Judge Kerry Bensinger, Case Number: 24STCV32088, Date: 2025-04-15 Tentative Ruling

CASE: Ana Laura Renteria, et al. v. Michael Lee Ross, Successor Trustee of the Martha Rebecca Logan Revocable Living Trust, et al.

DEFENDANT JUAN TAJOYA’S MOTION TO STRIKE ALL REFERENCES TO PUNITIVE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Ana Laura Renteria Salazar, Israel Martinez Renteria, Maribel Salazar Mendoza, Alex Renteria, Brian Martinez, and Pablo Jr. Renteria (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action arising out of their tenancy in and eviction from their residence at 1612 W. 71st St., Los Angeles, California 90047 (the “Property”). On June 16, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against defendant Juan Tajoya (“Defendant”) [1] alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability; (2) Tortious Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability; (3) Negligence; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (5) Private Nuisance; (6) Violation of Civil Code, Section 1942.4; (7) Violation of Business and Professions Code, Section 17200; (8) Violation of Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance (LAMC 45.30 et. seq.); (9) Constructive Eviction; and (10) Retaliatory Eviction. As relevant here, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages in connection to their Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Causes of Action and request an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the lease agreement and applicable law.

On March 13, 2025, Defendant filed this Motion to Strike the claims for punitive and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees from the FAC.

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

Defendant moves for an order striking the claim for punitive and exemplary damages and the request for attorney’s fees. The court addresses each in turn.

Plaintiffs seek punitive and exemplary damages[2] in connection to the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Causes of Action.

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), “[a]n employer shall not be eligible for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”

Defendant argues the claim for punitive and exemplary damages should be stricken because (1) the allegations arise from contract, and (2) Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages. The arguments lack merit.

First, as Plaintiffs point out, punitive damages may be recoverable for breaches of the implied warranty of habitability, nuisance, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (see, e.g., Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 916-17, 920), negligence (see e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 374, 381; Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896). The court need not look further than Stoiber, the oft-cited case confirming the general availability of punitive damages in habitability and nuisance actions.

Second, the FAC is replete with factual allegations sufficient to support Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim. For instance, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew of the substandard conditions on the Property which rendered it unfit for human occupation yet failed or delayed to make repairs. (FAC, ¶¶ 26, 27, 30.) The conditions included ongoing rat and cockroach infestations (FAC, ¶¶ 11a., 11b., 81), water leaks and chronic mold (FAC, ¶ 11c.), and physical defects throughout the Property (FAC, ¶ 11d.). Defendant’s challenge to the punitive and exemplary damages claim fails.

Plaintiffs seek attorney’s fees in connection to every cause of action except the Seventh Cause of Action pursuant to Plaintiffs’ lease agreement and/or applicable law. (Prayer to the Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 16, 21, 25, 28.)

“Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter provided.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.)¿ Attorney’s fees are allowable costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 when authorized by contract, statute, or law.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)¿¿¿¿

Defendants argue the request for attorney’s fees should be stricken because their recovery is not authorized by statute and Plaintiffs fail to plead the applicable terms of the lease agreement or attach a copy of the lease agreement. The argument is not well taken.

First, Plaintiffs’ Sixth Cause of Action is Violation of Civil Code section 1942.4. Subdivision (b)(2) of Section 1942.4 expressly authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees and costs by the prevailing party.

Second, a plaintiff is not required to plead the exact terms of a contract or attach a copy of the agreement. A plaintiff may “plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 402.) Here, Plaintiffs plead the legal effect of the lease agreement. (See FAC, ¶¶ 22, 33, 40, 45, 53, 57, 65, 71, 78, 86.)

Defendant Juan Tajoya is ordered to file and serve his Answer to the FAC within 10 days of this order.

Kerry Bensinger

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] Plaintiffs also named Michael Lee Ross, Successor Trustee of the Martha Rebecca Logan Revocable Living Trust (“Ross”) as a defendant. Ross’s dismissal from this action was entered on April 4, 2025.

[2] The parties address punitive and exemplary damages together. The court follows suit.