Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case Number: 23STCV20217, Date: 2025-02-14 Tentative Ruling

Counsel may submit on the tentative ruling by emailing Dept. 31 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. The email address is smcdept31@lacourt.org. Please do not call the court to submit on the tentative. Please do not submit to the tentative ruling on behalf of the opposing party. Please do not e-mail the Court if you plan to appear and argue.

In deciding whether to submit on the tentative ruling or attend the hearing and present oral argument, please keep the following in mind:

The tentative rulings authored by this court reflect that the court has read and considered all pleadings and evidence timely submitted to the court in connection with the motion, opposition, and reply (if any). Because the pleadings were filed, they are part of the public record.

Oral argument is not an opportunity to simply regurgitate that which a party set forth in its pleadings. Nor, is oral argument an opportunity to "make a record" when there is no court reporter present and the statements and arguments of counsel are already part of the record because they were set forth in the pleadings. Finally, simply because a party or attorney disagrees with the court's analysis and ruling or is not satisfied with it does not necessarily warrant oral argument when no new arguments will be articulated.

If you submit on the tentative, you must immediately notify all other parties email that you will not appear at the hearing. If you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the motions. If all parties to the motion submit, this tentative ruling will become the final ruling after the hearing date and it will be memorialized in a minute order. This tentative ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such document will be considered by the Court.

**Tentative rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment will only be available for review in the courtroom on the day of the hearing.

CASE: The People of the State of California, Acting By and Through the Department of Transportation v. Breanna Esteves, et al.

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation

This action concerns the real property located at 5532 Poplar Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90032 (the “Premises”). On August 23, 2023, plaintiff The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (“Plaintiff”), filed a complaint against defendants Breanna Esteves, Erika Rivera, Does 1, through 50, and All Others In Possession (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges causes of action for (1)¿Ejectment and¿(2) Forcible Detainer. ¿As alleged in the Complaint, Defendants unlawfully entered the Premises, ousted Caltrans, and have been in possession of the Premises since May 2020. On August, 28, 2023, Plaintiff served Defendants with a 5-day Notice to Vacate the Premises. However, Defendants continue to refuse to vacate.

As relevant here, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name “Cindy Doe” as Doe 1 on September 7, 2023.[1]

On September 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed another amendment to the Complaint naming Cynthia Diaz (“Diaz” or “Defendant”) as Doe 2.

On April 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint to state the true name of Cindy Doe to be Cynthia Diaz.

On November 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for summary adjudication of the First Cause of Action for Ejectment against Diaz.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.)¿ The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. [Citation.] Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.) “Put another way, have defendants conclusively negated a necessary element of the [plaintiff’s] case or demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of trial?” (Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 853, 860 [cleaned up].) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. [Citation.] Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

Plaintiff’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the Grant Deed for the Premises, record April 15, 1969, is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); Ragland v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 194 [“A recorded deed is an official act of the executive branch, of which a court may take judicial notice.”].)

Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication of its First Cause of Action for Ejectment. “The essential elements of an ejectment action are (1) the plaintiff's valid interest in the property and (2) the defendant’s wrongful possession and withholding thereof.” (2710 Sutter Ventures, LLC v. Millis (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 842, 866.) Plaintiff argues there are no triable issues on this claim because it is undisputed that Caltrans is the sole owner of the Premises with the sole right of occupancy. In support, Plaintiff offers Caltrans’ Grant Deed, recorded April 15, 1969, and Diaz’s verified responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission (“RFAs”) which establish the following: (1) Plaintiff is the owner of the Premises (Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) 1); (2) since April 2020, Diaz has occupied the Premises without any rental agreement or other written document authorizing her occupancy (Cao Decl., Ex. 6, Responses to RFA Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8), (3) Plaintiff served Diaz with a 5-day Notice to Vacate on August 8, 2023 (Cao Decl., Ex. 6, Responses to RFA No. 11), (4) Diaz has no real property interest in the Premises (Cao Decl., Ex. 6, Responses to RFAs 5, and (5) Diaz has not paid any rent for the Premises to the State of California (Cao Decl., Ex. 6, Responses to RFA no. 9). Plaintiffs meet their initial burden to show there are no triable issues on its ejectment claim.

The burden shifts. Diaz argues the motion should be denied because there are triable issues as to whether Diaz is entitled to possession as a lawful tenant for having been in quiet possession of the Premises at least a year prior to the commencement of this action. In support, Diaz relies on Code of Civil Procedure 1172 and the undisputed fact that she has occupied the Premises since April 2020—more than three years before the commencement of this action.

“On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or forcible detainer, the plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry or forcible detainer complained of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims, have been in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year together next before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein is not then ended or determined; and such showing is a bar to the proceedings.”

On its face, Section 1172 applies to “any proceeding for any forcible entry or forcible detainer ….” Here, Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication of its ejectment claim. Section 1172 does not apply. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is arguing the ejectment claim is time-barred, the statute of limitations for an ejectment claim is five years. (See Harrison v. Welch (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 318.) Plaintiff’s ejectment claim is not time-barred.

In sum, Diaz does not dispute Plaintiff’s ownership of the Premises nor present any evidence or argument to establish her entitlement to possession of the Premises. Diaz does not meet her burden to show there is a triable issue of material fact as to the First Cause of Action.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the First Cause of Action against Defendant Cynthia Diaz is GRANTED.

¿¿¿

¿ Kerry Bensinger¿¿

¿ Judge of the Superior Court¿

[1] Plaintiff is proceeding to enter default judgment against the other named defendants.