Cause of
Action for Violation of ICRAA fails because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that
TransUnion, as the reporting agency, violated ICRAA.
The purpose of ICRAA is “to ensure
that consumer reporting agencies ‘exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness,
impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's right to privacy.’” (Connor v. First Student, Inc (2018) 5
Cal.5th 1026, 1032.) “[T]he statute
defines an ‘investigative consumer report’ as one ‘in which information on a
consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of
living is obtained through any means.’” (Id.,
citing Civ. Code, § 1786.2, subd. (c).)¿¿
Pursuant to ICRAA, any person who
requests an investigative consumer report on a prospective tenant must comply
with the following requirements: (1) “notify the consumer in writing that an
investigative consumer report will be made regarding the consumer’s character,
general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living” within “three
days after the date on which the report was first requested” (Civ. Code, §
1786.16(a)(3)); (2) “include the name and address of the investigative consumer
reporting agency that will prepare the report and a summary of the provisions
of Section 1786.22” (Id.); (3) “certify to the investigative consumer
reporting agency” that “the applicable disclosures” were made to the consumer
(Civ. Code § 1786.16(a)(4)); (4) “provide the consumer a means by which the
consumer may indicate on a written form, by means of a box to check, that the
consumer wishes to receive a copy of any report that is prepared” (Civ. Code, §
1786.16, subd. (b)(1)); and (5) “send a copy of the report to the consumer
within three business days of the date that the report is provided to the
recipient.” (Id.)¿
TransUnion’s argument rests on the dual
premise that (1) TransUnion is a reporting agency, not the landlord or property
management requesting a prospective tenant’s investigative consumer reports,
and (2) the Complaint sets forth allegations that ERM requested the
reports. Thus, TransUnion argues it did
not and could not have violated ICRAA. This
argument fails because the first premise—that TransUnion is a reporting
agency—is not alleged in the Complaint. It
is extrinsic, and therefore not a proper ground to sustain the demurrer. “A¿demurrer¿tests the legal sufficiency of
the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th
at p. 725, emphasis added.)
For similar reason, but stated differently,
the Court finds the First Cause of Action is uncertain. Here, the Complaint specifically alleges that
ERM, “under the direction and control of Property Owner manages and operates
the Hesby Apartments ... and the Altitude Apartments” (Complaint, ¶14), and
that ERM “required Plaintiffs to complete an “Application” and to consent to a
release of information” including a screen for criminal background and previous
evictions (Complaint, ¶ 22). There are
no allegations describing TransUnion’s role in the alleged noncompliance with
the ICRAA.
Plaintiffs’ opposition also confirms
the uncertainty of the allegations as to TransUnion. Plaintiffs appear to concede that TransUnion
is a reporting agency by pointing to the allegation at paragraph 41 of the
Complaint that ICRAA regulates landlords and agencies that gather
information on consumers. (See
Opposition, p. 3:11-12.) The ICRAA may
very well apply to agencies, however there is no allegation identifying
TransUnion as such an agency. Nor is
there an allegation identifying TransUnion as a landlord. The distinction is
important because the main thrust of the Plaintiff’s allegation is that the landlord
is the person/entity requesting the
investigative consumer report and there is no allegation TransUnion is
the landlord. (See Complaint, ¶ 44.) The First Cause of Action is uncertain.
2. Second Cause of Action for Invasion of
Privacy
“An actionable claim [for invasion
of privacy] requires three essential elements: (1) the claimant must possess a
legally protected privacy interest; (2) the claimant’s expectation of privacy
must be objectively reasonable; and (3) the invasion of privacy complained of
must be serious in both its nature and scope.” (County of Los Angeles v. Los
Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926.) The ICRAA does not prevent any consumer from
maintaining an action for invasion of privacy, among other claims. (Civ. Code, § 1786.52.)
Here, the invasion of privacy claim
rests upon the sole allegation that “the Defendants ... invaded the Plaintiffs’
rights of privacy by obtaining investigative consumer reports about the
Plaintiffs without complying with mandatory requirements under the ICAA for
getting investigative reports about the Plaintiffs.” (Complaint, ¶ 52.) This allegation fails to satisfy the second
or third element. The Complaint merely alleges
a reasonable expectation of compliance with the ICRAA. There is no allegation regarding Plaintiffs’
reasonable expectation of privacy or the nature and scope of the invasion. The Second Cause of Action is deficient.
3. Declaratory Relief
“To qualify for declaratory relief,
a party would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements:
(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy
involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations.”
(Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909,
quotation marks and brackets omitted.)
A cause of action for declaratory
relief should not be used as a duplicate cause of action for the determination
of identical issues raised in another cause of action. (General of America Insurance Co. v. Lilly
(1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470.) Further, “there is no basis for
declaratory relief where only past wrongs are involved.”¿ (Osseous
Technologies of America, Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191
Cal.App.4th 357, 366, quotation marks omitted.)¿
Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief claim
is based on the contention that an actual controversy exists between the
parties regarding the legality and effect of Defendants’ application. Because Defendants demand that all leases be
renewed or re-certified, and because the same forms are always used, which
authorizes Defendants to obtain investigative consumer reports about the
Plaintiffs, a judicial determination is necessary to prevent the Defendants’
continued violations of the ICRAA.
(Complaint, ¶¶ 53-54.) The declaratory relief claim, however,
is not ripe because Plaintiffs allege only a past wrong. Plaintiffs do not allege they reapplied or
will reapply. Without such an allegation
there is no actual controversy, only a hypothetical one.
Moreover, for the reasons stated
above, the Complaint fails to identify whether TransUnion is a landlord or a
reporting agency. Given this
uncertainty, the Third Cause of Action is deficient.
V. CONCLUSION
Defendant TransUnion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc.’s
Demurrer to the Complaint is Sustained.
Leave to amend is Granted.
Plaintiffs are ordered to serve and file their First Amended
Complaint within 30 days of this order.
Defendant is ordered to serve and file their responsive
pleading within 30 days of service of Plaintiffs’ amended pleading.
The Motion to Strike is moot.
The stay is lifted.
Moving party to give notice.
Dated: December 21,
2023
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Kerry Bensinger Judge of the Superior Court |
[1] This case was previously deemed
related to lead case Thomas v. Equity Residential (22STCV23730). On June 23, 2023, this case was stayed while the
lead case proceeded. On October 11,
2023, the court in lead case 22STCV23730 deemed this case unrelated. This action was then severed and returned to
this Court. Accordingly, the Court lifts
the stay and proceeds.
[2] This action was also filed by
Plaintiffs Bashar Alabi, Margaret Dawson, Jamie Meraz, and Renae Young. These plaintiffs requested dismissal of the
Complaint on August 7, 2023. Dismissal
was entered the following day.