Judge: Kevin C. Brazile, Case: 22STCV22899, Date: 2022-11-14 Tentative Ruling

Hearing Date: November 14, 2022

Case Name: Malibu Coast Vintners and Grape Growers Alliance, Inc., et al. v. County 

of Los Angeles, et al.

Case No.: 21STCP01784

Matter: (1) Petition for Writ of Mandate

(2) Motion to Augment Record

Moving Party: Petitioners Malibu Coast Vintners and Grape Growers Alliance, Inc. and 

John Gooden

Responding Party: Respondents County of Los Angeles and Board of Supervisors for the 

County of Los Angeles

Notice: OK

Ruling: The Petition for Writ of Mandate is denied.

The Motion to Augment is granted in part.

Petitioners to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly 

encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

On June 2, 2021, Malibu Coast Vintners and Grape Growers Alliance, Inc. and John Gooden filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate against the County of Los Angeles and the Board of Supervisors for the County of Los Angeles.  Petitioners, a broad coalition of vintners and associated businesses, challenge a May 4, 2021, update to the Santa Monica Mountains North Area Plan (“NAP”) and associated ordinance that banned new or reconstructed vineyards. 

1. Writ of Mandate

Petitioners first argue that Respondents failed to comply with Gov. Code § 65855, et seq.  Specifically, they contend, “[t]he vineyard ban was never discussed at any of the public hearings, was not proposed or considered by the Planning Department or the Regional Planning Commission, and was not raised during the public hearings at the Board of Supervisors. Instead, the ban was inserted into the final ordinance after the close of public comment and without first referring back to the Regional Planning Commission as required by Government Code § 65857.”

Gov. Code § 65857 states in relevant part, “The legislative body may approve, modify or disapprove the recommendation of the planning commission; ¿provided that any modification of the proposed ordinance or amendment by the legislative body not previously considered by the planning commission during its hearing, shall first be referred to the planning commission for report and recommendation, but the planning commission shall not be required to hold a public hearing thereon.”

Petitioners further contend that “The version of the CSD presented to the Planning Commission on October 7, 2020, did not include the vineyard ban. (AR 2449-56.) According to planning staff, the only changes then proposed to the CSD with respect to vineyards involved minor alterations to eliminate the minimum size for a vineyard to become subject to the CSD, and to conform tree protections with those provided elsewhere in the code. (AR 5591-92) No Area wide vineyard ban was even hinted at. (AR 5591-92 (staff discussion of changes to CSD, including the vineyard standards), 5638-47 (Commission deliberation and vote).)”

Respectfully, the Court disagrees with Petitioners’ contentions.  From the outset, the draft NAP noted that certain limitations might be foreseeable:  “The [SMM] have a long history as a rural setting…most recently ‘hobby vineyards’…some agricultural uses are not appropriate for the mountain environment of the [SMM].”  Further, in seeking to amend the NAP, the Board initially sought to ensure consistency with the LCP, which had already banned vineyards in adjacent land. 

Notably, the scope of the Commission’s recommendations is not necessarily the same as what was “considered”.  Indeed, a draft EIR shows that the Commission had received numerous public comments/requests supporting a ban on new vineyards: “We support a ban on vineyards similar to LCP.” (AR1541); “We support regulating vineyards in the same fashion as in the [LCP] with the same standards and enforcement.” (AR1537); “Vineyard policies should be synced up with the LCP.” (AR1626); “I support the complete banning of new vineyards.” (AR1694); “We support a ban on vineyards similar to LCP.” (AR1696, 1704; AR1547, 1551, 1644; AR7:1026.) Additionally, in limiting certain vineyards, commissioners commented on “prohibiting the [event] facilities in the A1 Zone, and Triunfo/Lobo Canyons”.  (AR50:5643; AR8:1263; AR5:654, 680.)

Petitioners also argue the ban was arbitrary and capricious.

“An agency acting in a quasi-legislative capacity is not required by law to make findings indicating the reasons for its action (City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 381, 389, 390-391 [142 Cal.Rptr. 873]), and the court does not concern itself with the wisdom underlying the agency's action any more than it would were the challenge to a state or federal legislative enactment. (Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Air Resources Board (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 789, 794-796 [180 Cal.Rptr. 550]; Faulkner v. Cal. Toll Bridge Authority (1953) 40 Cal.2d 317, 329 [253 P.2d 659]; City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, at p. 389.) In sum, the court confines itself to a determination whether the agency's action has been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support ....”  (Shapell Indus., Inc. v. Governing Bd. (1991) 1 Cal. App. 4th 218, 230–31 (internal quotation marks omitted.)

The Court disagrees that the ban is arbitrary and capricious as the NAP sought to (1) “[p]rotect and conserve natural resources, natural areas, and available open space” (AR2:30-40), (2) “limit grading, soil compaction and removal of locally indigenous vegetation” (AR2:42), (3) “Minimize the land disturbance activities of construction (e.g., clearing and grading), especially in erosive areas (including steep slopes, unstable areas, and erosive soils), to avoid detrimental water quality impacts” (AR 2:43, 46), and (4) “Preserve Scenic Elements in their natural state, including canyon walls” (AR2:48, 54), “Agriculture, has greater visual impacts on the land than in many other parts of Los Angeles County” (AR2:47), (5) “Development brings the unregulated use of materials such as pesticides, fertilizers, and household cleaners, increasing the amount of toxic materials in the ground and in water systems,” and the County’s actions seek to “prohibit new facilities that handle large amounts of hazardous and toxic materials.” (AR2:71.)

Indeed, in a similar case in which landowners in the SMM attacked the LCP, the Court of Appeal ruled: “we are in complete agreement with the trial court's summary of the substantial evidence in the record: ‘[V]ineyards are harmful to the Santa Monica Mountains ecology because they require clearing and scarification, increase erosion and sedimentation, require pesticide use, and constitute an invasive monoculture. Of these harms, many are inherent in the nature of viticulture, and there is no evidence that they could be mitigated. Vineyards increase erosion because the hillsides are planted with grapes where the hillsides are bare during winter months and lack the root stratification of native vegetation.... They create air pollution from dust. Grapevines are an invasive monoculture species that impact all of the surrounding vegetation and harm riparian habitat.... They create water runoff and sedimentation of streams. The only impacts that could be mitigated [are] the use of pesticides, which is already banned under the [local coastal plan], and water usage. Under these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the Commission's decision to ban new vineyards.’ ”  (Mountainlands Conservancy, LLC v. California Coastal Comm'n (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 214, 241–42.)

The LCP and NAP share the same habitat, topography, and environmental issues.  In this case, a USC study does indicate that “the ecology of the area needs help from possible vineyard conversions but cannot protect itself.” (AR1406:18359.)  It also notes that vineyards can result in habitat fragmentation and aesthetic issues.  (AR1406:18361, 18365, 18370.)  Ultimately, the Court cannot conclude that the ban was arbitrary or capricious. 

Relatedly, Petitioners contend that they were essentially deprived of procedural due process because the vineyard ban was initiated without notice and after public comment had closed. However, the record shows that in 2018 Petitioners had already anticipated and considered a ban as Gooden wrote that Respondents “desire[d] to extend this [vineyard] ban to the entire Third Supervisorial District.” (AR7:1136, 1104.)  Further, as discussed, numerous entities had submitted commentary requesting a ban from the Commission.  Prior to officially adopting the ban, Respondents took comments, and Petitioners and their counsel submitted comments asserting many of the same arguments found in the instant Petition. (AR37:4978-4986.)  The Board acknowledged that “written comments were received, all of them were available to the supervisors for their consideration” (AR52:5931; AR48:5527), and the Board orally requested “comments for all agenda items.”  (AR52:5936.)  This seems to be sufficient.

Petitioners next contend Respondents’ actions violate the equal protection clause, but, for the reasons already discussed, the Court cannot find that Respondents’ actions did not meet the rational-basis test.  

Petitioners further argue that the ban violated CEQA because the EIR failed to include the ban in the project description or to evaluate the ban’s environmental impact. 

“ ‘Project’ means the whole of an action, which has a potential for resulting in either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment . . . .”  (14 CCR § 15378.)  

Under CEQA, “the agency will not be required to assess the environmental effects of the entire plan or preexisting land use designations. Instead, the question is the potential impact on the existing environment of changes in the plan which are embodied in the amendment.”  (Black Property Owners Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 974, 985.)

As Respondents put it, “Petitioners admit the previous 2015 vineyard ordinance, which regulated all vineyards in the NAP, ‘effectively serve[d] as a ban’ on vineyards (AR7:1105; AR5:522; AR1406:18391.) Making this ban explicit does not constitute a regulatory change that would lead to environmental impacts.”  Further, non-vineyard crops have been permissible under the NAP for considerable time (LACC §§ 22.16.030.C, 22.20.030.C; AR5:412-414), and banning vineyards does not necessarily require the EIR to assess the impacts of the existing zoning.  Finally, as discussed, there is no project description defect or prejudice as it was apparent that the NAP might further limit or ban vineyards.

In sum, the Petition for Writ of Mandate is denied.  Petitioners’ Requests for Judicial Notice are granted.  The objections are overruled.

2. Motion to Augment 

Respondents seek to augment the record to include 10 exhibits, which were cited in the Opposition.  Alternatively, Respondents seek judicial notice of some of these exhibits.

The Court takes judicial notice of all Exhibits, except Exhibit B.  The Motion is otherwise denied.

Petitioners to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.