On March 30, 2016, plaintiffs Peter J. Garcia (“Peter”) and John Garcia (“John”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action for assault, battery, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent training and supervision against defendants Malli Patibandla-Rao (“Patibandla-Rao”), E.M. Pizza, Inc. (“E.M. Pizza”), Francisco Montes (“Montes”), Danny Egoavil (“Egoavil”), Raymond Hill (“Hill”), Jose Cruz (“Cruz”), Andrea Jimenez (“Jimenez”), and Stephanie Leon (“Leon”). Plaintiffs allege that they were attacked by Montes, Egoavil, and Hill, on April 3, 2014 when Peter tried to purchase a pizza at a restaurant owned by E.M. Pizza. (Comp., 11, 15-16.) Plaintiffs allege Montes, Egoavil and Hill conspired to support Montes’s assaultive behavior and that Jimenez, Leon, and Cruz conspired with Montes, Egoavil, and Hill by failing to take any action to stop the assault and battery and were dishonest with the police about the incident. (Compl., 26-28.) Plaintiffs further allege that E.M. Pizza negligently trained and supervised its employees. (Compl., 39-44.)  

On May 9, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint.  

On December 28, 2018, the Honorable Laura A. Seigle granted Plaintiffs’ counsel, E. Samuel III Johnson’s motion to be relieved and signed the proposed order on January 4, 2019. On January 9, 2019, Mr. Johnson submitted a proof of service showing that the signed order was served on Plaintiffs on January 7, 2019.  

On May 2, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a substitution of attorney indicating they were represented by Negin Yamini.  

On October 4, 2022, Peter and John filed an opposition brief. 

On October 20, 2022, the Court heard argument on this motion.  In the minute order, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs to address argument and issues raised at the hearing and continued the matter. 

On December 8, 2022, Moving Parties filed supplemental briefing. 

No opposition or responsive briefs have been filed. 

Code of Civil Procedure section 386, the interpleader statute, provides two separate bases for bringing an interpleader action. Subdivision (a) of the statute pertains to a complaint in interpleader brought by a defendant “against whom an action is pending upon a contract, or for specific personal property . . . .” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 386, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) pertains to a complaint in interpleader brought by “[a]ny person, firm, corporation, association or other entity against whom double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more persons which are such that they may give rise to double or multiple liability . . . .” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 386, subd. (b).)  

A complaint in interpleader allows an obligor to require parties with conflicting claims to litigate those claims against each other, instead of against the obligor. (Code Civ. Proc., § 386, subd. (b).) The purpose of interpleader is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and double vexation. (City of Morgan Hill v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122.) However, an interpleader action may not be maintained upon the mere suspicion of double vexation. (Westamerica Bank v. City of Berkeley (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 598, 607-608.) The plaintiff must allege facts showing a reasonable probability of double vexation, or a valid threat of double vexation. (Ibid.) “Where the only relief sought against one of the defendants is the payment of a stated amount of money alleged to be wrongfully withheld, such defendant may, upon affidavit that he is a mere stakeholder with no interest in the amount or any portion thereof and that conflicting demands have been made upon him for the amount by parties to the action, upon notice to such parties, apply to the court for an order discharging him from liability and dismissing him from the action on his depositing with the clerk of the court the amount in dispute and the court may, in its discretion, make such order.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 386.5.)   

In this Court’s October 20, 2022 minute order, the Court expressed doubt that the Settlement Agreements were enforceable. The Court further stated the Moving Parties had failed to carry their burden because none of the exhibits attached to the motion were authenticated, nor was there any evidence upon affidavit that Moving Parties were facing a reasonable probability of double vexation or that conflicting demands have been made upon them. Specifically, the Court noted that upon inquiry during the October 20, 2022 hearing Johnson stated he had no claim pending or threatened against the Moving Parties.  Thus, the Moving Parties’ representation “on information and belief” that Plaintiffs and their counsel have made conflicting demands upon them with respect to the allocation of the settlement proceeds was unsupported. 

Upon review of the Moving Parties’ supplemental briefing, the Court finds that Moving Parties have cured some of the defects described above. Moving Parties submit the Johnson Lien Letter, court transcript wherein the counsel for Plaintiffs and counsel for Moving Parties discussed the stipulated Settlement Agreements and its terms at length, the general liability insurance policy issued to Defendants in this matter, the Settlement Agreements, and the lien letter from the California Department of Health Services by way of declaration. (See Wilson Decl., ¶¶ 2-7; Exs. A-F.)  Moving Parties also establish that Moving Parties and Plaintiffs created a valid enforceable contract.  In the court transcript, counsel for the parties discussed the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreements with the court.  “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civil Proc., § 664.6.)  A stipulated settlement presented orally by the party litigants or their counsel to a judge satisfies the “before the court” requirement of section 664.6. (Casa de Valley View Owner’s Assn. v. Stevenson (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1189, 1190.)  The terms and conditions provide, in relevant part, that (1) it is Plaintiffs’ responsibility to make sure any liens asserted by a healthcare provider is paid (Wilson Decl., Ex. B, 2:28-3:4) and (2) it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide a release to Plaintiffs’ former counsel, Mr. Johnson, in order to verify that there is no money owed to him (Wilson Decl., 3:16-4:10).  Thus, Moving Parties establish that an enforceable settlement agreement exists.   

However, Moving Parties do not provide any evidence beyond their representations “on information and belief” that Plaintiffs’ former counsel, Mr. Johnson and Ms. Yamini, have made conflicting demands upon them with respect to the allocation of the settlement proceeds. Moving Parties fail to carry their burden. 

The motion is denied.   

Moving party to give notice. 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.