Judge: Kevin C. Brazile, Case: 22STCV27621, Date: 2023-04-20 Tentative Ruling

Hearing Date: April 20, 2023

Case Name: Oceguera v. Priority Workforce, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 22STCV19079 

Matter: Motions to Compel Arbitration (2x)

Moving Party: (1) Defendants Priority Workforce, Inc. and Priority Business Services, 

Inc., joined by Crown Poly Inc. and Antonio Flores

(2) Defendant Crown Poly, Inc., joined by Antonio Flores

Responding Party: (1) Plaintiff Laura Oceguera 

(2) Unopposed 

Notice: OK

Ruling: The Motions are granted.

Moving parties to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly 

encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

This is an employment action.  Defendants Priority Workforce, Inc. and Priority Business Services, Inc., joined by Defendants Crown Poly Inc. and Antonio Flores, seek to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff Laura Oceguera as a component of her employment.  Defendant Crown Poly, Inc., joined by Antonio Flores, separately moves to compel arbitration as a third-party beneficiary to the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants Priority Workforce, Inc. and Priority Business Services, Inc.  

With respect to the Motion of Defendants Priority Workforce, Inc. and Priority Business Services, Inc., Plaintiff argues that the subject arbitration agreement is unconscionable and that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (“EFAA”) prohibits arbitration here.

“ ‘[U]nconscionability has both a “procedural” and a “substantive” element,’ the former focusing on ‘ “oppression” ’ or ‘ “surprise” ’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘ “overly harsh” ’ or ‘ “one-sided” ’ results. [Citation.] ‘The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.’ [Citation.] But they need not be present in the same degree.... [T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”  (Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.)

Plaintiff has failed to show any substantive unconscionability, pointing only to the following: “the Agreement does not discuss the available forms of relief in arbitration. What sense is there to arbitrate if the Agreement does not inform the Parties of all available forms of relief? Additionally, the Agreement improperly limits the pool of arbitrators by providing that the arbitration can only be ‘…carried out solely before an arbitrator in Orange County, California.’ [See Mtn, Exh. B at ¶4.] This is especially egregious and inappropriate in this case given the simple fact that the address where Plaintiff worked for her onsite employer is in Los Angeles County, California. [Oceguera Decl., ¶ 2.] Third, the Agreement is completely silent on material terms. Namely, there is no provision regarding who is responsible for the costs of arbitration. In employment disputes, the employer shall cover all costs unique to arbitration leaving Plaintiff only responsible to the initial filing fee. There is no such provision here. Fourth, the Agreement does not include any language regarding recovery of attorney’s fees and costs.”

Plaintiff’s first contention lacks merit because the subject agreement states that “[t]he arbiter shall apply the same substantive law, with the same statute of limitations and the same damages that would have been applied if the claims had been filed in a court of law.”  As to Plaintiff’s second contention, there is no analysis provided as to how an arbitrator from Orange County tends to favor the Defendants.  Plaintiff’s third contention lacks merit because the Court can and will order that Defendants bear all costs unique to arbitration.  (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1085.)  Plaintiff’s final contention lacks merit because, again, the subject agreement requires the arbitrator to apply the same substantive law as that used in Court.  

Because there is no substantive unconscionability, Plaintiff’s unconscionability defense fails.  (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83, 114 [defense of unconscionability requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability].)  

Further, Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated in 2020 (Compl. ¶ 29), and “[t]he EFAA applies only to claims that accrued on or after March 3, 2022, the day President Biden signed the EFAA into law; it does not have retroactive effect.”  (Johnson v. Everyrealm, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2023) 2023 WL 2216173, at *10.)

Because a valid arbitration agreement encompasses Plaintiff’s claims, the Motion to Compel Arbitration of Defendants Priority Workforce, Inc. and Priority Business Services, Inc. is granted. 

The Motion of Defendant Crown Poly, Inc. is granted because no opposition was filed thereto.  (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.54(c); Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

The claims against Defendant Flores should also be arbitrated because Flores is alleged to be an employee of the other Defendants.  (Compl. ¶ 9; Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams (1984) 40 Cal.3d 406, 418.)

The Court expects to set an OSC re: dismissal without prejudice pursuant to a reservation of jurisdiction by the Court to proceed if and as necessary with any appropriate enforcement or other proceedings herein; with respect to the parties subject to the Arbitration Order in this case, all applicable statutes of limitation are tolled from the date of entry of this Order.

The objections are overruled.

Moving parties to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.