Judge: Kevin C. Brazile, Case: 23STCV17401, Date: 2023-11-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV17401 Hearing Date: March 13, 2024 Dept: 20
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kevin C. Brazile
Department 20
Hearing Date: Wednesday, March 13,
2024
Case Name: Kathleen Margaret
Sullivan v. Los Angeles Community College District,
et al.
Case No.: 23STCV17401
Motion: (1) Motion to
Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena served on Liliana Hernandez and
Request for Monetary Sanctions in the amount of $875
(2)
Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena served on Burton A.
Liebross, MD and Request for Monetary Sanctions in the amount of $3,325
Moving Party: (1) and (2) Defendants
Los Angeles Community College District, Suleman Ishaque, Earic Dixon-Peters and
Genice Sarcedo-Magruder
Responding Party: (1) and (2) Plaintiff Kathleen
Margaret Sullivan
Notice: OK
Ruling: Defendants’
Motions to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoenas on Burton A. Liebross,
MD and Liliana Hernandez, LMFT are granted.
Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are ordered to pay sanctions in the
amount of $1750.
Moving
party to give notice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant
Los Angeles Community College District at Pierce College as a full time
counselor in its Disabled Student Program and Services. Plaintiff alleges she suffered harassment and
discrimination based on her age and gender.
Plaintiff also alleges she suffered retaliation and a hostile work
environment based on her age, gender and her open support for several
colleagues who she believed were unfairly treated and discrimination
against. Plaintiff alleges Defendant
failed to properly investigate her complaints about the workplace. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Suleman Isaque,
Earic Dixon-Peters and Genice Sarcedo Magruder were the individuals who perpetrated
the discrimination, harassment and retaliation.
The operative complaint is the First
Amended Complaint filed on January 2, 2024.
The FAC alleges (1) discrimination in violation of the FEHA; (2) hostile
work environment harassment in violation of FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation
of FEHA; (4) failure to accommodate disability in violation of FEHA; (5) failure
to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA; (6) discrimination
and retaliation for requesting/requiring an accommodation; (7) failing to take
all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, harassment and retaliation in
violation of FEHA.
DISCUSSION
Applicable
Law
When a subpoena has been issued
requiring the attendance of a witness or the production of documents,
electronically stored information, or other things before a court or at the
taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion “reasonably made” by the party,
the witness, or any consumer whose personal records are sought, or upon the
court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard,
may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing
compliance with it upon those terms and conditions as the court may
specify. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1; Southern
Pac. Co. v. Superior Court (1940) 15 Cal.2d 206.)
The court can make an order quashing
or modifying a subpoena as necessary to protect a person from “unreasonable or
oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy
of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
1987.1, subd. (a).)
“Prior to the date called for in the
subpoena duces tecum for the production of personal records, the subpoenaing
party shall serve or cause to be served on the consumer whose records are being
sought a copy of the subpoena duces tecum, of the affidavit supporting the
issuance of the subpoena, if any, and of the notice described in subdivision
(e), and proof of service as indicated in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c).” (CCP §1985.3(b).)
“The party requesting a consumer's
personal records may bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to enforce the
subpoena within 20 days of service of the written objection. The motion shall
be accompanied by a declaration showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at
informal resolution of the dispute between the party requesting the personal
records and the consumer or the consumer's attorney.” (CCP §1985.3(g).)
For discovery purposes, information
is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case,
preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Generally, all
unprivileged information that is relevant to the subject matter of the action
is discoverable if it would itself be admissible evidence at trial or if it
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010; Schnabel
v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 711.)
Application
to Facts
Parties’ Positions
On January 2, 2024, Defendants
served Plaintiff with Notices to Consumer informing her that Defendants
intended to serve Plaintiff’s health care providers, Burton A. Liebross, MD and
Liliana Hernandez, LMFT, with deposition subpoenas. On January 9, 2024, Plaintiff served
objections in response to the Notice, arguing the document requests in the
deposition subpoenas violated her privacy rights, were overbroad, unduly
burdensome, sought manifestly irrelevant documents and were harassing.
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s
objections are meritless. Defendants argue Plaintiff has placed her emotional
and physical health at issue by claiming emotional and physical injuries. Defendants argue Plaintiff therefore waived
any objections based on privacy.
Defendants argue the document requests are not vague and ambiguous. Defendants argue the requests are simple and
direct, seeking each witness to produce his or her file on services provided to
Plaintiff and invoices documenting those services. Defendants argue the discovery requests are
not burdensome or overbroad, as they mirror language Plaintiff has used in her
discovery requests and would require production by a third party. Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to
identify any possible overbreadth in the scope of the document requests.
Defendants ask that monetary
sanctions be imposed against Plaintiff in connection with each motion to compel
compliance. Defendants ask that
sanctions in the amount of $875 be imposed against Plaintiff and her attorney
of record for the motion to compel compliance with the deposition subpoena on
Liliana Hernandez, LMFT. Defendants ask
that sanctions in the amount of $3,325 be imposed on Plaintiff and her attorney
in connection with the motion to compel compliance with the deposition subpoena
on Burton A. Liebross, MD.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues
Defendants filed to meet and confer in good faith prior to filing this
motion. Plaintiff argues Defendants were
required to meet and confer per CCP
§1985.3(g).
Plaintiff argues the requests are
overly broad. Plaintiff argues there is
no time limit on the document requests, nor is there any limitation based on
subject matter. Plaintiff argues the
only discoverable records are those directly relevant to the action. Plaintiff argues she has not waived her
privacy rights as to medical records that are not directly relevant to her
claims. Plaintiff argues the only
medical condition at issue in this action is her stress-related medical
leave.
Plaintiff asks that the court impose
monetary sanctions on Defendants for having to oppose these meritless motions
to compel compliance. Plaintiff asks for
sanctions in the amount of $1,050 per motion.
In reply, Defendants argue they
extensively met and conferred prior to filing these motions to compel
compliance. Defendants argue they met
and conferred but were at an impasse when Plaintiff could not present any law
or fact in support of her position that the requests had to be limited or
withdrawn.
Defendants argue the requested
records are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. The third parties subpoenaed are medical
providers identified by Plaintiff in her discovery responses as having treated
her for her alleged “stress related” injuries.
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s alleged injury is also vaguely described. Defendants argue, if the net cast by its
discovery is wide, it is in large part because Plaintiff has defined her
injuries so widely and vaguely.
Defendants argue Plaintiff also
claimed she began to suffer abuse in the workplace in 2017 and that she began
seeing Liebross and Hernandez for injuries in 2018 and 2022 respectively. Defendants argue the records request is
proper based on this time frame.
Defendants argue the requests are
also simple and direct. Defendants argue
Plaintiff’s objection that they are not reasonably particularized is
untenable.
Defendants argue Plaintiff and her
counsel should be sanctioned for asserting baseless objections and forcing
Defendants to file these motions to compel compliance. Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claim that
Defendants did not meet and confer in good faith is demonstrably false.
Defendants sufficiently met and
conferred
Defendants complied with CCP
§1985.3(b)’s Notice to Consumer Requirement as to both deposition subpoenas by
serving Notices on Plaintiff on January 2, 2024. (Picker Decs., Ex. D.) Plaintiff timely responded with objections on
January 9, 2024. (Id. at Ex.
E.)
Thereafter, Defendants sufficiently
met and conferred on the deposition subpoenas on January 16, 2024 and January
22, 2024. (Id.) Parties were unable to reach an
agreement.
Plaintiff’s objections are overruled
Privacy rights. Medical records clearly fall within the right
of privacy. (John B. v. Sup. Ct.
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1198.) Personal
financial information comes within the zone of privacy protected by article I,
section 1 of the California Constitution.
(Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652,
656.)
The right of privacy is not absolute
and may be waived. “In determining
whether one has waived the right of privacy by bringing suit, our Supreme Court
has noted that although there may be an implicit partial waiver, the scope of
such waiver must be narrowly, rather than expansively construed, so that
plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from instituting lawsuits by fear of
exposure of private activities. An
implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery
directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution
of the lawsuit.” (Davis v. Superior
Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014 (citing Vinson v. Supr. Ct.
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842 (quoting Britt v. Supr. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d
844, 859).)
In addition, even where a right of
privacy is shown, discovery may still be compelled under the test set forth in Hill
v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35. “In Hill, we established a framework
for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy
right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened
intrusion that is serious. The party
seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important
countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection
may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective
measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance
these competing considerations.” (Williams
v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 (citing Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35).)
“In general, the court should not
proceed to balancing unless a satisfactory threshold showing is made. A
defendant is entitled to prevail if it negates any of the three required
elements. A defendant can also prevail at the balancing stage. An otherwise
actionable invasion of privacy may be legally justified if it substantively
furthers one or more legitimate competing interests. (Hill, at p. 40, 26
Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.) Conversely, the invasion may be unjustified if
the claimant can point to “feasible and effective alternatives” with “a lesser
impact on privacy interests.” (County
of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56
Cal.4th 905, 926.)
Plaintiff identified both Liebross
and Hernandez in her discovery responses as providers who treated her for her
alleged injuries. Plaintiff is seeking
emotional distress damages and claims physical injuries as a result of
Defendants’ wrongful conduct. Plaintiff’s
claimed injuries are also ill defined.
Plaintiff claims she was placed on work related stress leave. Defendants request need not be limited to
files pertaining only to Plaintiff’s work-related stress leave or
injuries. Defendants are entitled to
conduct discovery into other possible causes of Plaintiff’s alleged emotional
distress.
The failure to limit the records to
a specific time period is not fatal to the requests. Plaintiff claims the abuse began at work in
2017. Plaintiff began to seek Liebross
in 2018 and Hernandez in 2020 for her work related injuries. There is therefore no need to limit the
requested documents to a certain time period.
The entire period during which Liebross (2018-present) and Hernandez
(2020-present) treated Plaintiff is relevant.
Plaintiff waived her right to
privacy over her mental, physical and emotional health records during the
relevant time period. To the extent
Plaintiff believes these records will reach irrelevant information about
unrelated health conditions, Plaintiff fails to substantiate this concern. The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claimed
injuries require that a broad net be cast.
Vague, ambiguous, failure to
identify information with particularity, oppressive, harassing,
overbreadth. Plaintiff’s remaining
objections are likewise meritless. The
documents requests are very straightforward and identify the responsive
documents with particularity. There are
only four document requests contained in each deposition subpoena and they
clearly identify the categories of documents requested with particularity. For these same reasons, the requests are not overbroad,
unduly burdensome, harassing or oppressive.
Sanctions
“Except as specified in subdivision
(c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of
Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion,
including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or
opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more
of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (CCP §1987.2(a).)
The court finds the motions were
opposed without substantial justification.
Defendants’ request for sanctions is granted in the total amount of $1,750
for both motions to compel compliance is granted as to Plaintiff and her
counsel.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motions to Compel
Compliance with Deposition Subpoenas on Burton A. Liebross, MD and Liliana
Hernandez, LMFT are granted. Plaintiff
and Plaintiff’s counsel are ordered to pay sanctions in the amount of $1,750.
Moving party to give notice.