Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 23STCV04392, Date: 2025-04-03 Tentative Ruling
Counsel may submit on the tentative ruling by emailing Dept. 31 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. The email address is smcdept31@lacourt.org. Please do not call the court to submit on the tentative. Please do not submit to the tentative ruling on behalf of the opposing party. Please do not e-mail the Court if you plan to appear and argue.
In deciding whether to submit on the tentative ruling or attend the hearing and present oral argument, please keep the following in mind:
The tentative rulings authored by this court reflect that the court has read and considered all pleadings and evidence timely submitted to the court in connection with the motion, opposition, and reply (if any). Because the pleadings were filed, they are part of the public record.
Oral argument is not an opportunity to simply regurgitate that which a party set forth in its pleadings. Nor, is oral argument an opportunity to "make a record" when there is no court reporter present and the statements and arguments of counsel are already part of the record because they were set forth in the pleadings. Finally, simply because a party or attorney disagrees with the court's analysis and ruling or is not satisfied with it does not necessarily warrant oral argument when no new arguments will be articulated.
If you submit on the tentative, you must immediately notify all other parties email that you will not appear at the hearing. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. If all parties to the motion submit, this tentative ruling will become the final ruling after the hearing date and it will be memorialized in a minute order. This tentative ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such document will be considered by the Court.
**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.
Case Number: 23STCV04392 Hearing Date: April 3, 2025 Dept: 31
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kerry Bensinger, Department 31
HEARING DATE: April 3, 2025 TRIAL
DATE: September 30, 2024
CASE: Dmitri Shistik v. Kia America, Inc., et al.
CASE NO.: 23STCV04392
MOTION
FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND EXPENSES
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff
Dmitri Shistik
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Kia America,
Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a Song Beverly action brought by plaintiff Dmitri
Shistik (“Plaintiff”) and against defendant Kia America, Inc. (“Kia”).
On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement
of Entire Case.
On February 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed this Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses.
On March 21, 2025, Kia filed an opposition.
On March 27, 2025, Plaintiff replied.
II. JUDICIAL
NOTICE
Plaintiff’s unopposed request for judicial notice is
GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
III. DISCUSSION
& LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff seeks a total award of $144,946.38, consisting of
$95,475.00 in attorneys’ fees, a 0.5 multiplier enhancement in the amount of $47,737.50,
and $1,733.88 in costs and expenses.
On August 19, 2024, the parties agreed to settle the
matter. (Azimtash Decl., Ex. CC.) The settlement provides for attorney
fees by motion under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). (Id.)¿¿
Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) provides:¿¿¿
(d) If the buyer prevails in an action under this section,
the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a
sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s
fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been
reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and
prosecution of such action.¿¿¿
¿
(Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)¿¿¿
The settlement provides that Plaintiff is the prevailing
party under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act for the purposes of this
motion.¿ Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney
fees, costs, and expenses as the prevailing party.¿ The only matter at issue is
the reasonableness of the requested fees.¿¿¿
A. Attorney Fees¿
The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is
within the sound discretion of trial courts. (PLCM Group v. Drexler
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.) “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable
fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably
expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’”¿ “[T]he lodestar is the
basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by
the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting
them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other
employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….”¿ (Graciano
v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)¿ In setting
the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the
rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community
for similar work.’”¿ (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993)
13 Cal.App.4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other
grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644,
664.)¿ The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness
of the fees.¿ (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615.)¿¿¿
It is settled “ ‘that the determination of what constitutes
reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court ....
[Citations.] The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in
which the trial court has its own expertise. [Citation.] The trial court may
make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without
the necessity for, expert testimony.’ ” (PLCM Group v. Drexler, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 1096; accord, Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122,
1132 [the “ ‘ “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of
professional services rendered in his court, and ... his judgment ... will not
be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong”
’ ”].)¿
1. Reasonable Hourly Rate¿¿¿¿
Plaintiff retained Alexander Khoubian (Khoubian) and Sam
Azimtash (Azimtash) for this matter. (See Azimtash Decl., Ex. EE.)¿ Mr. Khoubian
billed at $450/hour. Mr. Azimtash billed at $500/hour.
¿ Kia contends the hourly billing rates for Plaintiff’s
attorneys are unreasonable. Citing Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, Kia argues that the court should reduce the
value of services rendered to $200 and $250, respectively. Defendant’s
main points of contention are that Mr. Khoubian and Mr. Azimtash were admitted to practice law in California only recently in
2019 and 2020 and that their respective billing rates exceed the rates approved
of in Mikhaeilpoor.
After consideration of the filings in connection to this
issue, the court finds the billing rates to be reasonable. However,
because Plaintiff does not provide the number of hours billed, as explained below,
the court will apply a blended rate of $475.
2. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended¿¿¿
Plaintiff submits counsel’s records which detail the hours
spent litigating this matter. ¿(Azimtash Decl., Ex. CC.)
¿¿ “[I]t is the burden of the challenging party to point to
the specific items challenged [within the moving party’s verified billing
invoice], with a sufficient argument and citations to evidence.¿ General
arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not
suffice.”¿ (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459,
488.)¿¿¿¿¿
Kia objects to excessive billing for communications with
Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s counsel’s use of template discovery, document review, unwarranted
motions to compel, and for preparing the attorney fee motion. Kia
challenges specific entries. (Opp., pp. 5:1-8:2.) Plaintiff
contends they were reasonably incurred.
The court appreciates that this case progressed towards
trial.¿ Along the way, Plaintiff served and responded to standard written
discovery. There was very little law and motion practice.¿¿Moreover,
there was nothing particularly complex or unique about this case.¿ The issues
involved were applicable to other consumers’ vehicles, thereby triggering
economies of scale in terms of Plaintiff’s counsel’s efficiency in litigating
this type of lemon law case.¿ ¿
Considering these facts, the court agrees that in some
instances, the time quoted is excessive or unreasonable under the
circumstances.¿¿Further, a multiplier is not warranted. The court notes however that neither
Plaintiff’s billing record nor Plaintiff’s motion sets forth the specific hours
billed by Mr. Khoubian and Mr. Azimtash or the total hours billed. The court declines to do the math for counsel.[1] Instead, the court
finds a reasonable award of attorney fees in this matter is $41,800 (88 hours
at $475 per hour).
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees in the sum of $41,800,
and costs in the sum of $1,733.88, for a total award of $43,533.88.
Plaintiff
to give notice.
Dated: April 3, 2025
|
|
|
|
|
Kerry Bensinger Judge of the Superior Court |
[1] Declaration of SA is not
bookmarked. Exhibit EE fails to identify
the total hours spent by each counsel. While
itemized, the running list without totals is unmanageable. Moreover, the overall time is excessive in this
type of case that resolved before trial.