Judge: Kevin C. Brazile, Case: 22STCV33746, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV33746    Hearing Date: June 10, 2025    Dept: 20

Tentative Ruling

Judge Kevin C. Brazile

Department 20

Hearing Date:             June 10, 2025

Case Name:                 Hardin v. County of Los Angeles, et al.

Case No.:                    22STCV33746

Matter:                        Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

Moving Party:             Defendant County of Los Angeles

Responding Party:       Plaintiff Brison Hardin

Notice:                        OK

Ruling:                       The Motion for Summary Adjudication is granted as to the fourth

and fifth causes of action, but is otherwise denied.

                                    Moving party to give notice.

The Court encourages all parties to appear remotely via LA CourtConnect.  If submitting on the Court's tentative ruling, please follow the instructions provided above.

On June 21, 2024, Plaintiff Brison Hardin filed the operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) against the County of Los Angeles for (1) FEHA disability discrimination, (2) FEHA retaliation, (3) FEHA failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, (4) FEHA failure to engage in the interactive process, (5) FEHA failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (6) FEHA race discrimination, (7) discrimination in violation of the California Constitution, (8) “discrimination and wrongful discharge in violation of Labor Code § 233(c)”, and (9) FEHA harassment.

Defendant now seeks summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication of all causes of action.

The law of summary judgment provides courts “a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts employ a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)  The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue, in which case the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).)  To show a triable issue of material fact exists, the opposing party may not rely on the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but instead must set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  (Aguilar, at p. 849.)  Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

            The elements of a reasonable accommodation cause of action are (1) the employee suffered a disability, (2) the employee could perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the employee's disability.  (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4^th 359, 373.) 

“The ‘interactive process' required by the FEHA is an informal process with the employee or the employee's representative, to attempt to identify a reasonable accommodation that will enable the employee to perform the job effectively. [Citation.] Ritualized discussions are not necessarily required.”  (Scotch v. Art Inst. of California (2009) 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1013.)

            The Motion is granted as to the fourth and fifth causes of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodations and failure to engage in the interactive process.  The evidence shows that every accommodation requested was provided; specifically, Plaintiff’s physician stated that Plaintiff should be on leave starting July 2021 and was clear to work on September 7, 2021, which was the leave that Plaintiff received.  The argument about pressuring Plaintiff to return to work by requiring him to provide weekly phone calls is not sufficient to raise a triable issue.

            On the other hand, the Motion is denied as to the remaining causes of action.

To analyze claims of discrimination under the FEHA based on a theory of disparate treatment, courts employ a three-step, burden-shifting test.  (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354-355 (“Guz”).)  Because evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, the law permits the inference of discrimination based on facts that create “a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.”  (Id. at p. 354.)  The tiered approach assists the Court in identifying such facts.  The approach proceeds as follows:  Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a presumption of discrimination arises.  The burden then shifts to the employer to dispel the presumption by producing admissible evidence that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.  Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who then has the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reason as pretext for discrimination, or to offer other evidence of discriminatory motive.  (Id. at pp. 355-356.)^[1]

Under the FEHA, a prima facie case of discrimination generally consists of the following elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position he or she sought or was performing competently in the position he or she held, (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) some other circumstance suggesting discriminatory motive.  (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355.)

With respect to motions for summary judgment, “ ‘the employer, as the moving party, has the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing either that one or more elements of plaintiff's prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.’ ”  (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 861.)  “If the employer meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the employee to ‘demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer's stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.’ ”  (Ibid.)

Courts employ the same burden-shifting approach to analyze claims of retaliation under the FEHA.  (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz).)  Thus, the plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case by showing (1) he or she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.  (Ibid.)  Once the employee establishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer, who must present a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.  (Ibid.)  If the employer carries this burden, the court no longer presumes retaliation, and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation.  (Ibid.)

To establish a prima facie case of harassment under the FEHA, the plaintiff must show that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment based on her protected status, and (3) the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.  (Thompson v. City of Monrovia (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 860, 876.)  “ ‘Harassment cannot be occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial; rather the plaintiff must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a generalized nature.’ ”  (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 131.)  In other words, the harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of the victim’s employment and create an abusive environment,” as judged by the reasonable person belonging to the plaintiff’s protected class.  (Thompson, at p. 877.)

            There are triable issues because Plaintiff testifies that Burton made comments like “you don’t know shit” and “that’s if you don’t get fired first,”; Burton, who is black, treated Plaintiff and other black employees with greater strictness, particularly for drills; Nieto provided false feedback and evaluations; Plaintiff received a negative evaluation soon after returning from his first leave; Johnson stated that Plaintiff might get “crap” for requesting leave; and Plaintiff claims that he felt compelled to resign under these circumstances, such that there was a constructive discharge.

            The Court acknowledges that there is a plethora of evidence to the contrary, including positive texts and, of course, Plaintiff’s resignation letter, which stated he was resigning for reasons unrelated to the department.  Factual disputes, however, are reserved for the jury.

            In sum, the Motion for Summary Adjudication is granted as to the fourth and fifth causes of action, but is otherwise denied.  The objections are overruled.

Moving party to give notice.