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Tentative Ruling

Judge Kevin C. Brazile

Hearing Date:                         Tuesday, May 28, 2024

Case Name:                             Carlos Davis v. Home 2 U 9, LLC

Case No.:                                21STCV45625

Motion:                                  Motion Compelling Disclosure

Moving Party:                         Defendant Home 2 U 9, LLC

Responding Party:                  Non-Party South Central Los Angeles Regional Center

Notice:                                    OK

Ruling:                                    The Motion Compelling Disclosure is GRANTED.

Defendant Home U 2 9, LLC to give notice.

BACKGROUND

Complaint

This is a case for negligence brought by Plaintiffs Carlos Davis, and his twelve-year old daughter, H.D Doe (“Plaintiffs”), a minor by and through her guardian ad litem and father, Carlos Davis.  Plaintiffs filed the original complaint against Defendant Home 2 U 9, LLC (“Home” or “Defendant”) on December 15, 2021 and then subsequently amended it.

 Defendant Home is an adult residential care facility located next door to Plaintiffs’ home.  In September 2021, Steve Golden (“Golden”) came to live at Defendant’s Home. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant knew or should have known that Golden had a criminal history, which included violent and abusive acts against children.  Specifically, Golden had been released from jail six months prior after being found mentally incompetent to stand trial for breaking into a neighbor’s home and sexually molesting their young children.

Plaintiffs allege that at approximately 5:00 AM on September 7, 2021, Golden left Defendant’s Home while unsupervised by nighttime personnel because the personnel who were supposed to be watching him was asleep.  Golden then broke into Plaintiff’s home and sexually assaulted Plaintiff H.D. Doe.  Plaintiff Davis awoke to his daughter screaming and entered his daughter’s bedroom, at which time, Plaintiff Davis began struggling to remove Golden from his home.  In the interim, Golden managed to obtain a knife from Plaintiffs’ kitchen and attempted to stab Plaintiff Davis.  Golden was subsequently arrested and is now in jail, awaiting trial for nine criminal charges connected to that evening, including burglary, lewd and lascivious acts with a minor under the age of 14, oral copulation of a minor, and assault with a deadly weapon.

After the incident, the owner of HOME 2 U 9, LaQuisha Anderson (“Anderson”) stated that (1) she was aware of Golden’s propensity for sexually assaulting children; (2) had warned him in the past to stay away from children; and (3) that Golden was supposed to have one-to-one care at Defendant’s Home, which he had not been receiving.

Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on March 8, 2024 which is now the operative complaint. The FAC alleges a single cause of action for negligence against Defendant Home on the basis that a special relationship was established between Defendant and Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs were readily identifiable victims of a foreseeable injury if Golden gained access to Plaintiffs.  As such, Defendant had a duty to warn Plaintiffs of Golden’s history.  Moreover, Plaintiffs detrimentally relied upon Defendant’s representations that Golden would be supervised to the extent necessary to maintain Plaintiffs’ safety. Lastly, Defendant knew H.D. Doe was at extreme risk because Golden had expressed a particular fascination with her in the months leading up to the incident, made statements regarding her, and taken action consistent with stalking her.

Procedural Background

On September 22, 2022, the Court granted the Parties’ Stipulation to a Protective Order, protecting documents, testimony, and information marked “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential” under the provisions of the Protective Order.

On April 5, 2024, Defendant Home filed the instant Motion to Compel Disclosure of South Central Los Angeles Regional Center’s (“SLACRC”)  file on Golden.  The Hearing for the instant motion was originally scheduled for June 11, 2024, as well as a trial scheduled for September 23, 2024.  SLARC is a non-party to the suit and made the decision to place Golden with Defendant Home.

On April 30, 2024, Defendant Home filed an Ex Parte application to shorten the time for the Hearing on the instant motion to May 14, 2024, or soon thereafter as the Court is available.

On May 1, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s Ex Parte application and the Hearing was advanced to May 24, 2024.

            Also on May 1, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Joinder to Defendant’s Order Compelling Disclosure of SLARC’s file for Golden.  Non-Party SLARC filed their Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel on the same day.

            On May 15, 2024, the Court issued a notice, informing the parties that the Hearing on the instant Motion to Compel was being continued from May 24, 2024, to May 28, 2024.

            On May 17, 2024, Defendant filed their Reply.

Moving

Defendant contends that it previously contacted SLARC to discuss Golden’s placement with Defendant and SLARC responded by saying that pursuant to the Lanterman Act, they were prohibited from discussion the matter, “even if you send a subpoena.”  (Motion to Compel “Mot. Compel”, pg. 3, Declaration of Defendant’s attorney of record, Rachel M. Spoasto (“Sposato Decl.”, ¶ 3, Ex. B.)  However, on September 22, 2022, Plaintiffs issued a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to SLARC (“SLARC Subpoena”), requesting Golden’s files which SLARC produced to Plaintiffs. (Mot. Compel, pg. 3.)  After Defendant learned about this disclosure, SLARC sent an email on November 8, 2022, informing the parties that (1) Golden’s records were inadvertently produced, and (2) that “SLARC will produce the subpoenaed records in earnest upon presentation of a valid waiver or to the Court pursuant to section 4515, subdivision (f) . . .” (Sposato Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B, Mot. Compel, pg. 3.) 

Defendant now seeks an Order from the Court compelling SLARC to disclose the inadvertently produced documents that Plaintiff received pursuant to CA Welfare and Institutions Code § 4514(f) (“§ 4514) in the interests of justice.

Defendant argues good cause exists to compel the disclosure and states that when Courts are faced with a request to compel disclosure of confidential information, Courts are asked to balance competing interests of preserving the confidentiality with the interest of justice. See, Rider v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal. App. 3d 278, 282, citing in part, Evid. Code § 1040(b)(2). Under § 4514, one circumstance serving as an exception to the section’s confidentiality provision is “[t]o the court as necessary to the administrative of justice.”  (§ Wel. Inst. Code. § 4514(f).)  Given Plaintiffs are alleging that Defendants knew or should have known of Golden’s propensity for sexual misconduct, it has been alleged during discovery that SLARC potentially had information about Golden that it used to determine where to place him and the level of care he required.  (Mot. Compel, pg.5.)  Furthermore, such documents can reveal what information and records regarding Golden that SLARC did or not share with Defendant.  (Id.)  Given Plaintiff already received a copy, Defendant will be unfairly disadvantaged, and Plaintiff’s prior knowledge will debilitate Defendant’s right to a fair trial. Thus, Defendant’s need for disclosure outweighs privacy rights.  Finally, Defendant would agree to mark all documents as “CONFIDENTIAL” or “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL” under the Protective Order already in place.

Opposition

SLARC argues that although Welfare and Institutions Code § 4514 provides twenty-seven (27) exceptions to the legislative mandate requiring confidentiality (including the exception to disclose when it is in the administration of justice) the policy in favor of protecting a client’s confidentiality must be weighed heavily.  (SLARC’s Opposition (“Opp.”), pgs. 3-4.) SLARC asserts that if the policy in favor of protecting a client’s confidentiality is not weighed heavily, the broad legislative provision for confidentiality would be nullified.  (See County of Riverside, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p.481; Opp., pg. 4.)   Furthermore, while the language of the California Constitution does not prohibit all incursions into individual privacy, such interventions generally must be justified by a compelling interest.  (Cal. Const. Art. 1 § 1; Opp., pg. 5.)  Thus, SLARC requests that if the Court determines that the disclosure is necessary to the administration of justice, the Court should make clear orders expressly allowing SLARC to produce the requested records.  (Opp., pg. 5.)

Reply

Defendant reiterates that while SLARC is correct that such confidential disclosures must generally be supported by a compelling interest, in this case, there are two compelling interests.  (Reply, pg. 2.)  First, the documents are relevant and discoverable because they concern outstanding issues such as the SLARC’s assessment of Golden, communications concerning Golden, and any modifications or changes in his care.  (Id.)   Second, Defendant will be prejudiced, and injustice will endure if the case continues forward with Plaintiffs having unilateral access to such documents while Defendant does not. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

Applicable Law

            “[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)

“However, in California, an individual's privacy is specifically recognized as an ‘inalienable’ constitutional right. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) This right to privacy applies to sexual relations outside of marriage (Fults v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 899, 903–904, 152 Cal.Rptr. 210; Morales v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 283, 292, 160 Cal.Rptr. 194) and applies to minors as well as adults.  (Rider v. Superior Ct., 199 Cal. App. 3d 278, 282, 244 Cal. Rptr. 770, 772 (Ct. App. 1988).)  Moreover, pursuant to Evidence Code § 1040, subd. (b)(2), conditional privilege is afforded to governmental agencies to refuse to disclose information acquired in confidence if disclosure would be ‘against the public interest.’” (Evid. Code, § 1040, subd. (b)(2).  (Rider v. Superior Ct., 199 Cal. App. 3d 278, 282, 244 Cal. Rptr. 770, 772 (Ct. App. 1988).)

“The right to privacy, however, is not absolute. (Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 842, 239 Cal.Rptr. 292, 740 P.2d 404.) On occasion, one person's right to privacy may conflict with another's right to a fair trial. When this happens “courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.” (Id. at p. 842, 239 Cal.Rptr. 292, 740 P.2d 404.) (Rider v. Superior Ct., 770, 772.)   Previous cases have required courts to balance a civil litigant's need for discovery against an individual's right to keep sexual conduct private. These cases agree, in principle, that the litigant’s need for discovery prevails over the competing interest in sexual privacy.  For example, in Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, the court acknowledged the defendant in a suit for sexual harassment could, on a showing of good cause, inquire into the plaintiff's past sexual conduct.” (43 Cal.3d at pp. 843–844, 239 Cal.Rptr. 292, 740 P.2d 404.  (Rider v. Superior Ct., 770, 772–73.)

Application to Facts

            Here, Defendant is arguing that because Plaintiff received SLARC’s inadvertent disclosure of Golden’s personnel records, Defendant would be prejudiced in trial if the Court does not compel the disclosure of such documents to Defendant.  However, Defendant’s argument does not acknowledge that Plaintiff was instructed to delete and/or destroy any such documents in its possession and thus, would not be permitted to rely on any such inadmissible evidence during trial.  On the other hand, the Court does note that Plaintiff was in possession of the foregoing documents for a significant period of time.  Plaintiff informed Defendant on October 22, 2022 that SLARC had produced the records pursuant to subpoena and it was not until November 8, 2022 that SLARC emailed the parties to declare the documents had been produced inadvertently and request Plaintiffs immediately destroy the documents.  This window of time was sufficient for Plaintiffs to review the records and benefit from the facts therein in a manner that would prejudice Defendant if Defendant does not obtain them. 

            Moreover, like Vinson, the need for discovery in this case outweighs the privacy interest of keeping an individual’s sexual conduct confidential.  The Court finds there is good cause to compel the records because they may reveal facts that pertain to Defendant’s prior knowledge of Goldens’ propensity for sexual misconduct. The records may also reveal facts that inform the legal arguments of both parties regarding foreseeability.  Thus, the Court finds it is in the administration of justice to compel the disclosure of the foregoing records, especially in light of the sexual nature of the misconduct and prior disclosure to Plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

            The Motion Compelling Disclosure is GRANTED.

Defendant Home 2 U 9, LLC to give notice.