Judge: Kerry Bensinger, Case: 24STCV15115, Date: 2025-02-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV15115 Hearing Date: February 11, 2025 Dept: 31
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kerry Bensinger, Department 31
HEARING DATE: February
11, 2025 TRIAL DATE: Not set
CASE: Lilly Property Management v. United Agencies, Inc., et al.
CASE NO.: 24STCV15115
DEFENDANT
UNITED AGENCIES, INC.’S DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT
DEFENDANT
GREAT AMERICAN E&S INSURANCE COMPANY’S DEMURRER WITHOUT MOTION TO STRIKE TO
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff 522
Wilshire Blvd., LLC[1]
(Plaintiff) brings this bad faith insurance action against its longtime
insurance broker, defendants United Agencies, Inc. (UA) and UA’s errors and omissions
insurance carrier, Great American E & S Insurance Company (Great American).[2]
According
to the operative pleading, Plaintiff manages commercial real property located
at 518, 520, and 522 Wilshire Blvd., Santa Monica, CA 90401 (the Property). In
2021, UA procured insurance for the Property on Plaintiff’s behalf. In 2024, a fire caused significant damage to
the Property. At Plaintiff’s request, UA
President Daniel Wakely (Wakely) filed an insurance claim. The insurance carrier, Nationwide, denied the
claim on the basis that the Property did not have an automatic fire sprinkler
system which contradicted representations made in Plaintiff’s application for
property insurance. Plaintiff discussed
the claim denial with Wakely. Wakely
admitted UA made a mistake in the application and promptly submitted the claim
to Great American. At that point, all
accountability stopped. UA retained counsel and have done nothing but
stonewall, deny liability, refuse to cooperate, refuse to provide information,
refuse to process reimbursement requests for repairs Plaintiff completed,
refuse to provide their insurance information or even identify the name of
their Errors & Omissions Insurance Carrier, and refuse to accept any
liability or responsibility for the loss or repairs. Further, despite its knowledge of its
insured’s obvious and admitted fault and liability as well as Plaintiff’s
substantial damages and the fact that its damages are accruing daily, which
have been tendered and submitted to Defendants’ counsel with repeated requests
for payment, Great American refuses to or has unreasonably delayed providing
payment of policy benefits and/or refuses to indemnify UA for its admitted
negligence, for which Plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary.
On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff commenced
this action against defendants UA and Great American (collectively,
Defendants). On August 13, 2024,
Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants for
(1) professional negligence, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) tortious breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (5) violation of California’s
Unfair Competition Law.
Before the
court are three filings: (1) UA’s Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action; (2)
UA’s Motion to Strike punitive damages from the FAC; and (3) Great American’s
Demurrer to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action. The court addresses them in turn.
II. DISCUSSION
RE UA’S DEMURRER
A.
Relevant
Procedural History
On October 16,
2024, UA filed this Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action and concurrently
filed a Motion to Strike punitive damages from the FAC.
On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed oppositions to the
Demurrer and Motion to Strike.
On December 5, 2024, UA filed a consolidated reply.
B.
Legal
Standard for Demurrer
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint
states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte
v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)
“Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can
only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial
notice.” (Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 556.)
C.
Analysis
UA demurs
to the Fourth Cause of Action for Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff’s allegations
generally concern refusal of Great American, as opposed to UA, to provide
coverage, and (2) under Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1998) 47 Cal.3d
654 (Foley), for a variety of policy reasons, recovery for
tortious breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is generally
limited to insurer versus insured.
The first issue
is dispositive.[3] Specifically, Plaintiff, as a third party
beneficiary, may be entitled to sue Great American for Great American’s
tortious breach, but not UA. This is so
because UA is not the insurer. “While an
action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounds in
tort, the duty of good faith and fair dealing arises from and exists solely
because of the contractual relationship between the parties. [Citation.] Thus,
someone who is not a party to the contract has no standing to enforce it or to
recover extra-contractual damages for the wrongful withholding of benefits to
the contracting party. [Citation.] However, in the context of insurance
policies, “[a] non-party who is nevertheless entitled to policy benefits, such
as an ‘insured’ person under the terms of the policy or an express beneficiary,
has standing only if [he or] she is the claimant whose benefits are
wrongfully withheld.” (Jones v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1722.) “Certainly a non-contracting party is entitled
to sue an insurer for breach of the implied covenant if that
non-contracting party is a third party beneficiary of the insurance contract. (Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas.
Co. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1599, emphasis in original.)
Here, UA is a party
to the UA-Great American insurance contract.
Great American is the insurer. UA
is the insured. And, as alleged, UA
submitted the claim to Great American. (FAC,
¶ 18.) Therefore, the ball is in Great
American’s court to process UA’s claim. Framed
in this way, UA’s alleged bad faith conduct has no bearing on whether policy
benefits from the UA-Great American insurance contract are being withheld from
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues it has sufficiently pled that UA and Great
American acted jointly to delay and deprive Plaintiff of the third-party
benefits of UA and Great American’s contract. In support, Plaintiff cites Navarrete v.
Meyer (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286, for the proposition that concert
of action theory imposes liability where the defendant did not personally cause
the harm, but encouraged or assisted the other tortfeasor, knowing the conduct
to be tortious, and which is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort. Navarrete does not apply here. That case discussed the concert of action
theory in an entirely different context.
There, the passenger of a vehicle willfully interfered with the driver
of a vehicle by encouraging the driver to exceed the speed limit on a
residential street. By contrast, this
case concerns contractual duties and the implied covenants arising from an
insurance contract. Further, the
paragraphs Plaintiff cites which purportedly establish joint
liability—paragraphs 7, 8, and 82-94—do not establish joint liability. (Navarrete, at pp. 1288-89.) Absent from those paragraphs are any
allegations showing UA encouraged or assisted Great American to withhold coverage.
Accordingly, the demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is
SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is DENIED.
III. DISCUSSION
RE UA’S MOTION TO STRIKE
UA moves to strike
the request for punitive damages from the FAC. The request for punitive
damages is made in connection to the Fourth Cause of Action. Because the court has sustained the Demurrer
to the Fourth Cause of action, the Motion to Strike is MOOT.
IV. DISCUSSION RE
GREAT AMERICAN’S DEMURRER
A.
Relevant
Procedural History
On November 21, 2024, Great American filed this Demurrer to
Plaintiff’s third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in the FAC.
On January 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition.
On February 4, 2025, Great American replied.
On February 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed an objection to Great
American’s reply.
B.
Objections
Plaintiff objects to Great American’s reliance on and
inclusion of language from the purported UA-Great American policy. The objection is well-founded. The policy was not attached to Plaintiff’s FAC
and is extrinsic. The objection is
SUSTAINED.
Plaintiff also objects to Great American’s reliance on new
arguments raised for the first time in reply.
Plaintiff does not identify the new arguments. The objection is OVERRULED.
C.
Legal
Standard for Demurrer
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint
states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. (Nolte
v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)
“Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can
only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial
notice.” (Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 556.)
D.
Analysis
Great American advances two general arguments: (1) Plaintiff
lacks standing to bring the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action because
it is not a third-party beneficiary of the UA policy, and (2) the third,
fourth, and fifth causes of action are insufficiently pleaded.
1. Plaintiff Has Standing.
Great American argues that Plaintiff lacks standing because
Plaintiff is a third-party claimant. ‘
“[G]enerally, an insurer may not be joined as a party-defendant in the
underlying action against the insured by the injured third party. The fact that
an insurer has agreed to indemnify the insured for any judgment rendered in the
action does not make the insurer a proper party. Liability insurance is not a
contract for the benefit of the injured party so as to allow it to sue the
insurer directly.” ’ ” (Royal Indemnity Co. v. United Enterprises, Inc.
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 194, 205; see Shaolian v. Safeco Ins. Co. (1999)
71 Cal.App.4th 268, 271 [“Because the insurer's duties flow to its insured
alone, a third-party claimant may not bring a direct action against an insurance
company”].) “Thus, ... a third party who
is not in privity of contract with the liability insurer (nor named as an
express beneficiary of the policy) ... normally lack[s] standing to sue the
insurer to resolve coverage questions about a tortfeasor, such as where there
has been a failure to settle a claim under the policy.” (Royal Indemnity Co.,
supra, at p. 205.)
Here, Plaintiff alleges it is a third-party beneficiary
of the UA-Great American policy. Royal
Indemnity Co. discussed whether a third-party claimant has standing
to sue an insurer. Great American argues
the allegations of the FAC show Plaintiff is a third-party claimant in an
effort to bring Plaintiff’s claims within the preclusive net of Royal
Indemnity Co. However, to do so, the
court would have to ignore the allegations that Plaintiff is a third-party
beneficiary. The court declines to do
so.
Great American next argues there are no facts to support the
legal conclusion that Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary. The allegations on this point are admittedly
light. However, Great American overlooks the allegation that “[t]he errors and
omissions policy is intended to benefit a class of insured members such as [Plaintiff].” (FAC, ¶ 66.)
The court finds this allegation is sufficient at this stage to establish
Plaintiff’s third-party beneficiary status.
“Civil Code section 1559 provides: ‘A contract, made
expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him [or her] at
any time before the parties thereto rescind it.’ Because third party
beneficiary status is a matter of contract interpretation, a person seeking to
enforce a contract as a third party beneficiary ‘ “must plead a contract which
was made expressly for his [or her] benefit and one in which it clearly appears
that he [or she] was a beneficiary.” (The
H.N. & Frances C. Berger Found. v. Perez (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 37, 43.) It is not “necessary that the beneficiary be
named and identified . . . a third party may enforce a contract if he can show
he is a member of a class for whose benefit it was made.” (LaBarbera v. Sec. Nat’l Ins. Co.
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1329.)
In reply, Great American insists the court can and should determine
at the pleadings stage whether Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary. However, the policy at issue is not attached
to the FAC. Although Plaintiff could
have included it (assuming Plaintiff obtained the policy), there is no
requirement a written contract, which serves as the basis of a plaintiff’s
claims, be attached to the pleading. At
this point, all that is before the court are Plaintiff’s allegations. Absent
authority that a third-party beneficiary may not directly sue an insurer, Great
American fails to demonstrate the demurrer should be sustained for lack of
standing.
2.
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing (3rd Cause of Action)
Great
American argues the Third Cause of Action fails to allege facts sufficient to
state a cause of action. The court
agrees. In the cause of action,
Plaintiff does not mention Great American or the Doe defendants once. (See FAC, ¶¶ 73-81.) Plaintiff does not address this argument and
therefore concedes the point.
Accordingly,
Great American’s demurrer to Third Cause of Action is SUSTAINED. Leave to Amend is GRANTED.
3.
Tortious Breach of Implied Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (4th Cause of Action)
Great American next argues the Fourth Cause of Action fails
because it lists boilerplate conduct in which UA and Great American allegedly
engaged, including withholding coverage under the policy. (See FAC, ¶ 87.) Great American also complains that
Plaintiff’s allegations are inconsistent because Plaintiff admits not knowing
Great American’s coverage position which contradicts the allegations that Great
American wrongfully and unreasonably denied coverage.
The court disagrees. To
plead a cause of action, “what is important is that the complaint as a whole
contain sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the basis upon which the
plaintiff is seeking relief.” (Thompson v. Spitzer (2023) 90 Cal. App.
5th 436, 452.) The court has reviewed
the FAC and is satisfied Plaintiff apprised Great American of the basis upon
which relief is sought. Further, it is
well-settled that a claim may be based upon inconsistent theories. (See Batta v. Hunt (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 295, 304.)
Accordingly, Great American’s Demurrer to the Fourth Cause
of Action is OVERRULED.
4. Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (5th
Cause of Action)
Great American argues the Fifth Cause of Action fails
because there are no factual allegations to show that Great American has
engaged in unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair business practices. The court is not persuaded. Plaintiff alleges unfair and wrongful business
practices of UA and Great American. (See
FAC, ¶ 96.)
Accordingly, Great American’s Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of
Action is OVERRULED.
V. CONCLUSION
1. UA’s demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is Sustained. Leave to amend is Denied. UA’s motion to strike is Moot. UA is ordered to file and serve its Answer to
the First Amended Complaint within 20 days of the date of service of the First
Amended Complaint (FAC.).
2. Great American’s demurrer to the Third Cause of Action is Sustained.
Leave to Amend is Granted. Great
American’s demurrer to the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action is Overruled. Plaintiff has 20 days to file a First Amended
Complaint. Great American is ordered to
file its responsive pleading within 20 days of service of the FAC.
Plaintiff to
give notice.
Dated: February 11,
2025
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Kerry Bensinger Judge of the Superior Court |
[1] On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff
filed an amendment to the FAC correcting its name from “Plaintiff Property
Management d/b/a 522 Wilshire Blvd LLC” to “522 Wilshire Blvd., LLC.”
[2] Great American was named as Doe 1.
[3] As to UA’s second point, UA
pushes hard to apply Foley and the policy reasons discussed therein to
this case. However, the court is doubtful Foley
helps or hurts either party. Foley
was principally concerned with whether tortious breach claims should be
extended to the employment context. This case does not arise from an
employer-employee dispute.