Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case Number: 23STCV30160, Date: 2024-09-04 Tentative Ruling

This is a landlord-tenant habitability case involving the property located at 598 East 11^th Street, Pomona, California 91766 (“Subject Property”). Vilma Carpano (“Ms. Carpano”), Emilia Aguiluz, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem, Vilma Carpano, and Fernanda Aguiluz, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem, Vilma Carpano (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) were tenants of the Subject Property subject to a lease agreement. Since April 2016, Rafael Navarro (“Mr. Navarro”) and Florina Navarro (“Ms. Navarro”) (collectively, “Defendants”) have owned and managed the Subject Property.

Mr. Navarro filed an unlawful detainer action against Ms. Carpano in Case Number 22WCUD0224. Mr. Navarro alleged that Ms. Carpano breached covenants in the lease agreement by maintaining unauthorized pets on the premises, allowing two unauthorized persons to occupy the unit, making unauthorized alterations to the unit, and failing to maintain the front and back of the unit free of clutter and creating a fire hazard. Mr. Navarro sought restitution possession of the unit. As relevant here, Ms. Carpano asserted an affirmative defense based on a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.

On January 4, 2023, the unlawful detainer action proceeded to trial before Commissioner Lynette Gridiron Winston. After hearing testimony and receiving evidence, Commissioner Winston rendered judgment in Mr. Navarro’s favor. Restitution and possession of the Subject Property was granted and the lease agreement between Mr. Navarro and Ms. Carpano was cancelled.

On December 11, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants alleging causes of action for (1) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, (2) Breach of Statutory Warranty of Habitability, (3) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (4) Negligence, (5) Violation of California Civil Code Section § 1942.4, (6) Private Nuisance, and (7) Violation of Unfair Business Practices.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to correct substandard conditions on the Subject Property, including but not limited to: garbage disposal deficiencies; electrical deficiencies; plumbing deficiencies; lack of hot water; water leaks; water damaged ceilings, floors and walls containing mold and mildew; rodent infestations; insect infestations; pest infestations; security and safety deficiencies; storage deficiencies; refuse disposal deficiencies; and loss of use of the premises for various periods of times throughout their ownership.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿ (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)¿ When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true.¿ (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)¿ “Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial notice.”¿ (Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 556.)

· For more than four (4) years before the filing of this action, Ms. Navarro has had no ownership interest in the Property – and Ms. Navarro is misjoined as a party to this action. In support, Defendants rely on a Quitclaim Deed, executed on January 8, 2020, by which Ms. Navarro conveyed all of her interest in the real property commonly known as 598 E. 11th Street, Unit B, Pomona, CA 91766 (“Property”) to Mr. Navarro, which was duly recorded in the Official Records, County of Los Angeles, as Document Number: 20200118096. (Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) 1.)

· Ms. Navarro is not a party to the lease agreement and is misjoined as a party. Further, minor Plaintiffs are not parties to the lease agreement. In support, Defendants rely on the Residential Lease or Month-to-Month Rental Agreement, dated February 7, 2020 (“Lease”), by and between Mr. Navarro, as “Landlord,” and Vilma Carpano and Jose Armando Arebalo, as “Tenant”. (RJN 2.)

· Ms. Navarro is not a party to a separate unlawful detainer action and Ms. Navarro is misjoined as a party. Further, Mr. Navarro and Plaintiff Vilma Carpano (which would include all other Plaintiffs in this action), were parties to prior lawsuit involving the property. In support, Defendants rely on the Unlawful Detainer Complaint, filed on October 17, 2022, by Mr. Navarro in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case Number: 22WCUD0254. (RJN 3.)

· Ms. Navarro is not a party to the Unlawful Detainer action and is misjoined as a party to this action. Further, Mr. Navarro and Plaintiff Vilma Carpano (which would include all other Plaintiffs in this action), were parties to prior lawsuit involving the Subject Property and the Answer was filed raising the same habitability defense which are the subject of this Complaint. In support, Defendants rely on the Answer to Unlawful Detainer Complaint, filed on November 8, 2022, by Vilma Carpano in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case Number: 22WCUD0254. (RJN 4.)

· Ms. Navarro is not a party to the Unlawful Detainer action and is misjoined as a party to this action. Further, Mr. Navarro and Plaintiff Vilma Carpano (which would include all other Plaintiffs in this action), were parties to prior lawsuit involving the Subject Property and the Answer was filed raising the same habitability defense which are the subject of this Complaint and are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. In support, Defendants rely on the Unlawful Detainer Judgment, filed on January 4, 2023, in matter of Navarro v. Carpano, Case Number: 22WCUD0254. (RJN 5.)

Although Defendants rely on documents of which the court may take judicial notice, Defendants improperly seek judicial notice of factual propositions which are in dispute. Accordingly, to the extent Defendants seek judicial notice of the foregoing documents, the request is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 352, subd. (d)(1).) Defendants request for judicial of the foregoing factual propositions is DENIED.

Defendants advance three arguments in support of their demurrer: (1) res judicata bars Plaintiffs’ claims; (2) minor plaintiffs lack the capacity to sue; and (3) Ms. Navarro is misjoined as a party. The court addresses each argument in turn.

Defendant argues this action is barred by the judgment rendered in the prior unlawful detainer action because Ms. Cardona asserted an affirmative defense based on breach of the implied warranty of habitability.

“Res judicata describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.¿ A predictable doctrine of res judicata benefits both the parties and the courts because it seeks to curtail multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration.” (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp.¿(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 675, 683 (cleaned up).)

“A prior judgment is not¿res¿judicata¿on a subsequent action unless three¿elements¿are satisfied:¿‘(1) the issues decided in the prior adjudication are identical with those presented in the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior action; and (3) the party against whom the plea is raised was a party or¿in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. [Citation.]”¿ (Id. at pp. 685-86.)¿ ¿In an unlawful detainer action, “‘full and fair litigation’ of an affirmative defense even one not ordinarily cognizable in unlawful detainer, if it is raised without objection, and if a fair opportunity to litigate is provided will result in a judgment conclusive upon issues material to that defense.” (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 256-257.)

Here, the judgment entered in the unlawful detainer action does not preclude Plaintiffs’ claims. First and foremost, that judgment does not indicate at all whether there was any litigation of Ms. Cardona’s breach of implied warranty defense. (See Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) 5.) Second, the court notes that the breach of implied warranty of habitability, although asserted as an affirmative defense, would not have been litigated because it was irrelevant to Mr. Navarro’s basis for the unlawful detainer action. The breach of the implied warranty of habitability may be asserted as an affirmative defense for nonpayment of rent. (See Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 620 [“As we shall explain, a landlord's breach of a warranty of habitability directly relates to whether any rent is ‘due and owing’ by the tenant; hence, such breach may be determinative of whether the landlord or tenant is entitled to possession of the premises upon nonpayment of rent. Accordingly, the tenant may properly raise the issue of warranty of habitability in an unlawful detainer action.”].) Mr. Navarro did not bring a claim for nonpayment of rent. Rather, Mr. Navarro sought restitution and possession of the Subject Property because of Ms. Cardona’s then-alleged breaches of the lease agreement prohibiting pets, occupation of the unit by unauthorized persons, making unauthorized alterations to the unit, and failing to maintain the front and back of the unit free of clutter. (See RJN 3.) The doctrine of res judicata does not apply.[1]

Defendants next argue that minor plaintiffs Emilia Aguiluz and Fernanda Aguiluz lack standing to sue because (1) as minors, they cannot incur an obligation to pay rent, and (2) they are not parties to the lease agreement.

These arguments lack merit. Defendants’ arguments are based upon Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 502 (Danger Panda), which is inapposite. In Danger Panda, residential landlords brought an unlawful detainer action against apartment residents after the residents refused to vacate a unit in a building the landlord withdrew from residential use pursuant to the Ellis Act. The residents filed a motion to quash based on the landlord’s failure to tender a relocation payment to David, a minor tenant of the unit. The superior court granted the motion to quash. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that David was not a tenant within the meaning of the San Francisco Rent Stabilization Act because, as a minor, he lacked capacity to enter into a rental contract or to incur independent obligation to pay rent. David was not entitled to relocation benefits.

Unlike Danger Panda, minor plaintiffs are not asserting the failure to provide relocation benefits as a defense to an unlawful detainer action. Rather, they are affirmatively seeking tort damages. In fact, Danger Panda contains language that cuts directly against Defendants’ position. The Court stated:

However, David is a minor without capacity to enter into a rental contract or to incur an independent obligation to pay rent. (Fam. Code § 6701 [“A minor cannot do any of the following: ... (b) Make a contract relating to real property or any interest therein.”].) Thus, he could not have acquired a legally cognizable right to occupy Unit 308A to the exclusion of others pursuant to any of the methods set forth in section 37.2(t). This does not mean that David is not a lawful occupant, but only that his right to occupy is derivative of the rights of his parents. (See, e.g., Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1551, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 602 [minor child of tenant has the “right to enjoyment of the premises as a member of the tenant[’s] family”].)”

(Danger Panda, at p. 514, emphasis added.) Indeed, there is no authority for the proposition that a minor plaintiff cannot bring the causes of action asserted here because they lack the capacity to enter into a lease agreement, or further, because they are not parties to the lease agreement. Minor plaintiffs’ rights are derivative of their parent, Plaintiff Vilma Carpano.

Defendants next argue without citation to authority that Ms. Navarro is misjoined as a party to this action. In support, Defendants rely on requests for judicial notice which purportedly establish that Ms. Carpano signed a lease agreement for the Subject Property in March 2020 and Ms. Navarro was not a signatory to that contract; that Ms. Navarro quit claim her interest in the property in January 2020; and that Ms. Navarro was not a party to the unlawful detainer action. (See RJN 1, 2, 3.)

Defendants’ argument fails. The court has denied Defendants’ request for judicial notice regarding several of these very factual propositions. The truth of several of the matters are extrinsic to the Complaint and are at odds with the allegations. The Complaint does not indicate when Plaintiffs became tenants at the Subject Property. Nevertheless, the allegations of the Complaint may be liberally constructed to establish Plaintiffs’ tenancy began prior to January 2020. (See Complaint, ¶ 31(a) [“Citation Warning Noticed issued by the City of Pomona Community Development Department dated December 04, 2019 bearing Case number CE-013520-2019(A) and served on the defendant owner;” (emphasis added).].) Plaintiffs also allege that Mr. Navarro and Ms. Navarro owned and managed the Subject Property since April 20, 2016. (Complaint, ¶ 1.) Thus, Ms. Navarro’s ownership of the Subject Property overlaps with Plaintiffs’ tenancy.

Defendants are ordered to serve and file their Answer to the Complaint within 10 days of the date of this order.

[1] The parties argue over the application of the case Landeros v. Pankey (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167. Landeros is inapposite. There, two tenants leased a house for a period of three years, beginning in 1989. (Id. at p. 1170.) The landlords initiated an unlawful detainer action alleging a failure to pay rent for two months in 1992. (Ibid.) The action was resolved by a stipulated judgment based on a written agreement that was narrowly confined to the action and which lacked “any comprehensive language typically employed to indicate a settlement of any and all issues in dispute.” (Id. at p. 1171.) Later, the tenants sued their landlord for breach of the warranty of habitability, alleging the house was unsafe and defect-ridden during the entire period they occupied it. (Id. at p. 1169.) The trial court sustained a demurrer to their complaint without leave to amend on the ground that collateral estoppel arising from the judgment in the unlawful detainer action barred the action. (Landeros, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1170.) The appellate court reversed, concluding that the collateral estoppel effect of the judgment could not be determined in the context of a demurrer, as “[a] prior stipulated or consent judgment is subject to construction as to the parties' intent.” (Id., at p. 1172.) Unlike Landeros, the prior unlawful detainer action was resolved by judgment after a non-jury trial on the merits. There is no stipulated judgment subject to construction of the parties’ intent.