Judge: Kevin C. Brazile, Case: 20STCV49845, Date: 2022-10-31 Tentative Ruling

Hearing Date: October 31, 2022

Case Name: Urick, et al. v. Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP, et al.

Case No.: 20STCV17462

Matter: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

Moving Party: Defendants Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP, Jeffrey Riffer 

and Julie Kimball

Responding Party: Plaintiffs Dana Urick and Trentyn Urick-Stasa 

Notice: OK

Ruling: The Motion is granted as to the second and fourth causes of action, 

but is denied as to the third cause of action.  Twenty days leave to 

amend is granted as to the second cause of action.  Leave to amend is 

denied as to the fourth cause of action.

Moving parties to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly 

encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

On October 16, 2020, Plaintiffs Dana Urick and Trentyn Urick-Stasa filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP, Jeffrey Riffer, and Julie Kimball for (1) professional negligence, (2) professional negligence, (3) breach of contract, and (4) interference with prospective economic advantage.

Defendants Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP, Jeffrey Riffer and Julie Kimball seek judgment on the pleadings as to the second, third, and fourth causes of action for failure to state sufficient facts. 

“A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action against that defendant. A motion for judgment on the pleadings ‘is equivalent to a demurrer . . . .’ Leave to amend ‘is properly denied if the facts and nature of plaintiffs’ claims are clear and under the substantive law, no liability exists.’ ”  (Templo v. State¿(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730, 735.)  

Defendants first argue that the third cause of action for breach of contract fails because Plaintiffs are not third-party beneficiaries of the legal services contract at issue.  

“A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.”  (Civ. Code § 1559.)

“The test for determining whether a contract was made for the benefit of a third person is whether an intent to benefit a third person appears from the terms of the contract. [Citation.] If the terms of the contract necessarily require the promisor to confer a benefit on a third person, then the contract, and hence the parties thereto, contemplate a benefit to the third person. The parties are presumed to intend the consequences of a performance of the contract.” (Johnson v. Holmes Tuttle Lincoln–Merc. (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 290, 297.)  In other words, “the doctrine presupposes that the defendant made a promise which, if performed, would have benefited the third party.”  (Souza v. Westlands Water Dist. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 879, 891.)

The FAC makes clear that the contract at hand was between Urick, as a trustee, and the Defendants, as counsel.  Therefore, the FAC proceeds on a third-party beneficiary theory.  Generally speaking, the “right of a third party beneficiary to sue on a contract made expressly for his or her benefit has no application where a trust has been created in favor of that party, and the contract in question is between the trustee and an agent of the trustee.”  (Saks v. Damon Raike & Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 419, 431.)  However, accepting as true the allegation that Defendants promised to act in the best interests of the Plaintiffs (FAC ¶ 51), Plaintiffs state a claim as third-party beneficiaries.  (See, e.g, Morales v. Field, Degoff, Huppert & Macgowan (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 307.)  Therefore, the Motion is denied as to the third cause of action.

As to the fourth cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to plead interference with respect to a third-party.  Plaintiffs argue that they pled a relationship with their trust.  In Reply, Defendants argue that a trust is a type of relationship, not a third-party. 

The tort of interference with prospective economic advantage relates to commercial relations—not those involving a trust.  (See Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 75, 233 Cal.Rptr. 294, 729 P.2d 728 [the interests protected by the tort are business expectancies, and the tort is not to be extended to cover nonbusiness relations]; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 330, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58 [same]; see also Axe v. Wilson (1939) 96 Pac.2d 880, 806 [the proper remedy is not an action for tort damages but instead a contest of the instrument in question].)  Therefore, the Motion is granted as to the fourth cause of action, without leave to amend.

Finally, Defendants argue that the second, third, and fourth causes of action against Trentyn Urick-Stasa are defective because (1) Trentyn has suffered no damages and (2) Trentyn is over 18 years old such that he should not have a guardian ad litem as stated in the FAC.  

The latter argument lacks merit because the guardian ad litem relationship terminates by operation of the law upon Trentyn reaching the age of majority.  (See, e.g., California Rule of Court Rule 7.1004.)  Therefore, the Court believes the FAC already asserts direct claims by Trentyn as a plaintiff.  

As to the issue of damages, Defendants argue that the “Probate Court has held that, in addition to his own inheritance, Trentyn is entitled to receive Dana Urick’s annuity distributions under the Trust due to Ms. Urick’s no-contest violation. See RJN, Ex. A at 2 ¶ 2(a).”  Plaintiffs argue that Defendants refer the Court to an interim order that might be changed given that it is “subject to further evidentiary hearing and briefing regarding the interpretation of the Trust’s no-contest provision . . . .”  (Defendants’ RJN, Exhibit A.)  

Given the probate court’s interim ruling, as it stands, Trentyn has not suffered any damages.  If that ruling is changed, Trentyn would then have a claim for damages.

Trentyn also argues that he “has incurred attorneys’ fees defending his interests as a beneficiary of the Trust, which are legally cognizable as damages.”  The Reply is silent on this issue.

Attorneys’ fees as damages are not seemingly pled in the FAC.  Thus, the Motion is granted as to the second cause of action, with twenty days leave to amend.   

In sum, the Motion is granted as to the second and fourth causes of action, but is denied as to the third cause of action.  Twenty days leave to amend is granted as to the second cause of action.  Leave to amend is denied as to the fourth cause of action. The Requests for Judicial Notice are granted.  

Moving parties to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.