Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case Number: 23STCV25724, Date: 2025-04-23 Tentative Ruling

On October 23, 2023, Plaintiff, Maria Guadalupe Puentes-Sandoval, filed a Complaint against Defendant, General Motors LLC, alleging four statutory causes of action based on the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The claims are based upon Plaintiff’s purchase of a used vehicle with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty.

On October 31, 2024, the California Supreme Court held in Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 180 that a vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty is not a new motor vehicle within the meaning of Civil Code section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) unless the warranty was issued with the sale.

On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion for leave to file the First Amended Complaint (FAC). Plaintiff seeks to add a cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

The court may, in its discretion and after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading, including adding or striking out the name of any party, or correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).)¿ “Public policy dictates that leave to amend be liberally granted.”¿ (Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 23, 32.)¿ “Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial . . . this policy should be applied only ‘where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party.’¿ [Citation].¿ A different result is indicated ‘where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party’ is shown.¿ [Citation.]” ¿(Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.)¿¿¿

A motion to amend a pleading must include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments and must state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted or added, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the allegations are located. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.1324(a).)¿ The motion shall also be accompanied by a declaration attesting to the effect of the amendment, why the amendment is necessary and proper, when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered, and why the request for amendment was not made earlier.¿ (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.1324(b).)¿¿¿

In ruling on a motion for leave to amend a pleading, the court does not consider the merits of the proposed amendment, because “the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.”¿ (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.)¿ While the court may deny leave to amend where the proposed amendment is insufficient to state a valid cause of action or defense, such denial is most appropriate where the insufficiency cannot be cured by further amendment—i.e., where the statute of limitations has expired or the insufficiency is established by controlling caselaw. (California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 280-281, disapproved on other grounds in Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390.)¿¿¿

Plaintiff seeks leave to file the proposed FAC to add a cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Acy.

Defendant argues the motion should be denied because (1) Plaintiff had knowledge of all the facts to determine whether to assert a Magnuson-Moss claim when she commenced this action, (2) Defendant would be prejudiced by having to explore additional discovery concerning Magnuson-Moss, and (3) amendment would be futile.

Leave to amend is appropriate. Although Defendant makes the undisputed point that Plaintiff had all the facts to assert a Magnuson-Moss claim at the initiation of this action, the court agrees with Plaintiff’s argument that Rodriguez changed the law regarding the applicability of the refund-or-repurchase remedy under Song-Beverly. Thus, prior to Rodriguez, Plaintiff did not need to bring a Magnuson-Moss claim.

Moreover, Defendant does not demonstrative prejudice if leave is granted. Defendant argues it will be prejudiced by having to conduct discovery into Magnuson-Moss. This argument simply amounts to having to defend against Plaintiff’s claims. But it is undisputed the factual basis for the proposed Magnuson-Moss claim is the same as Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims. Trial is nearly ten months away. This is sufficient time to conduct discovery without the need to continue the trial date. Moreover, the weight of authority favors granting leave to amend. “Public policy dictates that leave to amend be liberally granted.” (Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 23, 32.)

Defendant’s last argument regarding the futility of the proposed amendment does not change the result. Defendant argues an alleged violation of Magnuson-Moss is coextensive with her Song-Beverly claims. “Claims under the Magnuson-Moss Act stand or fall with [Plaintiff’s] express and implied warranty claims under state law.” (Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1017, 1022.) Generally, Defendant’s view of Magnuson-Moss is correct. However, Defendant’s belief that Rodriguez forecloses all Song-Beverly claims for used vehicles purchased without a new car warranty is erroneous. As noted elsewhere, Rodriguez clarified the meaning of “new car vehicle” which limits the refund-or-repurchase remedy under Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d). Here, Plaintiff also brings causes of action based on Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b) (2^nd Cause of Action) and Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3) (3^rd Cause of Action). Neither of the foregoing subdivisions depend on whether a vehicle was purchased with a new car warranty. In other words, notwithstanding Rodriguez, Plaintiff states viable Song-Beverly claims.

Based on the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to file and serve the First Amended Complaint within 5 days of this order.

Kerry Bensinger

Judge of the Superior Court