Judge: Kevin C. Brazile, Case: 22STCV33271, Date: 2023-04-27 Tentative Ruling
Hearing Date: April 27, 2023
Case Name: Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company v. Plymouth Inglewood
Development LLC, et al.
Case No.: 22STCV12841
Matter: (1) Motion for Reconsideration
(2) Motion for Leave to File Amended Cross-Complaint
Moving Party: Cross-Complainant Plymouth Inglewood Development LLC
Responding Party: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company
and Cross-Defendant Lawyers Title Company
Notice: OK
Ruling: The Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
The Motion for Leave to File Amended Cross-Complaint is denied.
Moving party to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly
encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
On January 17, 2023, Plymouth Inglewood Development LLC (“Plymouth”) filed a Second Amended Cross-Complaint (“SACC”) against Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (“CL”), Lawyers Title Company (“LTC”), Gorgy Engineering, Inc., and N.C. Hansen, Inc. (“Hansen”) for (1) breach of contract/implied covenant, (2) misrepresentation, (3) equitable indemnity, (4) bad faith, (5) fraud, (6) declaratory relief, (7) violation of the UCL, (8) negligence, (9) breach of oral contract, and (10) promissory estoppel. Plymouth alleges it purchased real property, but that Cross-Defendants failed to fully disclose the presence of an easement on the property that has cost Plymouth significantly.
On March 22, 2023, the Court sustained the demurrer of CL and LTC to the entirety of the SACC, without leave to amend. The Court found that “Plymouth erroneously bases tort liability on a preliminary report . . . .”
Reconsideration
Plymouth seeks reconsideration of the Court’s March 22, 2023, demurrer ruling, contending that the Court, sua sponte, raised an issue as to what a reasonable person would do—an issue for the jury.
Plymouth refers to the following portion of the Court’s order: “Respectfully, the SACC shows that Plymouth was issued a preliminary report and that there should not have been any reliance on such a document. A reasonable person would ask why they didn’t receive an abstract of title, rather than insist that a document is something other than what it explicitly purports to be or rely on some representation that Cross-Defendants never use the term ‘abstract’. Plymouth cannot conflate ideas to manufacture liability. As a practical matter, ‘abstracts of title are almost never used in California real estate transactions. Instead, title insurers list all matters that would be excepted from coverage if a policy were issued in a “preliminary title report.” ’ (Preliminary title reports, commitments, binders and abstracts of title: Compared and contrasted, California Insurance Law Handbook § 78:4.) ‘One opinion left the issue open where the substance of the transaction involves an abstract, regardless of the name of the instrument. However, given that the charge for such a preliminary report would be relatively nominal and the fact that the report would likely have been obtained in future anticipation of some future transaction, such an interpretation would appear incorrect and contrary to the legislative intent in limiting liability under the preliminary report . . . .’ (3 Cal. Real Est. § 7:27 (4th ed.).)”
Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a) states, “When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.”
Here, there are no new facts or laws that would justify reconsideration of the Court’s prior order. Plymouth simply insists the Court was wrong. In any case, the Court disagrees with Plymouth’s argument that there are any factual questions remaining. Therefore, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Amendment
Plymouth seeks leave to file an amended cross-complaint adding a claim for promissory estoppel.
However, the Court, in its demurrer ruling, stated any such claim “would fail, in any case, because there was certainly consideration for the transaction at issue. (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 904 [A promissory estoppel claim is ‘aimed solely at allowing recovery in equity where a contractual claim fails for lack of consideration . . . .’ ].)”
Given the demurrer ruling, amendment would be futile. Therefore, the Motion for Leave to File Amended Cross-Complaint is denied.
Moving party to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Case Number: 22STCV33271 Hearing Date: April 27, 2023 Dept: 20
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kevin C. Brazile